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ABSTRACT  
   
Inmate misconduct, and the formal disciplinary proceeding that follow official 
misconduct, is a common occurrence within correctional institutions. Decisions regarding 
punishment sanction post-disciplinary proceeding are important because they have direct 
implications for inmate freedom of movement within the institutional setting, yet this 
decision point has rarely been the subject of empirical research. Research that does look 
at this decision point commonly focuses on the presence or absence of a single category 
of disciplinary punishment – that being solitary confinement or disciplinary segregation. 
As such, prior research fails to observe the full range of post-disciplinary punishment 
options.  
Addressing this gap in the literature, this study provides the first rigorous 
empirical examination of the inmate-level characteristics that influence punishment 
outcome following guilty institutional misconduct proceedings. Guided by criminal 
sentencing literature, the inmate- level characteristics are divided into groups of legal 
factors, quasi-legal factors, and extra-legal factors. Representing a significant 
advancement beyond prior research, this study operationalizes punishment outcome in 
two ways – as an interval-level ordered sanction severity scale and as individual 
punishment categories. A series of multivariate models with sample selection corrections 
are estimated to model the direct and interactive effects of the legal, quasi-legal, and 
extra-legal inmate characteristics on punishment outcome. 
Results of the fully-saturated direct effects models reveal a consistent pattern 
across both operationalizations of the punishment outcome. The legal factor of 
misconduct offense and the prosocial behavior quasi-legal factors of working a prison job 
  ii 
and program involvement are significantly related to punishment outcomes. The quasi-
legal factor representing criminogenic risk and the extra-legal factors of inmate gender 
and race/ethnicity are not significantly related to punishment outcomes. When the direct 
effects models re-estimated on samples split by inmate gender and race/ethnicity, 
however, the extra-legal factors of gender and race/ethnicity condition the effects of some 
of the legal and quasi-legal factors on punishment outcome. Results of this study suggest 
that, holding constant the effect of legal misconduct-related factors, disparities exist in 
post-disciplinary sanctioning based on inmate race/ethnicity and gender.    
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Statement of the Problem 
There are multiple decision points within the criminal justice system in which a 
form of sentencing (or sanctioning) occurs.1 For members of the general public, those 
who work within the criminal justice system, and those who study or otherwise observe 
the elements of the justice system, discussions on the topic of sanctioning, especially 
“sentencing”, tend to immediately and understandably bring to mind a process and 
outcome that occurs within the criminal court system. However, the court system is not 
the only context within which sanction-related decisions are made (e.g., Blumberg, 
1979).  
Looking to a few examples within the context of community corrections, 
sanctioning decisions are made when someone is denied pre-trial release, is assigned to 
higher levels of supervision and incapacitation, and is revoked from supervision to 
incarceration due to criminal acts or technical violation (Morris & Tonry, 1990). Further 
sanctioning decisions are made when probationers violate their terms of community 
supervision, whether it be probation or parole (Petersillia, 1985). Within institutional 
corrections we see similar points of sanctioning decisions. For instance, sanction-related 
decisions are made by correctional officials at the time of entry to prison (security of 
                                                 
1 For purposes of the current research, “sentencing” refers to a discretionary decision made on the part of 
individual criminal justice actors (or groups of criminal justice actors) regarding a punishment or 
disciplinary outcome following a determination or finding of guilt for commission of some type of offense 
or infraction. The criminal court system involves a bifurcated process with two separate decisions – one 
regarding guilt or innocence, and a second regarding choice of punishment outcome. The current research 
focuses on the second of these two decisions that make up the larger sentencing process, and draw parallels 
between the influences on choice of punishment outcome (which by definition follows a finding of guilt) in 
various contexts within the criminal justice system. 
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prison) and exit to parole via early release to community supervision (Caplan, 2007; 
Petersillia, 2003; Travis & Lawrence, 2002). The decision to release from custodial 
confinement to parole represents a point in which criminal justice actors make a 
discretionary decision that has direct implications on freedom of movement within an 
indeterminate punishment structure. “Back-end sentencing” is a term commonly used 
within the community corrections literature to discuss punishment decisions following 
violations of the terms of probation or parole supervision (Blumstein & Beck, 2005; 
Travis, 2007). Both the parole release and revocation decision points have been subject to 
a fair amount of empirical scrutiny to inform our understanding of the factors that 
influence these decisions. Similar sanctioning decisions are also made within the realm of 
institutional corrections, prior to release, when considering the formal disciplinary 
process designed to respond to inmate misconduct (Flanagan, 1982). This is the decision 
point under study in the current research.  
The inmate disciplinary process is a routine occurrence within prisons, but unlike 
the visible process and outcomes of sentencing practices in criminal courts, it is largely 
shielded from observation by the closed nature of correctional institutions. Given that the 
inmate disciplinary review process is essentially unobservable to those outside of the 
institutional setting, the extent of disparate sanctioning decisions is unknown. Prior 
research on discretionary decision making at various stages of the criminal justice process 
suggests that differential processing may occur based on a variety of factors (Gottfredson 
& Gottfredson, 1988), some of which can be considered to be legally-relevant factors 
while others are in fact extra-legal factors. Commonly, extra-legal factors are personal, 
socio-demographic factors (such as age, race/ethnicity, and gender). A similar body of 
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research has also found that differential processing may be more likely to occur at those 
decision points within the criminal justice system that are less “visible” (Gottfredson & 
Gottfredson, 1988) – such as the inmate disciplinary process. The paucity of research to 
date on the inmate disciplinary process provides some support for a thesis of differential 
disciplinary punishment outcomes based on both legal and extra-legal factors (Butler & 
Steiner, 2016; McClellan, 1994; Olson, 2016a; Poole & Regoli, 1980); yet a thorough 
review of the literature suggests that the extent to which legal and extra-legal factors 
create differential for inmate misconduct remains largely unknown. 
There are several reasons why this oversight in the research literature is 
problematic. First, disciplinary sanctions can affect inmates’ custody levels, cell 
assignment, conditions of confinement, their treatment and other programming 
opportunities and consideration for work assignments, and, ultimately, their date of 
release through accumulation of “good time” and other early release programs (Butler & 
Steiner, 2016; Ciszak, 1996; Flanagan, 1982; Poole & Regoli, 1980; Steiner & Cain, 
2017). The formal disciplinary process and consequent sanctions or punishment outcome 
are a form of direct social control within the institutional setting. Disparate sanctioning 
outcomes would indicate that formal social control within the institution is not dispensed 
in a consistent manner across inmates based on non-legal factors (such as disparate 
punishment outcomes across racial/ethnic differences among inmates; Thomas, Mika, 
Blakemore, & Aylward, 1991). Therefore, due to the discretionary nature of this decision 
point, coupled with the observation that there is little to no oversight external to the 
institutional setting, it is possible that disparate sanctioning outcomes based on extra-
legal factors would result in a situation where some offender groups may be 
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systematically treated more harshly within prisons than others (Hewitt, Poole, & Regoli, 
1984).  
Second, it is possible, perhaps likely, that inmates’ experiences with the 
disciplinary process and the consequent sanction decision following a guilty finding will 
directly impact their subsequent behavior while incarcerated. Whether or not the sanction 
achieves a deterrent effect, differential sanctioning and punishment outcomes across 
inmates could generate negative prison-related attitudes among the inmate population. 
For example, experiences during the disciplinary process and perceptions regarding the 
punishment outcome can impact perceptions of distributive and procedural justice, and of 
the legitimacy of the larger institutional setting. The result is a set of negative attitudes 
about individual correctional officers, as well as the institutional management and prison 
environment itself (Liebling, 2004; Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay, 1996; Useem & Kimball, 
1989).  
These attitudes, particularly those regarding procedural justice, have the potential 
to impact inmate behavior in either a negative or positive (compliant) manner while 
incarcerated (Beijersbergen, Dirkzwager, Eichelsheim, Van der Laam, & Nieubeerta, 
2015; Jackson, Tyler, Bradford, Taylor, & Shiner, 2010; Sparks & Bottoms, 1995) and 
upon release (Beijersbergen, Dirkzwager, & Nieuwbeerta, 2015). Similarly, the 
application of Sherman’s defiance theory to the inmate disciplinary process suggests that 
if inmates are punished in a manner they define as disrespectful due to unfair sanction 
outcome, they can use this as provocation to act in further defiance of institutional rules 
governing inmate behavior (Sherman, 1993; Bouffard & Piquero, 2010).  
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This study addresses this gap in the literature by examining the influence that 
various inmate characteristics have on the sanctioning or disciplinary punishment 
outcome following inmate misconduct proceedings. Incorporating key factors identified 
in the sanctioning process in the criminal courts to inform the research design, inmate 
level-characteristics will be operationalized into groups of legally-relevant (legal), quasi-
legal, and extra-legal factors. By way of methodological contributions to the literature, 
this study will be the first to test the influences on sentencing within prisons with an 
outcome variable operationalized in terms of the full continuum of severity of possible 
punishment options. Additionally, the methodology of the proposed research will expand 
the current body of literature by examining these relationships with a national sample of 
male and female inmates housed in a large number of state and Federal prisons across the 
United States. This will allow for the inclusion of variables related to institutional 
environment at the second level of analysis as a method by which we can statistically 
account for the impact that institution-level factors could exert on the choice of 
disciplinary outcome. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, this project will answer 
two research questions: 
Research Question 1: What is the nature of the relationship between various 
inmate characteristics – categorized into groups of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal 
factors – and punishment outcome? 
Research Question 2: Beyond the significant direct effects, do the extra-legal 
factors condition the effect of the legal and quasi-legal factors on punishment outcome? 
Each of the above research questions has multiple hypotheses embedded within 
the larger question, as will be specified in Chapter 2. Before moving on to a discussion of 
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the research questions and hypotheses in Chapter 2 and methodology and analytic 
strategy in Chapter 3, the remainder of this chapter will provide an overview of the 
background information upon which the research design is built. This review of the 
literature and state of the research will cover two main areas. First, the literature review 
will discuss what is known regarding factors that influence sanctioning decisions in the 
criminal court system. This body of literature informs the current hypotheses regarding 
the manner within which it is expected that the inmate level factors will influence the 
choice of disciplinary punishment outcome. Continuing on, it will then provide a 
summary of the literature to date on the inmate disciplinary process, focusing on the 
small body of classic and more contemporary research literature that looks at influences 
on the punishment outcome following formal institutional misconduct proceedings. The 
final section of this chapter will illustrate how this research and the research hypotheses 
are consistent within the theoretical framework of the focal concerns perspective. 
 
Influences on Sanctioning Decisions in the Court System 
The formal inmate disciplinary process is a routine occurrence within the daily 
life of prison management and operations, which helps to establish and maintain a stable 
institutional setting (Poole & Regoli, 1980). By nature, correctional institutions are 
closed, total institutions (Goffman, 1961), characterized by impermeable “walls” built up 
around their exterior. These walls serve not only to contain the resident inmates, but also 
to shield the routine practices and activities within the prison from public view. As such, 
access to and observation of daily life within correctional institutions is highly restricted 
and fully controlled by institutional- and system-level administrators. Contrary to the 
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openness and visibility of the sentencing process in the criminal and civil court system, 
the inmate disciplinary process is conducted completely internal to the institution, 
rendering both the process and the outcome all but unobservable to the public (Petersen 
& Friday, 1975).  
It is possible, however, to draw parallels between the sanctioning or punishment 
outcome following the inmate disciplinary process and the sentencing outcome following 
a criminal conviction (Butler & Steiner, 2016; Steiner & Cain, 2017). For instance, both 
of these punishment outcomes are the result of a bifurcated process, whereby first a 
determination of guilt or innocence is made. After guilt is determined within both 
contexts (institutional misconduct and criminal offense), a second process occurs that 
concludes with a punishment decision made by criminal justice actors. Although 
determinate sentencing and sentencing guidelines do, at times, curb or essentially 
eliminate judicial discretion in criminal sentencing (e.g., Stolzenberg & D’Allessio, 1994; 
Tonry, 1997), it is accurate to say that the sanction decision within both prisons and 
courts is highly discretionary in that, in both cases, official decision makers (institutional 
disciplinary personnel in prisons and judges within the criminal courts) select a 
punishment outcome(s) from a range of possible sanction alternatives (Butler & Steiner, 
2016; Flanagan, 1982). Just as criminal sanctions following conviction for a criminal 
offense range in severity from fines to levels of supervision within the community, and to 
degrees of incarceration, disciplinary personnel within prisons also have a variety of 
increasingly severe sanctions to choose among in response to specific instances of inmate 
misconduct (e.g., Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 1972). Due to the lack of rigorous 
empirical research into formal disciplinary sanctioning within prisons, coupled with the 
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acknowledgment of similarities between the disciplinary process/sanction outcome and 
sentencing within the criminal courts (Flanagan, 1982), this research relies on the 
established body of sentencing literature to inform the hypotheses regarding how 
individual (inmate) level factors impact the sanction or punishment outcome.  
Individual Level Influences on Sanction Outcome within Sentencing 
A review of the literature suggests that there has been a considerable amount of 
research conducted in an attempt to understand the degree to which characteristics of the 
individual, specifics of the crime event, and even elements of the court setting itself 
influence individual punishment decisions in the criminal courts (e.g., Albonetti, 1991; 
Bales & Piquero, 2012; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 
1998). Research that examines the variation in and influences on individual-level 
sentencing outcomes has a history dating back multiple decades, providing a rich body of 
empirical literature focused on the influences on judicial discretion and decision-making 
regarding individual sentencing/sanctioning outcomes. This body of research has 
included both qualitative and quantitative research designs, and has taken many different 
forms. For example, some research has presented judges with hypothetical cases and then 
asked how and what punishment decision/s they would make (e.g., Cook, 1973; Forst & 
Wellford, 1980; Spohn & Horney, 1991). Another approach used within this area of 
research has been to collect data on actual cases and use statistical techniques to 
determine the relative influence that specific characteristics of interest have on choice of 
sentencing outcome (e.g., Albonetti, 1997; Spohn, Gruhl, & Welch, 1981; Steffensmeier, 
Kramer, & Ulmer, 1995; Ulmer, 1997).  
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This extensive body of research on judicial discretion regarding punishment 
decisions in the sentencing process has concluded that there are multiple factors beyond 
offense severity affect sentencing severity (e.g., Baumer, 2013; Nagel & Weitzman, 
1971; Pope, 1975; Spohn, 2009, 2015). These other factors found to influence sentence 
severity include offender background characteristics, case-processing factors (e.g., plea 
bargain versus trial-based disposition, pre-trial detention, private or public attorney), and 
factors related to the courtroom and/or community context (Spohn, 2009).  
Case specific characteristics of the criminal offense and the offender have been 
found to influence choice of sentencing outcome. These characteristics commonly are 
grouped in terms of the extent to which they are “legally relevant” to the current 
sentencing decision (e.g., Feldmeyer, Warren, Siennick, & Neptune, 2015; Hagan, 1974; 
Johnson, 2006; Kutateladze, Andiloro, Johnson, & Spohn, 2014; Wang & Mears, 2010; 
Warren, Chiricos, & Bales, 2012). Legally relevant factors, or “legal factors”, for the 
criminal sentencing decision include only those factors that judges are legally authorized 
to take into consideration during the sentencing process. These factors include specifics 
of the offense (e.g., the nature and number of current charges) and the individual’s prior 
criminal/arrest and conviction history.  
The term “extra-legal” often is used within the sentencing literature to refer to any 
other characteristics or attributes of the offender that are legally irrelevant to judicial 
sentencing decisions (Hagan, 1974; Lotz & Hewitt, 1977), such as demographic factors 
(namely gender, race/ethnicity, and age2), indicators of involvement in conventional 
                                                 
2 Some could argue that age can be a legal factor relevant to the sentencing decision, especially when 
considering juvenile offenders waved into adult court, decisions between different sentencing options, or 
other similar circumstances.  
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prosocial activities (e.g., employment status, marital history and having minor children, 
residential stability), factors that could be interpreted as indicators of criminogenic risk 
(such as addiction history), and the like. Research in this area is mixed, but has generally 
found that both sets of explanatory factors -- legal and extra-legal -- affect the sentencing 
process (e.g., Hewitt, Poole, & Regoli, 1984).  
Even within the category of extra-legal factors, however, there is a clear 
distinction between demographic factors (gender, race/ethnicity, age) and the others (e.g., 
indicators of involvement in conventional activities, attitudes and behaviors that indicate 
criminogenic risk and needs). Beyond being legally irrelevant to the current sentencing 
decision, offender demographics are not supposed to be considered at all during 
sentencing (Hagan, 1974). As such, gender, race/ethnicity, and age often are defined as 
“non-legal” or extra-legal factors and all other influential factors that cannot be 
categorized as legal factors or extra-legal factors are considered as quasi-legal factors. 
Legally relevant factors that affect sanction outcome. Legally relevant factors 
include those that judges are legally authorized to take into consideration when making 
sentencing decisions (Hagan, 1974). Among these, the most salient variables are the 
severity or type of conviction charge, number of charges for which the sentencing 
decision under observation is made, and the prior criminal (i.e., arrest) and conviction-
related history of the offender. Beyond the category of offense for which an individual is 
sentenced, indicators of offense seriousness can include weapon use, the extent of injury 
to the victim, and the like. 
The current body of sentencing research generally concludes that the legal factors 
of offense severity and prior record account for a significant amount of explanatory 
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power when predicting sanction type (e.g., prison versus community supervision) and 
length of sentence (e.g., Albonetti, 1997; Spohn & DeLone, 2000; Steffensmeier et al., 
1998; Ulmer, 1997). Although challenging to quantify due to methodological difficulties, 
Engen and Gainey (2000) suggest that roughly 50 to 60 percent of the variation in length 
of prison sentence is explained by the legally relevant factor of offense severity. 
Consistent with expectations, the large body of sentencing research finds that, holding all 
other factors constant, offenders who commit more serious crimes are sentenced more 
harshly than offenders who commit less serious crimes (e.g., Blumstein et al., 1983). 
Similarly, offenders with more extensive and serious criminal histories receive more 
severe sentences than do those similarly-situated individuals with less extensive or 
serious criminal histories (e.g., Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, & Tonry, 1983). The bulk of 
sentencing research finds that legal factors explain most of the variation in sentencing 
outcome (e.g., Albonetti, 1997; Dixon, 1995; Engen & Gainey, 2000; Feldmeyer & 
Ulmer, 2011; Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Dipierto, 2012; Kramer 
& Steffensmeier, 1993; Kutateladze et al., 2014; Miethe & Moore, 1985, 1986; Spohn & 
Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; 
Ulmer, 1997; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Wang & Mears, 2010; Warren et al., 2012; 
Wooldredge, 2010). However, since the legal factors do not explain all variation in 
sentencing outcome, this same finding also suggests that extra-legal factors significantly 
influence sentencing outcome as well.  
“Quasi-legal” factors that affect sanction outcome. Prior criminal record and 
seriousness of the current offense are not the only offender characteristics that influence 
sanctioning decisions (e.g., Nagel & Weitzman, 1971; Pope, 1975; Spohn, 2009). 
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Empirical studies have demonstrated that the type and the severity of sentence imposed 
may depend on individuals’ demographic characteristics and other factors, such as their 
perceived socio-economic status (e.g., education level, income) and social stability (e.g., 
residential stability, employment status, marital and familial history, having minor 
children), as well as indicators of criminogenic risk and need (e.g., age at first arrest and 
history of addiction). These influential characteristics have been discussed in the 
theoretical literature and then operationalized empirically as “extra-legal characteristics.” 
They are so termed “quasi”-legal as an acknowledgement that, although legally 
irrelevant, they do influence sentencing outcomes (Hagan, 1974). 
Extra-legal factors that affect sanction outcome. Although there are studies 
focusing on the influence of extra-legal factors on disparate sentencing outcomes dating 
back to the early part of the twentieth century (e.g., Martin, 1934; Sellin, 1928), a more 
methodologically sophisticated multivariate inquiry in to the extra-legal influences on 
differential sentencing outcomes began with the empirical work of various scholars in the 
early 1970s (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Hagan, 1974; Quinney, 1970). Independent 
variables that were commonly tested when conducting research into the influence of non-
legal, or extra-legal, characteristics on sentencing include, but are not limited to, the 
race/ethnicity, gender, age, and class/socio-economic status of the defendant (Hagan, 
1974). Numerous recent empirical, meta-analytic, and narrative reviews of the sentencing 
literature conclude that these variables remain important within the more contemporary 
empirical research in this area (Buamer, 2013; Franklin, 2015; Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 
2009; Ulmer, 2012; Zatz, 2000).  
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Defendant race/ethnicity is arguably the physical characteristic most closely 
associated with disparate outcomes across the many discretionary decision points within 
the criminal justice system (Poole & Regoli, 1984). Anecdotal and documented 
qualitative accounts of differential treatment of Whites and Blacks (Alexander, 2012; 
Kennedy, 1997; Myrdal, 1944) as well as Whites versus other minority racial/ethnic 
groups (e.g., Mann, 1993) has a long history within the United States. Looking 
specifically at the empirical sentencing literature, we see that research often finds that 
Blacks and Hispanics are sentenced more harshly than Whites (for full reviews of this 
literature, see overviews by Chiricos & Crawford, 1995; Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 2000; 
Zatz, 2009).  
In a review of 38 published sentencing studies, Chiricos and Crawford (1995) 
found that there is significant evidence of a direct impact of race on the decision to 
incarcerate, and this effect persisted after the addition of the legally relevant control 
variables -- crime severity and criminal record -- in the empirical models. Consistent with 
the main conclusions of Chiricos and Crawford, in a review of 40 studies at both the state 
and Federal level, Spohn (2000) suggested that, overall, there was evidence of a direct 
race effect: Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be sentenced to prison than white 
defendants. Similarly, after conducting a meta-analytic review of 71 published and un-
published quantitative studies on race/ethnicity and sentencing outcome, with controls for 
legally-relevant variables, Mitchell (2005) determined that African-Americans generally 
are sentenced more harshly than whites.  
Research on the influence of gender on severity of sentencing outcome generally 
finds that men are sentenced more harshly than women (e.g., Daly & Bordt, 1995; Daly 
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& Tonry, 1997; Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Streifel, 1993). Similarly, younger adults are 
sentenced more harshly than either juveniles/teenagers or older adults (Spohn & 
Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1995, 1998).  
Interaction among extra-legal factors: An intersectionality approach. Starting 
in the late 1980s into the 1990s, sentencing scholars began to explore an intersectionality-
based approach to examining the influence that specific extra-legal factors have on 
sentencing outcomes (Daly, 1989, 1994; Daly & Tonry, 1997). Under this perspective, it 
is inappropriate to consider the influence of a single extra-legal factor, like race/ethnicity 
or gender, on criminal justice outcome/s as these ascribed social characteristics always 
present together in the real world3. Therefore, it becomes important not to just look at the 
unique influence of race/ethnicity on sentencing and the unique influence of gender on 
sentencing, but to consider the interactive influence of race/ethnicity and gender together 
on sentence severity, net of legally relevant factors. Looking specifically at offender 
characteristics that interact to influence sentence outcome, age is another extra-legal 
factor that is commonly included in intersectional models with race/ethnicity and gender.   
Research that looks at the interactive effect of age, gender, and race/ethnicity 
largely finds that young minority-male offenders are subject to the most severe 
sanctioning decision when compared to all other offender groups (Franklin, 2010; 
Mustard, 2001; Steffensemeier et al., 1998; Spohn, 2000). More specifically, age, 
race/ethnicity, and gender all interact to produce harsher sentence outcomes for young 
Black males than all other offender groups (Franklin, 2010; 2017; Steffensmeier et al., 
                                                 
3 Applied to institutional corrections, we know that prison impacts and is experienced by inmates 
differently based on various characteristics, including the interactive effects of these characteristics (Irwin 
& Cressey, 1962; Ocen, 2013). 
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1998). Building on that finding, Spohn and Holleran (2000) included Hispanic 
individuals in their multi-jurisdictional sample to look further at the race/ethnicity-
gender-age interaction. While the findings are not as definitive as they are when 
comparing Black and White offenders of different gender and age groupings, this 
research still found a minority race/ethnicity effect that had both a direct effect on 
sentencing outcome and interactive effect of gender – race/ethnicity – age (Spohn & 
Holleran, 2000). Specifically, at one research site, Spohn and Holleran found that young 
Black male offenders were 12.1 percent more likely than young white male offenders to 
be sentenced to prison, while young Hispanics were 15.3 percent more likely than young 
whites to be incarcerated, controlling for legally relevant factors. A similar pattern is 
found when looking at gender and race/ethnicity in split-gender samples; minority 
women tend to be punished more severely than are similarly situated white women when 
controlling for legally-relevant factors (Spohn & Beichner, 2000; Steffernsmeier et al., 
1993; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006). 
Prior research on the influence of “quasi-legal” factors. Although not 
currently operationalized this way in sentencing literature, an argument could be made 
that some of what are currently termed extra-legal factors are actually quasi-legal factors. 
With regard to the potential to influence sentencing outcomes, legally relevant factors are 
those that are directly proscribed by legal statute and formal policy to be the factors that 
are to be considered during the sentencing process. Extra-legal factors, as discussed 
above, are all the other offender and case characteristics that have been empirically 
demonstrated to be statistically associated with and predictive of sentencing outcomes 
(Hagan, 1974). However, it is possible to make a clear distinction between the so-called 
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“legality” of considering some of the extra-legal factors (namely ascribed offender 
demographic characteristics such as race/ethnicity, gender, age) during the sentencing 
process and others (e.g., history of addiction, employment history, education, 
responsibility for young children). In contrast to ascribed offender demographic 
characteristics, these other characteristics and factors are achieved characteristics that are 
largely behaviorally-based. While it is true there is some debate regarding how to classify 
gender (Steffensmeier et al., 1998) the majority of legal scholars would agree that 
allowing offender personal socio-demographic characteristics to have a direct influence 
on the sentencing process violates the integrity of the sentencing process, which should 
be impartial and non-discriminatory.  
A search of the current body of sentencing literature shows that there is very little 
direct mention of “quasi-legal factors” that are relevant to the sentencing process, with 
scholars instead conceptualizing and operationalizing relevant factors and offender 
characteristics in to categories of “legal” or “extra-legal” factors. There was a series of 
research published in the 1970s and 1980s that analyzed influences on court dispositions 
and sentencing outcomes and the part played by quasi-legal factors (Bernstein et al., 
1977; Crew, 1991; Frazier & Bock, 1982; Frazier et al., 1980; Mann, 1984; Swigert & 
Farrell, 1977). However, since that time similar research has not considered any 
influential offender or case characteristics to be “quasi-legal” factors, instead opting to 
categorize only into the dichotomy of legal and extra-legal factors. 
Evidence of an interaction between legal and extra-legal factors. As noted 
before with respect to a possible interaction among specific extra-legal factors, there also 
is the potential for a significant interaction between legally-relevant and extra-legal 
 17
factors. Some scholars have suggested, and in fact demonstrated, that the independent 
effect of legal and extra-legal factors can be challenging to parse out, as it is highly 
possible that some of the “legal” factors have been the outcome of biased or disparate 
criminal justice system processing based on extra-legal factors (Hewitt et al., 1984). In 
this perspective, extra-legal factors, namely race/ethnicity and gender, are assumed to 
have an indirect influence on sentencing decisions by way of their direct effect on 
outcomes at prior stages of the criminal justice process. Affirming this assumption, 
qualitative research on court decision-making concluded that race/ethnicity affect 
sentencing outcomes through criminal history and crime severity (Kramer & Ulmer, 
1996). Reaching the same conclusion, Bushway and Piehl (2001, p.736) asserted “it is 
not hard to think of cases in which (racial) discrimination could be masked by correlation 
with legal factors.”   Reaching a similar conclusion, Spohn (2008) argues that crime 
seriousness and prior record are not “pure” legal factors. 
There has been a trend in the sentencing literature whereby scholars have begun 
to question whether the common finding that legally-relevant factors account for the 
majority of the variation in sentencing outcomes is actually an artifact of the research 
methodology and/or statistical techniques used in the analyses (e.g., Franklin, 2015), and 
not necessarily evidence that there is no systematic, overt bias at operation among 
criminal justice decision makers as a whole. Scholars suggest that it is possible that 
offense xseverity does not have a linear effect on (or relationship with) sentencing 
outcomes, as is assumed by the commonly used OLS and/or logisitic regression 
techniques (Engen & Gainer, 2000; Tonry, 1993, 1996). In response to this suggestion, 
some research has begun to estimate interactive models to examine whether 
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race/ethnicity operates indirectly on sentencing outcome through another variable/s, such 
as prior criminal record, courtroom environmental factors, community context, or other 
individual offender characteristics. Common statistical techniques that account for the 
conceptual interaction between race/ethnicity and other variables include the 
incorporation of interaction terms into multivariate models (e.g., Chiricos & Crawford, 
1995; Miethe & Moore, 1986; Myers & Talarico, 1987; Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 1987), or 
estimating separate models for racial/ethnic and even age- and gender-based subgroups of 
race/ethnicity (e.g., Albonetti, 1997; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  
Influence of Environmental and Case Processing Characteristics on Sanction  
 Sentencing research has also demonstrated that there are elements of the 
environment and external context (Myers & Talarico, 1986) and various case processing 
factors (Dixon, 1995; Emerson, 1983; Waegel, 1981) that influence the sanctioning 
outcome during the criminal court process. The initial findings of significant direct 
effects of courtroom and community characteristics on individual sentencing outcomes 
reported in the seminal study by Myers and Talarico (1986) have since been replicated 
with more advanced statistical techniques on both state (Britt, 2000; Dixon, 1995; Ulmer 
& Johnson, 2004) and federal samples (Albonetti, 1997; Kautt, 2002; Mustard, 2001). A 
number of studies have concluded that characteristics that vary among courts -- 
specifically the nature of the courtroom caseload including type/severity and number of 
cases -- influence individual sentencing outcomes (D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1997; 
Dixon, 1995; Kautt, 2002). With regards to community characteristics, this same body of 
research finds that the county-level crime rate and the racial composition of the 
surrounding area influence sentencing outcome (e.g., Johnson, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 
 19
2004). Case processing factors that have been demonstrated to influence sentencing 
outcome include the type of disposition, release on pretrial detention, and type of attorney 
(Dixon, 1995).  
 Another body of sentencing research suggests that the influence of individual-
level offender characteristics (grouped in to categories of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-
legal factors) will interact with courtroom/environmental characteristics to influence 
sanctioning outcome. For example, after their review of 38 empirical sentencing studies, 
Chiricos and Crawford (1995) concluded that the probability of incarceration and average 
sentence length increase for black defendants in specific environmental contexts (e.g., 
where there is a higher proportion of blacks in the population, and where the 
unemployment rate is high).   
Summary 
 There is a significant amount of evidence that quasi-legal and, in fact, extra-legal 
factors exert a non-trivial effect on sanction outcomes once the effect of legally-relevant 
factors is held constant. Building on the findings of the significant direct effects of the 
legal, extra-legal, and quasi-legal factors on sanction outcome, research also has 
demonstrated that the extra-legal factors of gender, race/ethnicity, and age can interact 
with, or condition, the effects of legal and quasi-legal factors. The next section of the 
literature review applies this legality-based framework of classifying influential factors 
on sentencing outcome to the current decision point under observation, that of the 
sanction decision following institutional disciplinary proceedings.  
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Application of the “Legality-Based Influences Framework” to the Decision to 
Sanction in Institutional Misconduct Proceedings 
 The purpose of this research is to apply the legal, quasi-legal, extra-legal factor 
framework as operationalized in the sentencing literature to study the influence of these 
factors on the sanction outcome following inmate disciplinary proceedings, a decision 
point about which our knowledge is currently quite limited. Employing this perspective 
allows for the examination of the influence of the specific variables that influence this 
discretionary punishment outcome within a framework commonly used when examining 
other decision points within the justice system. Prior to presenting a review of the small 
body of literature that focuses specifically on the influences on punishment outcome 
following misconduct proceedings, the legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal framework will 
be applied to the context of research on the formal disciplinary response to inmate 
misconduct. 
Legal and Extra-legal Factors in Prison Misconduct Sanction 
 The legally-relevant factors considered in the court sentencing process, severity 
and type of offense and specifics of the individuals’ prior record of conviction/s (Hagan, 
1974), are also the legally-relevant factors for determination of the sanction in prison 
misconduct hearings. Translating these concepts to the case of institutional misconduct, 
the legally-relevant factor of seriousness and/or type of offense would apply to the instant 
(or current) misconduct offense, not the offense for which they are serving their period of 
incarceration (Babcock, 1981). Similarly, the other legally-relevant factor of prior record 
of conviction would also apply specifically to the institutional setting. In this case, 
though, prior record/convictions translates to prior instances of official institutional 
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misconduct (Babcock, 1981), not the specifics of an inmates’ prior arrest/s and 
conviction/s outside of the prison setting.  
 As the review of the literature indicates, extra-legal factors4 as operationalized in 
the sentencing literature are the ascribed demographic characteristics of gender, 
race/ethnicity, and age. Not surprisingly, the category of extra-legal factors maintains the 
same operationalization within the context of the official disciplinary response to inmate 
misconduct.  
Quasi-legal Factors in Prison Misconduct Sanction 
 Similar to the quasi-legal factors relevant to court sentencing discussed 
previously, disciplinary hearings also have a variety of options for reference that reflect 
the nature of the court-based quasi-legal factors. As previously discussed with reference 
to post-conviction sentencing, quasi-legal factors include those individual-level 
characteristics related to socio-economic status (e.g., education level, income) and social 
stability (e.g., residential stability, employment status, marital and familial history, and 
having minor children), as well as indicators of criminogenic risk and need (e.g., age at 
first arrest, history of addiction). Within the context of institutional corrections, relevant 
and parallel factors reflect inmate involvement in conventional or prosocial activities 
within the prison setting, indicators of criminogenic risk, and indicators of overall 
institutional adjustment. Examples of this group of factors and indicators could include 
such characteristics as involvement in prison work/employment and/or involvement in 
rehabilitative, educational, vocational, recreational, or other programs within the prison. 
                                                 
4 This research continues to maintain the distinction discussed previously regarding extra-legal factors and 
quasi-legal factors, regardless of the trend in the courts and sentencing literature to combine them in to one 
category of extra-legal factors.  
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Other salient factors include prison gang membership, criminal history prior to the 
current term of incarceration, and elements of the inmates’ institutional case file (e.g., 
prior terms of incarceration, offense for which serving period of incarceration).   
Prison Environmental and Case-Processing Factors 
In an ideal situation, it would be possible to explore the influence of various case 
processing and institution-level factors on punishment outcome. Within the context of the 
current decision point, the relevant case processing factors would include factors such as 
the makeup of and ideological beliefs of the members of the disciplinary committee, the 
level and nature of inmate and reporting correctional officer involvement in the 
disciplinary process, and the punishment sanctioning guidelines within each institution 
and/or state or federal system. With regard to institution-level factors that address 
specifics of the prison environment unique to each institution and larger system, these 
factors can be likened to characteristics of the community and elements of the specific 
court (and courtroom) that influence criminal sentencing outcomes (D’Alessio & 
Stolzenberg, 1997; Myers & Talarico, 1986).  
Institutional corrections research has confirmed that elements of the prison 
environment, as well as aggregated demographic characteristics of the resident inmate 
population, influence the type and rate of inmate misbehavior, and therefore the rate of 
formal institutional misconduct, that occurs within the prison (e.g., Camp & Gaes, 2005; 
Camp, Gaes, Langan, & Saylor, 2003; Gendreau, Goggin, & Law, 1997). Relevant 
factors include: security level of the facility, inmate freedom of movement and 
involvement in work, rehabilitation, and recreational programming, the proportion of 
inmates involved in prison gangs (security threat groups), the type of offenders housed 
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within the facility (such as majority drug offenders or a high proportion of inmates with a 
violent crime of instant offense), and the age and racial/ethnic breakdown of the inmate 
population. While not yet the subject of extensive research, initial findings within this 
area suggest that the same sort of prison environmental factors and aggregated inmate 
demographic characteristics that influence misconduct-related behavior within the prison 
will also influence the official response to inmate misbehavior through formal 
misconduct proceedings (Butler & Steiner, 2016). 
 
Influences on Disciplinary Sanctioning within Prisons 
 
The Beginning of the Process: Formalizing Inmate Misbehavior as Institutional 
Misconduct   
 Within the prison setting, various types of behavior can be formally sanctioned as 
“institutional misconduct.” One type includes those behaviors that would be considered a 
crime or in violation of criminal law outside the prison, these include arson, assault, and 
manslaughter, and possession of illegal drugs, for example. A second and much broader 
category of misconduct is specific to the institutional environment and involves violation 
of rules and regulations designed to maintain custody, security, and order (Jackson, 1974; 
Sykes, 1958). Each prison has its own set of inmate rules and regulations, although there 
is a significant amount of overlap in these “house rules” across prison systems in the 
United States. Engaging in the behaviors that fall in this category of institution-specific 
misconduct does violate the rules and regulations of the facility, so it is technically 
considered institutional misconduct, but commission of the same behavior outside of the 
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prison setting would not be classified as a crime (Jackson, 1974; Jacob & Sharma, 1982). 
The need for social control in prisons is greater than it is outside the facility, so the rules 
differentiating acceptable from unacceptable behavior are broader within the prison 
setting than in general society (Jackson, 1974). 
 As custody, security, and order are the main goals of the institutional structure 
(DiIulio, 1987), it is not surprising that a majority of actions that are considered inmate 
misconduct are directly related to the security of the institution. An analysis of the 
different types of inmate misconduct that have a criminal counterpart outside of the 
institutional setting suggests that most of the inmate misconduct that fall into this 
category represents some sort of threat to the security of the institution and those who 
live and work within it (Jacob & Sharma, 1982; Sykes1958). Varieties of misconduct that 
fall into this category include, for example, fighting and various types of assault on other 
inmates or staff, stalking and other forms of threatening and intimidating behavior, 
possession and/or distribution of controlled substances, possession of a weapon, and theft 
of personal or institutional property.  
There are some forms of misconduct specific to the institutional setting that are 
also related to the security of the institution, such as escape attempts, inmates “being out 
of place” (in an unauthorized location), tampering with locking devices, and inciting 
organized group resistance among the inmate body (Jacob & Sharma, 1982). While a 
significant portion of the behavioral control rules outlined in the inmate handbook are 
geared toward maintaining the security of the institution, there are also a large number of 
behavioral control rules, and therefore also a significant amount of categories of formal 
inmate misconduct, that are not in any way associated with the security of the 
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institutional setting. For example, there are rules and types of official misconduct related 
to work performance, misuse of food, unauthorized contact with the outside world 
(misuse of mail or telephone services), abusive language, and a lack of 
neatness/orderliness in personal hygiene and cell upkeep. Finally, there are some 
disciplinary rules and varieties of official misconduct that are essentially designed to 
preserve the authority of the correctional officers in domination of the inmates (DiIulio, 
1987) -- such as insubordination to a staff member, disrespect or insolence towards staff 
member, and disobedience of a direct order, as well as the more catch-all category of 
“conduct which disrupts the orderly running of the institution” (Jacob & Sharma, 1982, 
p.21). 
The Extent of and Influences on Inmate Misconduct 
 The violation of institutional rules and regulations is a very common occurrence 
within prisons. Based on an analysis of Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) data as reported 
in a recent 2016 National Institute of Justice (NIJ) special report, correctional facilities 
experience high rates of misconduct (roughly 949 incidents of misconduct per 1,000 
inmates; Butler & Steiner, 2016). When comparing inmate misconduct to crime outside 
the institutional setting using published UCR crime report data (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2015), Steiner and Cain (2017, p.166) that “average rates of inmate-on-
inmate assaults are also two to three times higher (within prisons) than arrest rates for 
assaults among adults in the U.S. general population.” 
Even though inmate misconduct is a common occurrence within custodial 
facilities, incidents of misconduct are not evenly distributed across inmates or across 
prison facilities. The correlates and predictors of inmate misconduct have been 
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extensively researched within the institutional corrections literature; this research 
concludes that variations in the level and type of institutional misconduct can be 
attributed to the background characteristics of inmates (e.g., Beck & Harrison, 2010; 
Camp et al., 2003; Flanagan, 1982; Goetting & Howsen, 1986; Steiner, 2009; Steiner & 
Wooldredge, 2008a, 2008b; Sykes, 1958; Wolff, Blitz, Shi, Siegel, & Bachman, 2007; 
Wooldredge, 1998; Wooldredge & Steiner, 2014), their institutional routines and 
experiences while incarcerated (e.g., Camp et al., 2003; Griffin & Hepburn, 2006, 2013; 
Steiner, 2009; Steiner, Butler, & Ellison, 2014; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008; McCorkle, 
Miethe, & Drass, 1995; Wooldredge, Griffin, & Pratt, 2001), the characteristics of the 
correctional facilities (e.g., Bierie, 2012; Camp & Gaes, 2005; Camp et al., 2003; 
Goetting & Howsen, 1986; Griffin & Hepburn, 2013; Wooldredge & Steiner, 2015; 
Wooldredge, Griffin, & Pratt, 2001), and elements of the institutional management 
structure itself (e.g., Colvin, 1992; DiIulio, 1987). 
Since inmate misconduct is a common occurrence within correctional facilities, 
we can expect that disciplinary proceedings and the subsequent punishment outcome are 
also common occurrences. As such, that means that a significant proportion of inmates 
are subject to some form of disciplinary sanction/punishment following a misconduct 
proceeding at any given time.  
Discretion within the Inmate Disciplinary Process 
Discretion is inherent in nearly every stage of the institutional disciplinary 
process, and it begins with the initial decision to initiate the inmate misconduct process. 
When correctional officers observe or otherwise obtain knowledge of inmate violations 
of institutional rules, regulations, and procedures, they make the decision to handle the 
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matter informally or formally (Hewitt et al., 1984; Jacob, 1970; Light, 1980; Poole & 
Regoli, 1984). The decision to initiate the formal inmate disciplinary process (as opposed 
to “handle the matter” through some form of informal social control) in response to the 
less serious misconduct is a subjective, highly discretionary decision made by individual 
correctional officers (Cressey, 1959; Crouch, 1980; Freeman, 2003; Hewitt, Poole, & 
Regoli, 1984; Jones & Rhine, 1985;  Lombardo, 1981; Thomas et al., 1991), similar to 
the discretion exercised by police officers in response to minor rule infractions (LaFave 
& Remington, 1965; Lipsky, 1980; Muir, 1977/9). Reinforcing this point, the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons policy number 5270.09 (Inmate Behavior Program), which specifies 
the inmate disciplinary process for all FBOP institutions, specifically states that “... staff 
[are to] take disciplinary action at such times and to the degree necessary to regulate an 
inmate’s behavior within Bureau rules and institution guidelines and to promote a safe 
and orderly institutional environment” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011, p.3).  
A further layer of discretion is added to the decision to formalize inmate 
misbehavior into institutional misconduct when the correctional officer has to determine 
the specifics of the “charge” -- meaning type of misconduct offense, severity level (major 
or minor) of the offense, and the number of charges -- to include on the disciplinary 
ticket. Along this line, it is important to note that type and severity of the misconduct 
offense itself will be significant in the determination of the decision to formally charge. 
Minor misconduct offenses are more ambiguous, and less severe, thereby allowing 
discretion in how to respond. Prior research indicates that this decision to charge is 
influenced by the extra-legal factors of the inmate race/ethnicity and gender (Bell, 2017; 
Freeman, 2003) 
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Once inmate misbehavior is formally processed as an instance of institutional 
misconduct, the case proceeds through the formal disciplinary process. In contrast to the 
criminal court process, prison scholars suggest that the inmate disciplinary process is 
more dispositional or adjudicatory than adversarial in nature (Freeman, 2003; Harvard 
Center for Criminal Justice, 1972; Jackson, 1974; Parton, Stratton, & Shanahan, 1987). 
Reinforcing this assertion, qualitative research and personal accounts by inmates and 
prison staff suggest that there tends to be an informal presumption of guilt at the start of 
the prison disciplinary process (Jackson, 1974; Parton et al., 1987). Not surprisingly 
under these circumstances, the vast majority of cases that go through a disciplinary 
hearing receive a guilty determination. Although an inmate can technically appeal a 
punishment imposed subsequent to the disciplinary process, the fact is that the inmate 
disciplinary process is conducted fully internal to the institution. As such, any appeals are 
resolved within the prison bureaucracy and they are rarely, in fact, overturned (Calavita 
& Jenness, 2013).  
Therefore, once the misconduct report is filed and a formal disciplinary hearing 
set, the primary decision to be made centers around the sanction, or punishment, outcome 
(Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 1972; Freeman, 2003). This is a highly 
discretionary decision point as the prison administration and specific disciplinary 
personnel possess a considerable amount of latitude in the disciplinary actions that are 
assigned on a case-by-case basis (American Civil Liberties Union, 2005; Butler & 
Steiner, 2016; Fellner, 2006). This high amount of discretion is even reflected within 
institutional policy that commonly specifies a range of potential punishment outcomes for 
different types (e.g., contraband, verbal assault, order-related offenses) and categories 
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(major or minor, class of misconduct offense) of misconduct. These institutional policies 
also commonly leave room for the opportunity for overrides based on the specifics of 
individual case/s, as institutional administrators or disciplinary personnel deem 
appropriate (Babcock, 1981). Inmate rule books and other institutional documents outline 
the potential punishments associated with each rule violation, with the notation that each 
case depends on “factors such as the circumstances of the violation and the inmate’s past 
record. Just as a sentencing judge takes into consideration a defendant’s past record, it is 
common practice for disciplinary panels to review an inmate’s file prior to imposing 
punishment” (Babcock, 1981, p.1081).  
There are multiple reports that may be included within the inmate file that could 
guide the sanctioning decision, but some of the most important pieces of information for 
guiding this decision likely include the legal factors of prior institutional misconduct and 
disciplinary history, as well as the pre-prison arrest, conviction, and 
correctional/incarcerative history (Babcock, 1981). Yet it is highly likely these reports 
also will include other so-called quasi-legal and extra-legal information that could be 
directly relevant to the sanctioning decision. This ancillary information could include 
anything ranging from risk-need assessment information used to help guide custody 
determinations and internal housing and programming decisions, to demographic, 
background, and criminal history information, to reports of issues related to the current 
period of incarceration and/or prior disciplinary proceedings and sanctions. It is clear, 
then, that disciplinary personnel should have a good deal of information about the inmate 
and the specific misconduct situation that can help to inform the sanctioning decision at 
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this highly discretionary decision point.5 We do not know from prior research, however, 
which of these types of information are more or less influential to the sanctioning 
decision following this internal disciplinary proceeding. 
Prior Research on Disciplinary Sanctioning  
In his work on discipline severity within prisons, Crouch stated that “we know 
relatively little about the factors which shape this (institutional) disciplinary decision” 
(Crouch, 1985, p.222). A review of the empirical literature that has been conducted in the 
past thirty years suggests that Crouch’s conclusion is still valid: the factors which shape 
the outcome of the institutional disciplinary process have been largely ignored. Today, 
the manner in which various factors influence the sanctioning process within prisons 
largely remains an open-ended question.  
This is surprising and somewhat troubling in light of the fact that this represents a 
discretionary decision point in which the disciplinary outcomes have direct implications 
for inmate freedom of movement and access to resources within the prison setting. 
Emphasizing the discretionary nature of this decision point, Parton and colleagues (1987) 
concluded that even though disciplinary committees operate fully internal to the 
institutional setting, there is evidence that “… the DC (disciplinary committee) usually 
has considerable discretion in determining the type and amount of sanction to be imposed 
on the inmate [for an alleged rule infraction]” (Parton, Stratton, & Shanahan, 1987, p.82; 
see also Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 1972). Even though it has been the subject 
                                                 
5 There were a series of USSC and other court decisions that limit attempt to limit the scope of discretion of 
prison officials in determining punishment decisions; however, these decisions largely apply to the single 
punishment outcome of solitary confinement or situations where sentences are extended. For a full 
discussion of relevant USSC and State court decisions associated with this decision point, see prior work of 
Bernstein (1974), Jacob (1970), Jacob & Sharma (1982), and Milemann (1971). 
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of only a handful of classic and contemporary studies to date, “the research literature 
contains expression of concern about the equity and consistency of DC discretion” 
(Parton et al., 1987, p.82; see also, Flanagan, 1982; Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 
1972; Thomas et al., 1991 as reported in Butler & Steiner, 2016).  
The majority of research on this internal sanctioning decision was conducted in 
the 1980s and 1990s, yet the first look at this topic occurred a few decades earlier. At a 
time when institutional corrections research focused largely on institutional management 
structures and the general orientation of custodial institutions, Fox (1959) focused on the 
degree to which punishment would vary with orientation of the institution. This initial 
research, unsurprisingly, concluded that a more individualized and treatment-oriented 
approach to discipline occurred within those institutions that were aligned with a 
rehabilitative ideal, whereas there tended to be a more routinized, custodial-based 
disciplinary handling of disciplinary processes in control-oriented institutions (Fox, 
1959).  
In response to lawsuits over disciplinary proceedings and other inmate rights’ 
issues, and in an effort to shift the focus of research to a more comprehensive 
examination of influences on the sanction outcome, the Harvard Center for Criminal 
Justice (1972) examined disciplinary proceedings in Rhode Island. Among the findings tp 
emerge is that there was only a limited correlation between the type of institutional 
misconduct charged and the type of punishment received for that violation. In other 
words, there was a lack of proportionality between the severity of the misconduct and the 
severity of its punishment outcome. Looking specifically at the security level of the 
facility, this study found a statistically significant yet modest correlation between level of 
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security of the facility and the disciplinary disposition, whereby punishment tended to be 
more severe in minimum than maximum security facilities. The Harvard Center for 
Criminal Justice study also was among the first to examine the relationship between 
sanction dispositions and inmate-level demographic characteristics. While the analysis 
concluded that inmate demographics had no consistent influence on punishment outcome, 
the authors specifically state that their research was limited by a lack of statistical rigor 
and weaknesses within the data that limited the type of analyses that could be conducted. 
Concluding this report, the authors were alert to the possibility that their finding 
regarding the lack of a significant relationship between inmate demographics and 
sanction outcome could be an artifact of their research design and the numerous 
limitations of the data. They note that they were unable to consider any interaction/s 
whereby the demographic data could be examined in tandem with other information 
regarding the category of misconduct committed, specifics of the individual incident, and 
the institutional history of the offender. 
Research interest surrounding sanctioning within prisons was seemingly 
reinvigorated with a series of studies that were published starting in the early 1980s that 
focused on the exercise of discretion within inmate disciplinary proceedings. The 
research at this time concluded that age (Flanagan, 1982) and race/ethnicity (Crouch, 
1985; Poole & Regoli, 1980) significantly impacted choice of sanction. Interestingly, 
race/ethnicity, specifically minority status, was not found to be a effect of sanction, with 
some scholars finding that non-white inmates received more harsh sanction outcomes 
(Poole & Regoli, 1980) and others concluding that there is either no relationship between 
race/ethnicity and sanction outcome (Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 1972) or that 
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white inmates actually received more harsh sanction outcomes when compared to 
similarly situated non-white inmates (Crouch, 1985; Flanagan, 1982). Per the wider trend 
in general institutional corrections research, the influence of inmate gender and/or the 
difference in disciplinary practices between institutions housing male and female inmates 
was not examined in this body of literature (McClellan, 1994).  
Beyond the influence of inmate personal characteristics, scholars also began at 
this time to examine how factors considered legally-relevant to the criminal sentencing 
process in the court system operate within the context of administrative disciplinary 
hearings for inmate misconduct internal to correctional facilities. A variety of legally-
relevant factors, such as the type and severity of the misconduct offense (Crouch, 1985; 
Flanagan, 1982; Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 1972), the number of misconduct 
offenses the inmate received for the current disciplinary hearing (Crouch, 1985; Harvard 
Center for Criminal Justice, 1972), and having a prior record of disciplinary infractions 
(Crouch, 1985; Flanagan, 1982; Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 1972; Poole & 
Regoli, 1980) were also found to directly influence the disciplinary process and 
consequent punishment outcome in a positive direction such that the presence of these 
factors increased sanction severity.  
Extending their research on the direct effect of inmate characteristics on 
disciplinary outcomes, one set of scholars then began to explore the existence of a 
potential interaction between inmate personal characteristics and other influential factors. 
Inmate race/ethnicity was found to influence the relationship between the inmate’s prior 
record of institutional misconduct and punishment outcome (Poole & Regoli, 1980). The 
authors go on to conclude that, when comparing non-white and white inmates, having a 
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prior record of institutional misconduct has a greater effect on severity of sanction 
outcome for non-white inmates than it does for white inmates. This finding raises 
concerns that the interaction of non-white status and having a prior record of institution 
misconduct generate a situation where there is a more oppressive response of disciplinary 
action for non-white inmates than white inmates, further exacerbating perceptions of 
racial biases and disparities within the institutional setting itself (Poole & Regoli, 1980).    
 After a period of no research on this decision point post-1980s, research on the 
factors influencing sanction outcomes within prisons recently re-emerged within the 
literature (e.g., Butler & Steiner, 2016; Clark, 2018; Cochran, Toman, Mears, & Bales, 
2017; Logan, Dulisse, Peterson, Morgan, Olma, & Pare, 2017; Olson 2016a; 2016b; 
Steiner & Cain, 2017). Conducted within the current correctional climate of mass 
incarceration, this body of research almost uniformly focuses on one specific disciplinary 
outcome – solitary confinement (for an exception see Steiner & Cain, 20176).  
Looking at the influence of inmate race on the likelihood of placement in solitary 
confinement following a disciplinary proceeding, Olson (2016a) found that black inmates 
are significantly more likely to experience solitary confinement than white inmates. The 
findings of this study, however, must be considered in light of the other variables that 
were included (and more importantly, not included) in the empirical models. Olson 
(2016a) did not include a statistical control for the type or severity of the instant 
misconduct offense, even though prior research has shown it to be highly associated with 
disciplinary sanction at both the bivariate and multivariate levels (see work of Crouch, 
1985; Flanagan, 1982; Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, 1972). Switching focus from 
                                                 
6 The sanction outcome under observation in Steiner & Cain (2017) is loss of earned “good time”.   
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the influence of inmates’ race/ethnicity on their likelihood of experiencing solitary 
confinement to examining the effect of the race of the inmate population at the aggregate 
level across correctional institutions, Olson (2016b) found that institutions with a higher 
percentage of black inmates utilize solitary confinement as a punishment outcome 
following disciplinary proceedings at a higher rate than do institutions with a lower 
percentage of black inmates. However, this piece of research also has some severe 
limitations, as it suffers from the same model misspecification concerns highlighted 
above.  
Butler and Steiner (2016) examined the direct effect of various inmate and 
institution-level factors on the likelihood of receiving solitary confinement following a 
misconduct proceeding. They concluded that both legally-relevant criteria (prior 
misconduct history) and extra-legal factors (inmate age, holding a prison job) 
significantly influence whether an inmate is placed in disciplinary segregation. At the 
facility level (level two), institutions with a greater proportion of their inmate population 
involved in prison work and with a higher density of inmates classified as minimum-
security were found to use the sanction outcome of disciplinary segregation less 
frequently. Surprisingly, however, and in contrast to prior research, Butler and Steiner did 
not find a significant direct effect of the type/severity of the instant misconduct offense 
on likelihood of receiving the sanction outcome of disciplinary segregation. This research 
did not incorporate possible interaction terms, so it is not known whether type of instant 
misconduct offense or any other legally-relevant factors would interact with the salient 
extra-legal inmate characteristics, as was demonstrated in prior research (Poole & Regoli, 
1980).  
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Three additional studies that focus on disciplinary segregation as the dependent 
variable of interest have been published within the past year and a half (Clark, 2018; 
Cochran et al., 2017; Logan et al., 2017). In her recent research, Clark focused on and 
then confirmed a positive effect of having a pre-prison mental illness on the likelihood of 
receiving segregation, controlling for other salient factors. Logan and colleagues (2017) 
looked at potential race-based effects on the application of disciplinary segregation. 
Initial results of their study suggest that black inmates are roughly 20 percent more likely 
to receive disciplinary segregation, but that statistically significant effect was reduced to 
non-significance when the effects of criminal history and the specifics of the misconduct 
were included in the models. Looking at the other race/ethnicity groupings, inmates who 
report falling into the other racial/ethnic category were significantly less likely to receive 
solitary confinement controlling for the effect of other variables in the fully-saturated 
multivariate model. The effect of Hispanic race/ethnicity was not consistent across the 
four models presented in this research, achieving significance in only one of the two 
fully-saturated models. The most consistent and significant relationships were found 
between prior misconduct history and severity of current misconduct offense and the 
likelihood of receiving solitary confinement. As such, the authors conclude that future 
research should being to examine potential interactions between these variables 
(considered “legal factors” in the current research) and other important factors when 
looking at influences on post-disciplinary punishment outcome (Logan et al., 2017).   
Using different data and a slightly different modeling strategy, Cochran and 
colleagues (2017) conducted a set of analyses similar to those of Logan et al (2017) that 
was published at about the same time. This study also focused on racial/ethnic disparities 
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in the use of disciplinary segregation. Taking the analyses a step further than Logan, 
however, Cochran and colleagues also looked at the interaction of race/ethnicity with 
gender and age in the likelihood of disciplinary segregation. Looking at the direct effects 
of race/ethnicity, as was the case with the findings in Logan et al.’s paper, results suggest 
that the initially significant negative effect that white inmates are less likely to receive 
disciplinary segregation when compared to black inmates remains significant in the next 
model with the inclusion of variables that are associated with criminogenic risk (prior 
incarceration, offense of incarceration, sentence length, time served), but that effect is 
then then completely removed in the final model with aspects of the disciplinary 
infraction included. When the analyses expanded to include a series of two and three-way 
interactions between race/ethnicity, gender, and age, however, all the significant 
relationships were reduced to non-significance, with the exception of the significant 
gender and age, and gender-by-age interactive effects.  
As mentioned previously, there is only one recent piece of empirical research on 
the current decision point that looks at any sanction option other than solitary 
confinement/disciplinary segregation. Steiner & Cain (2017) look at the loss of 
accumulated “good time” as the dependent variable in their recently published work. 
Following their analyses, Steiner and Cain concluded that when making the decision to 
remove good time as a response to inmate misconduct, prison officials are influenced by 
the severity of the instant misconduct offense and the type of rule violation, as well as the 
inmates’ prior misconduct history while incarcerated, gang status, and mental health 
problems. Comparing the results of this study to that of Butler and Steiner (2016), we see 
that the legal factor of type/severity of instant misconduct offense appears to be a salient 
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factor influencing the sanctioning decision for certain punishment outcomes (removal of 
good time) but not for others (placement in solitary confinement). This raises concerns 
about how and why there is variation in the influence of this same factor -- type/severity 
of instant misconduct offense -- which arguably should be the most salient legal factor to 
consider during the sanctioning process. It must be acknowledged, however, that this 
difference in significance could be a methodological artifact, as these two studies were 
conducted on two different samples.  
 Limitation of prior research: Operationalization of the dependent variable. 
While this is a research area that is once again gaining traction with those who study 
discretionary decision making in the criminal justice system, there is still a sheer lack of 
rigorous, systematic, empirical research on the decision point of sanction/punishment 
outcome following disciplinary proceedings conducted in the contemporary prison 
environment. Additionally, this body of research findings discussed above is limited by 
the fact that the dependent variable of disciplinary sanction has been operationalized as a 
dichotomous outcome in all studies of which the author is aware published to date. 
Beyond this use of a dichotomous, presence-or-absence of a specific type of punishment 
operationalization of the dependent variable, the vast majority of the studies to date have 
focused on one specific punishment option – that being disciplinary segregation/solitary 
confinement. As such, this body of research does not take advantage of the opportunity to 
examine the influence that various legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal inmate 
characteristics have on likelihood of receiving a sanction within the full range of 
potential punishment options. In order to move beyond the current state of the literature 
and contribute to our understanding of influences on this decision point, this study views 
 39
disciplinary sanctioning as a choice of one specific punishment out of a full punishment 
continuum that objectively ranges in severity regarding further restrictions placed on 
inmate freedom of movement. This “sanction severity scale” operationalization of 
disciplinary punishment outcome will be discussed more fully in the section on 
Operationalization and Measurement in Chapter 3.  
Summary 
The inmate disciplinary process, and the factors that influence the accompanying 
sentencing decision/punishment outcome, is one of the “least visible proceedings in the 
administration of justice” (Poole & Regoli, 1980, p.932). As such, it represents an 
understudied decision point within the criminal justice process that has experienced a 
lack of systematic, empirical research. Research on discretionary decision making at 
various stages of the criminal justice process suggests that differential processing may 
occur based on a variety of legal, extra-legal, and quasi-legal factors; and that 
discretionary decision making may be more likely to occur in those areas of the process 
that are less public and therefore less visible (Bushway & Forst, 2013), such as the 
punishment outcome following a finding of guilty following inmate misconduct 
proceedings. As has been discussed throughout the literature review, the extent to which 
disparity based on quasi- and extra-legal factors occurs within the choice of disciplinary 
punishment outcome following misconduct proceeding is largely unstudied.  
This study will contribute to our understanding of this discretionary decision by 
examining the influence that various inmate- and facility-level characteristics have on the 
sanctioning or disciplinary punishment outcome following inmate misconduct 
proceedings. As it is largely informed by sentencing research within the criminal courts, 
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inmate level-characteristics included in the current research will be operationalized into 
groups of legally-relevant (legal), quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors. By way of 
methodological contributions to the literature, the proposed study will be the first to 
explore the various influences on sentencing within prisons with an outcome variable 
operationalized in terms of the full continuum of severity of possible punishment options. 
Additionally, the methodology of the current research will expand the current body of 
literature by examining these relationships with a national sample of male and female 
inmates housed in a large number of state and federal prisons across the United States. 
Prior to moving on to a discussion of the research questions and specific 
hypotheses that guide this research in Chapter 2, the remainder of this chapter will 
provide an overview of the theoretical perspective that provides a framework to explain 
why legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal characteristics of inmates exert a significant 
influence on punishment outcomes.  
 
Theoretical Perspective 
 The focal concerns perspective has been proposed as a theoretical framework 
within which to attempt to understand and explain influences on decisions made by 
criminal justice actors (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Originally developed 
and used to explain the sentencing component of judicial decision making, the focal 
concerns perspective has also been applied to other discretionary decision points in the 
criminal justice process, including: police officer behavior during traffic stops (Higgins, 
Vito, & Grossi, 2012) and police use of force (Crow & Adrion, 2011); prosecutorial 
decision making (Ball, 2006; Sherman & Johnson, 2010); and parole decision making 
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(Huebner & Bynum, 2006). The focal concerns framework has also been applied to 
specialized courts, such as juvenile courts (Harris, 2009) and mental health courts (Ray & 
Brooks Dollar, 2013), to help explain influences on decision making within more unique 
court contexts that operate outside of the legal parameters of the criminal court system.  
Since the reinvigoration of research on the current decision point of institutional 
disciplinary sanctioning, multiple studies have grounded their research within the focal 
concerns perspective (Butler & Steiner, 2016; Cochran et al., 2017; Logan et al., 2017). 
Focal concerns theory provides an explanatory framework through which to consider the 
influence of inmate characteristics on punishment outcome following disciplinary 
proceeding. To the extent that the institutional disciplinary process and sanctioning 
decisions parallels sentencing decision making in the court setting, it is anticipated that 
focal concerns will provide a useful mechanism through which to examine and then 
explain potential disparities in punishment outcome. The assumption is that inherent 
biases that influence discretionary punishment judgments extend from the community (in 
terms of sentencing decisions within the criminal courts) into the institutional setting 
(Irwin, 1980, 2005; Marquart, 1986; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2009; Trulson & Marquart, 
2002). In a way, then, the focal concerns perspectives is the explanatory mechanism 
through which this study will attempt to explore and understand the influence of various 
inmate characteristics on the amount of formal social control inmates receive as post-
disciplinary punishment severity.  
Focal Concerns Theory 
According to this theoretical perspective, there are three primary considerations 
(or “focal concerns”) that criminal justice actors balance when making sanction 
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decisions. These are: assessment of offender blameworthiness, a desire to protect the 
community, and the practical constraints and consequences of sanction decisions on local 
(justice system) resources (Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 
1998). Each of these focal concerns is operationalized in a different way in empirical 
research, and each has a different theoretical justification or underpinning as to why and 
how it should influence the sentencing process.  
The focal concern with offender blameworthiness largely assesses the severity of 
the offense. Offense severity can be conceptualized in multiple ways, but it is most 
commonly discussed in terms of the culpability of the defendant and the harm caused (the 
victim) by the offense (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Severity of the offense is commonly 
categorized in rather objective, legal terms with considerations such as aggravating 
factors of the offense and measures of harm caused to the victim. However, offense 
severity is also associated with subjective measures such as crime wrongfulness, which 
are associated with assessments of blameworthiness and appropriateness of criminal 
sanctions (Farrell & Holmes, 1991; Miller, 1994). Beyond offense severity, perceptions 
of offender blameworthiness are also influenced by other aggravating factors such as an 
individuals’ criminal history and the role the individual played in the offense (e.g., 
whether they were the leader or a follower), both of which can serve to increase 
assessments of offender blameworthiness. Some mitigating factors can also serve to 
decrease offender blameworthiness, such as severe mental health problems or crisis, an 
extensive history of prior victimization, and the like (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). 
The second focal concern considered during the sentencing process is the desire to 
protect the community. Protection of the community is largely concerned with the 
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dangerousness of the offender with regard to assessment of future behavior. Here, 
considerations of future dangerousness involve perceptions of the dangerousness of the 
offender and judgments that the offender will recidivate – elements of criminogenic risk 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). In empirical research, this focal concern is commonly 
operationalized as elements of criminogenic risk (especially risk for future violence), the 
nature of the current offense, specific case information, and criminal history. Other 
considerations for this focal concern also can include both aggravating and mitigating 
offender-level characteristics, such as employment history, education level, drug 
dependence and addition, prior history of abuse, and mental illness (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998).   
The third focal concern recognizes that there are practical constrains and 
consequences of sentencing decisions, and that these consequences can be at both the 
organizational-level and the level of the individual offender (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). 
Organizational concerns can include concerns regarding the courtroom work group and 
maintaining relationships among courtroom actors, maintaining a stable flow of cases 
through the court process, and considerations for local and larger state correctional 
resources (e.g., financial resources, personnel demands, and levels of overcrowding; 
Dixon, 1995; Ulmer, 1995). Practical concerns and consequences for the offender 
include, among others, judgements regarding the offenders “ability to do time” – which 
can be influenced by factors such as mental illness, health problems, and other personal 
needs – and disruption to pro-social bonds such as family/children, employment, 
schooling, addiction treatment and programming, and the like (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998).  
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These three considerations, while in practice operating in tandem to influence the 
sanction (e.g., Steffensmeier et al., 1998), are in fact grounded in different theoretical 
perspectives on offending and punishment. As described by Steffensmeier and colleagues 
(1993, 1998) in the original statements of this theoretical perspective, the focal concern 
of desire to protect the community suggests that offenders should be incapacitated (and 
would-be offenders deterred from engaging in criminal behavior) in order to minimize 
the risk that offenders inherently impose on the community. Assessment of offender 
blameworthiness, however, shifts the focus from incapacitation and risk-
management/reduction towards a retributive or “just desserts”-related focus, suggesting 
that some offenders deserve more severe punishment due to elements related to the 
severity of their offense and the level of perceived culpability for their offense-related 
actions (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). The focal concern regarding the practical constraint’s 
and/or consequences of sanction decisions shifts focus from the offender to the 
organizational consequences of sentencing decisions, such as the expected impact that 
this decision will have on the local criminal justice system and various agency-level 
resources (Dixon, 1995; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Ulmer, 1995; Ulmer & Kramer, 
1996).  
Within sentencing research, the decision point most closely related to that under 
observation in the study, operationalization of the three focal concerns includes variables 
that can be categorized as both legal and extra-legal factors (Hartley, Maddan, & Spohn, 
2007; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). For example, the focal concern of protection of the 
community is commonly operationalized as aggravating circumstances of the 
offense/offender (violent crime of instant offense, drug offense, weapon use, prior 
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criminal history) and indicators of social stability (e.g., marital status, citizenship status). 
Indicators of assessments of offender blameworthiness largely involve the legal factors of 
criminal history, offense seriousness/severity, and the number of charges of conviction. 
Finally, the operationalization of practical constraints varies across research and is 
dependent on the location of the research and the nature of the data themselves.  
Connection of focal concerns theory and the intersectionality perspective. 
Recent elaborations of the focal concerns perspective have integrated it with the 
intersectionality perspective discussed previously (e.g., Steffensmeier & Painter-Davis, 
2018; Steffensmeier, Painter-Davis, & Ulmer, 2017). Integrating these two perspectives 
together, it seems very possible that “combinations of status characteristics shape the 
focal concerns in ways that are unique and not present when separate status categories are 
considered in isolation” (Steffensemeier et al., 2017, p.827). This integration asserts that 
the impact that the factors representing each focal concern have on sanction outcome is 
influenced by inmate status characteristics, which include race/ethnicity, age, and gender 
(Steffensmeier et al., 2017; Steffensmeier & Painter-Davis, 2018).  
Focal Concerns and Disciplinary Sanctioning  
The three focal considerations of desire to protect the community, assessment of 
offender blameworthiness, and practical constrains and consequences as outlined by focal 
concerns can broadly be applied to decisions regarding punishment outcomes in an 
institutional setting, as noted in prior research (Butler & Steiner, 2016; Cochran et al., 
2018; Logan et al., 2017). Due to the parallels between the inmate disciplinary process 
and criminal sentencing, common operationalizations of the focal concerns within 
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empirical sentencing research have strong parallels within those that can be used for 
research within institutional corrections and inmate disciplinary proceedings. 
For example, factors considered for the focal concern of judgements of offender 
blameworthiness largely revolve around those representing offender risk level and 
offense severity. Mitigating and controlling inmate risk is a dominant concern within 
prisons, so it is logical to assume that inmate risk level is continually monitored and 
tracked on institutional case files. Similarly, the formal misconduct reports that initiate 
the disciplinary process include specifics of the misconduct offense, so the disciplinary 
committee has insight into the severity of the misconduct offense, the amount of harm 
caused, and other elements of offender blameworthiness. Prior research has established 
that various individual status characteristics, namely the extra-legal characteristics of 
race/ethnicity, age, and gender, influence both explicit and implicit perceptions of 
wrongfulness, harmfulness, and/or blameworthieness (Miller, 1994; Steffensemeier et al., 
1998). By way of example, it could be that disciplinary personnel view 
“blameworthiness” as those who are incarcerated for specific offenses (e.g., person or 
violent offense), and/or who commit a more severe form of misconduct, and/or who have 
a more serious misconduct history, and therefore as deserving of a more severe 
punishment outcome.  
The second focal concern – protection of the community – is appropriate within 
the prison community. The prison community consists of inmates, security staff, and a 
wide variety of professional and civilian staff, as well as property and resources. As such, 
the safety and stability of the prison community is a primary concern for correctional 
administrators. Inmate risk level, prior history of misconduct offenses, and severity of 
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current offense enter into disciplinary personnel’s judgments regarding the amount of 
formal social control needed to protect the institutional community from future 
misconduct.  
The third focal concern of practical constrains and consequences of various 
sanction outcomes is directly applicable to the institutional setting. When thinking about 
the practical constraints and consequences at the organization level, this focal concern 
speaks directly to the resources that are available to support each punishment option, and 
recognizes that these resources are finite. In this case, resources necessary to 
accommodate various post-disciplinary sanction options include, for example, security 
staff/personnel, the requisite physical space available for assigning inmates various 
sanctions (e.g., cell space available within the institution to transfer an inmate to 
disciplinary segregation), and the ability to reassign an inmate to another location within 
the same (state or federal) correctional system.  
Beyond these institution-level concerns, it is possible that disciplinary boards 
might consider the inmates’ ability to “do time” in various disciplinary sanctions the 
same way that judges potentially take the defendants personal circumstances in to 
consideration before sentencing. For example, an inmate with a documented history of 
severe mental illness might be less likely to receive a disciplinary sanction of placement 
in disciplinary segregation/solitary confinement if the members of the disciplinary 
committee feel that the inmates’ mental illness might be exacerbated by placement in 
disciplinary segregation (Clark, 2018).   
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Conclusion 
 Having established that the sanction outcome following inmate disciplinary 
proceedings is a discretionary decision point with important implications for inmate life 
within correctional settings, this chapter provided an overview of the body of empirical 
sentencing research that identifies the salient legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal inmate 
characteristics that influence sentencing outcomes within the criminal courts. The 
literature review then went on to on to apply that same legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal 
framework to the discretionary decision that occurs within prisons, before moving on to 
discuss the small body of older and more contemporary research that has been conducted 
on this decision point. This review of the research illuminated a significant and 
problematic weakness in prior research on this decision point to the extent that it has 
applied only a dichotomous, presence versus absence, indicator of one specific potential 
punishment option at a time; and that with very few exceptions, the punishment outcome 
under observation has uniformly been that of disciplinary segregation/solitary 
confinement.  
The current research goes far beyond the limitations of prior research and 
explores the effect of inmate-level characteristics on punishment decisions for the full 
range of possible sanction options. As evident in the discussion of focal concerns theory, 
the nature of the hypothesized relationships between various inmate characteristics (legal, 
quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors) and punishment outcome are consistent within and 
empirically relevant to extending research on the “focal concerns perspective”. It is to 
these hypotheses, and the specific research questions that they are framed within, that this 
research now turns to in Chapter 2.   
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Current Focus 
This research explores the independent and combined effects of a variety of 
inmate-level characteristics that are hypothesized to influence the choice of punishment 
outcome following the inmate disciplinary process. There are two dominant research 
questions that guide this research. Initially, this research looks at the direct effects of 
various inmate characteristics on punishment outcome, while considering the inmate 
characteristics in groups of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors. Moving beyond the 
direct effects, the second research question models the interactive (or conditional) effects 
of the legal and quasi-legal factors on the punishment outcome.  
The specifics of variable operationalization and measurement are discussed in 
Chapter 3, yet it will be helpful to provide a quick overview of how the inmate-level 
characteristics were grouped into categories of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors 
for the current study. Similar to the conceptualization of legal factors within sentencing 
research in the criminal court system, the legal factors are variables related to the instant 
misconduct offense and inmate misconduct history. Quasi-legal factors, while not a 
categorization that is commonly used in this type of research, include inmate 
characteristics and institutional history variables that are associated with perceptions of 
risk and pros-social activities within the prison setting (e.g., category of offense of 
incarceration, time served, and involvement in work assignments and/or substantive 
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programming opportunities). Consistent with sentencing research, the extra-legal factors 
under observation are gender and race/ethnicity7. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
To begin the analyses, Research Question One (RQ1) will explore the direct 
influence of the individual, inmate-level variables on the dependent variable of 
punishment outcome, controlling for the fixed effect of the institutional setting on 
punishment outcome. With Research Question Two (RQ2) the analysis will then proceed 
to incorporate interactions (both two- and three-way interactions) among the inmate-level 
characteristics into the multivariate models predicting punishment outcome. Each of 
these research questions, and the specific hypotheses that will be tested within each area, 
are discussed below. 
Research Question One – Direct Effects of Inmate-Level Characteristics 
Research Question 1: What is the nature of the relationship between various 
inmate characteristics – categorized into groups of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal 
factors – and punishment outcome? 
The first research question in the study involves the extent to which individual-
level (inmate) characteristics influence the sanction outcome within prisons. Guided by 
sentencing and sanctioning research within the criminal courts, the individual-level 
factors are divided into categories of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal characteristics. 
Within this research focus, a number of complimentary hypotheses will be tested. First, it 
is anticipated that when holding constant the statistical effect of various controls at the 
                                                 
7 Due to limitations of the data, age is considered a control variable and not extra-legal factor, as the age 
variable indicates age at time of interview not specifically age at time of formal misconduct and 
disciplinary proceeding. 
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inmate and facility level, each of the theoretically informed variables, those being inmate 
characteristics divided into groups of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors, will be 
significantly associated with disciplinary sanction outcome. Then, once all variables are 
included in a fully saturated model, it is anticipated that the legal and quasi-legal factors 
will be significantly associated with sanction outcome, while the effect of the extra-legal 
factors will be diminished.  
 
• Hypothesis 1: In a series of partial models where each group of factors 
(categorized into groups of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors) is included 
in a model with just the control variables, all of the independent variables in each 
partial model will be significantly associated with the severity of punishment 
outcome at the multivariate level. 
 
• Hypothesis 2: When all variables are incorporated into a fully saturated 
estimation model predicting sanction severity, the legal and quasi-legal factors 
will remain significant predictors of sanction severity while the effect of the extra-
legal factors will be diminished. 
 
Research Question Two – Interactions Among Inmate-level Characteristics  
Research Question 2: Beyond the significant direct effects, do the extra-legal 
factors (gender and race/ethnicity) condition the effect of the legal and quasi-legal 
factors on punishment outcome? 
 52
The second research question begins to examine the existence of and relative 
influence of potential interaction effects among the individual-level factors and 
disciplinary punishment outcome. The analyses for the second research question take an 
approach guided by the intersectionality literature to investigate potential interactions 
between the extra-legal factors representing inmate demographic characteristics and the 
legal and quasi-legal factors, and whether this interaction influences the choice of 
punishment outcome. Guided by prior research within the area of sentencing (e.g., 
Brennan, 2016; Daly & Bordt, 1995; Johnson & Betsinger, 2009; Spohn, 2000; 
Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000; 2001; 2006; Warren, Chiricos, & Bales, 2012; Zatz, 
2000), the analysis will examine whether the legal and quasi-legal factors significantly 
interact with the extra-legal factors (gender and race/ethnicity of the inmate) to influence 
choice of punishment outcome. In a way, the extra-legal factors of race/ethnicity and 
gender are considered to moderate the relationship between punishment outcome and the 
legal- and quasi-legal factors, since they are hypothesized to influence the strength, 
direction, or significance of the relationship between the independent variables 
(legal/quasi-factors) and dependent variable (punishment outcome; Jaccard & Turrisi, 
2003).  
This set of analyses will examine whether the two extra-legal factors, gender and 
race/ethnicity, interact to significantly predict punishment outcome beyond the direct 
effect of either race/ethnicity or gender. As mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 
1, scholars who identify with an intersectionality-based theoretical approach to 
understanding influences on criminal justice decision points suggest that while the 
influence of race/ethnicity and the influence of gender themselves are important to 
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consider, it is also important to acknowledge that race/ethnicity and gender can interact to 
further influence criminal justice outcomes (e.g., Zatz, 2000). Acknowledging this, the 
final analyses will incorporate two- and three-way interactions among inmate-level 
characteristics. The relevant two-way interactions include those between the extra-legal 
and legal factors and the extra-legal and quasi-legal factors, as well as interactions 
between the extra-legal factors of gender and race/ethnicity themselves. A final variable 
will be incorporated into the model representing a three-way interaction between gender-
race/ethnicity-and the legal factor of inmate misconduct offense.  
 
• Hypothesis 3: Race/ethnicity and gender will interact with the legal factors to 
significantly influence the severity of the punishment outcome, reducing the direct 
effect of these individual variables.  
 
• Hypothesis 4: Race/ethnicity and gender will interact with the quasi-legal factors 
to significantly influence the severity of the punishment outcome, reducing the 
direct effect of these individual variables. 
 
• Hypothesis 5: The three-way interaction between race/ethnicity – gender – each 
of the legal factors (instant misconduct offense and prior misconduct history) will 
be significantly associated with punishment outcome. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
The research questions and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 will be tested with a 
combined dataset including both federal and state data from a sample of incarcerated 
male and female inmates housed in adult prison facilities in the United States. Data come 
from the restricted access version of the 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal 
Correctional Facilities (SISFCF), ICPSR study number 04572 (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2004). The combined SISFCF data set is composed of data obtained from the 
2004 Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities and the 2004 Survey of Inmates 
in Federal Correctional Facilities. 
The SISFCF has been an ongoing survey research project conducted by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics for the Bureau of the Census since 1974. While another wave 
of the Survey of Inmates was recently conducted in 2015-2016, the 2004 data are the 
most current data available in this series. As reported in the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
codebook for the 2004 SISFCF, this study provides nationally representative data on 
inmates incarcerated in State and Federal prisons (USDOJ, 2004). Data for the 2004 
SISFCF were collected through personal interviews conducted by trained Census 
department interviewers on behalf of the Bureau of Justice Statistics on location in 
correctional facilities from October 2003 through May 2004. Sampled inmates in state 
and federal facilities who consented to participation in the study were interviewed and 
asked to self-report about a variety of subject matters, including: current offense and 
sentence, criminal history, family background and personal (demographic) 
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characteristics, prior drug/ alcohol use and treatment programs, gun possession and use, 
and, most relevant for the current study, prison activities, programs, self-reported inmate 
misconduct, and services received while incarcerated. The in-person interviews, roughly 
an hour in length, used computer-assisted personal interviewing procedures. Prior to the 
start of the interview, inmates were told verbally and in writing that participation was 
voluntary and that information would be confidential, to which sampled inmates gave 
their informed consent to participate in the interview.  
Sample Design of the SISFCF  
 The sample of inmates to be used for both components of the SISFCF (i.e., the 
state and federal components) was drawn using a two-stage sample selection design, 
whereby prisons were selected in the first stage and inmates within sampled prisons in the 
second stage (USDOJ, 2004).  
First-stage sampling. First, the SISCF and SIFCF universe files were obtained 
for all state and federal facilities holding adult inmates on January 4, 2003. The universe 
file for the SISCF contained 1,585 state-operated correctional facilities, while the 
universe file obtained by the Federal Bureau of Prisons for the SIFCF contained 148 
federally operated prisons. For each state and federal list, the total universe was separated 
into two sampling frames – one for institutions that house male inmates and one for 
institutions that house female inmates.8 The procedure left a total of 1,435 state male 
                                                 
8 Institutions holding both male and female inmates (State institutions, n=216; Federal institutions, n=0) 
were included in both the male and female sampling frames. 
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prisons and 366 state female prisons. In comparison, there are 131 federal male facilities 
and 17 federal female institutions9.  
From this point, the inmate samples were drawn using a stratified sampling 
procedure. State facilities were divided, by gender, into eight location-based strata 
defined by census region (Northeast except New York, New York, Midwest, South 
except Florida and Texas, Florida, Texas, West except California, and California). Within 
each stratum, facilities were ordered by size of inmate population. Using selection based 
on probability proportional to size within each stratum,10 231 male state prisons and 66 
female state prisons were selected. A reserve sample of 16 male and 4 female prisons was 
selected for inclusion in the event that an insufficient number of prisons in the original 
sample agree to participate. 
In a similar stratification procedure based on inmate characteristics instead of 
geography, the universe of male federal facilities was divided into five strata based on 
security level of the institution (administrative, high, medium, low, and minimum). The 
universe of female federal facilities was grouped into two security-level based strata 
(minimum and all other security levels). Similar to the state procedure, within each 
stratum the federal facilities were ordered by size of inmate population and selected for 
inclusion with probability proportional to size. First-stage sampling resulted in selection 
of 32 male federal facilities and 8 female federal facilities.   
Second-stage sampling. In the second-stage of sample selection for the state 
(SISCF) sample, interviewers selected inmates for interviewing from a list provided by 
                                                 
9 Institutions which reported majority population in medical, mental health, and geriatric care functions 
were removed from the sampling frames for the SISCF and SIFCF. 
10 See code book for ICPSR Study 04572 for more information on the first-stage sampling procedure.  
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each facility which included all inmates using a bed within that facility the previous 
night. After each inmate on a given facilities’ list was assigned a number, computerized 
procedures including a randomly selected start point and predetermined skip interval and 
a sample of selected inmates was selected based on the numbers corresponding to the 
facility inmate list. Final state facility samples included 13,098 inmates housed in 231 
male correctional facilities and 3,054 inmates housed in 66 female correctional facilities, 
making for a total of 16152 state inmates that were sampled for inclusion in the SISCF 
interview pool.    
Second-stage of sample selection for the federal sample was done in a purposive 
manner to ensure that there would be a large enough population of nondrug offenders. 
Using a random start and predetermined skip interval, an oversample of inmates was 
initially selected so that nondrug offending inmates would be included in the sample in 
large enough numbers to be analyzed. Sampling procedures resulted in a final sample size 
of 3,347 male inmates housed in 32 federal facilities and 1,009 female inmates housed in 
8 federal facilities.  
The full sample for the SISFCF, then, included 20,508 male and female inmates 
housed in 337 state and federal facilities. Of those 20,508 inmates approached for 
participation in the study, 18,185 inmates housed in 326 facilities completed the 
interview (minimum = 5, maximum = 138, average = 32.01, standard deviation = 22.79). 
The combined SISFCF dataset includes data on a variety of information from those 
18,185 inmates. Total nonresponse for each survey includes both first-stage and second-
stage non-response for both the SISCF and SIFCF. The total nonresponse rate for both 
the SISCF and SIFCF was roughly 9%. The SISCF data includes 14,449 completed 
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interviews (nonresponse rate= 8.79%). The total number of completed interviews for the 
SIFCF was 3686 (nonresponse rate= 9.07%). Following the two-stage sampling 
procedure, according to the 2004 SISFCF code book,   
“approximately 1 in every 85 males and 1 in every 24 
females in State facilities were selected in the State survey 
and approximately 1 in every 32 males and 1 in every 9 
females were selected in the Federal survey” (USDOJ, 
2004, p.8).  
Sample weights as provided on the restricted data set were applied to correct for 
the inverse of each inmates’ probability of selection into the sample at both the first 
(facility-level) and second (inmate-level) stage of sampling (USDOJ, 2004).  
Sample for Current Study and Unit of Analysis 
Due to the nature of the research questions in the current study, the study sample 
is limited to only those inmates who self-report that they had been found guilty of some 
form of inmate misconduct following the formal institutional disciplinary process during 
the current term of incarceration. Consequently, data for the study includes the full 
population of 8,300 inmates who were found guilty during the formal disciplinary 
process from the larger sample of 18,185 inmates interviewed for the SISFCF (see Table 
1). In terms of specific breakdown by type of facility and gender, the study relies on data 
from 8,300 inmates (6,811 male and 1,489 female) housed in 286 State correctional 
facilities (number of inmates = 7,217) and 39 Federal correctional facilities (number of 
inmates = 1,083; total number of facilities = 326). By definition, then, each of the inmates 
in the sample of interest self-reported that she or he (1) received some type of formal 
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misconduct ticket from a correctional officer during their term of incarceration, (2) that 
resulted in the inmate going through the institutional disciplinary process, and (3) 
received a finding of guilty at the conclusion of that disciplinary hearing.   
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: SISFCF Combined and Component Datasets  
 Total State  Federal  
 # (%) # (%) # (%) 
Full sample of SISFCF 20,508 16,152 4,356 
Completed interviews 18,185 14,499 3,686 
    
Selection Variable Subsamplea     
Formal Misconduct/Guilty Disciplinary Hearing 8300  
(46.57) 
7217 
(49.78) 
1083  
(29.38) 
Gender    
   Male 6812  
(82.07) 
5918 
(82.00) 
894 
(82.55) 
   Female 1488  
(17.93) 
1299 
(18.00) 
189 
(17.45) 
Race    
   White (non-Hispanic) 2858  
(34.49) 
2583 
(35.86) 
275 
(25.42) 
   Black (non-Hispanic)  3591  
(43.34) 
3082 
(42.78) 
509 
(47.04) 
   Hispanic  1305  
(15.75) 
1099 
(15.26) 
206 
(19.04) 
   Other 532  
(6.42) 
440  
(6.11) 
92 
(8.50) 
Received Any Disciplinary Actionb 6775 
 (81.63) 
5829 
(80.77) 
944 
(87.17) 
    
NOTES: Values are frequencies, percentages in parentheses 
 
a Data on selection variable missing for 362 subjects (2.0%) 
b Data on dependent variable missing for 804 subjects (9.7%); 721 (8.7%) cases 
removed for “other” punishment option 
 
Of the total 18,185 inmates interviewed, roughly 45% of them (8,300) received a 
guilty misconduct finding. Further breaking down the numbers we see that of the 8,300 
inmates who received a guilty finding during the disciplinary process, 7,496 (90.31%) of 
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those inmates received some form of disciplinary action following the disciplinary 
proceeding. Comparing inmates in state and federal facilities, roughly fifty percent 
(49.95%, n = 7,217) of state inmates report a guilty misconduct finding as compared to 
the fewer than 30% (29.38%, n = 1,083) of federal inmates who do. Both state and 
federal inmates who receive a guilty misconduct finding, however, are similarly likely to 
experience some form of disciplinary sanction for that misconduct offense (just under 
85% and 90%, respectively). 
The study focuses on inmates who have had a guilty finding following the formal 
inmate disciplinary process as a way to assess the direct and interactive effects of 
individual-level influences on the punishment outcome at this unique decision point in 
the criminal justice system. In a way, the study uses the outcome of the decision point as 
a method by which to extend the literature on various legal and extra-legal influences on 
criminal justice system decision points to a yet under-researched one. The unit of analysis 
for this study is at the inmate level, as there is only a single sanctioning or punishment 
outcome for each inmate in the sample. In the case of multiple self-reported misconduct 
offenses and disciplinary proceedings, the analyses rely on information from the most 
recent during the period of incarceration. The study, then, focuses on the influence of 
direct and interactive effects of various legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal inmate-level 
factors on the severity and type of punishment outcome following guilty inmate 
misconduct proceedings. 
Inherent Nesting Structure of Data 
As disciplinary hearings experienced by individual inmates are handled at the 
facility level, the ideal data structure to examine the hypotheses for the study would be a 
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tri-level dataset whereby individual inmates are nested within prisons, which are nested 
within larger state (or federal) correctional systems. This sort of multi-level structure 
would allow for the statistical modeling procedure to reflect the acknowledgement that all 
inmates housed within the same prison/institutional setting are subject to the same set of 
polices, practices, and procedures, all of which can have a direct impact on the dependent 
variable as well as the key theoretical variables. Similarly, nesting prisons within larger 
correctional systems at the state or federal level allows for the modeling procedure to 
reflect and appropriately react to the acknowledgement that policies at the system level 
can and should influence all prison facilities that operate within that system in a similar 
manner (Primo, Jacobsmeier, & Milyo, 2007).  
Due to limitations within the secondary data set for this study, it is unfortunately 
not possible to nest correctional institutions within state systems (i.e., there are no level 
three predictors for the state data). It is possible to identify all inmates who are housed 
within the same facility, but the data contain no way to determine the specific facility or 
even larger state system based on the facility identification variable available in the 
restricted access version of the SISFCF. However, the federal facilities all operate/s under 
the same system-level policies (that is, all federal institutions are operated under the 
policies and direction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons). It is very likely, then, that 
system-level policies consistent across all prisons within the FBOP will impact the 
disciplinary outcomes of individual cases, which will affect the standard errors for cases 
in the federal data. We can account for this in the federal data by using a level-three 
control and holding the effect of prison system constant.  
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Unfortunately, we do not have this same ability to identify which correctional 
institutions in the state (SISCF) sample actually operate within the same state-level 
correctional system, eliminating our ability to control for system-level policies with any 
level three-indicators in the state data. The current analyses, then, rely on a two-level data 
structure whereby individual inmates are nested within the same correctional 
institutions.11 The modeling strategy employed to address the research questions accounts 
for this nesting and the general effect of institution on the dependent variable by 
incorporating a facility indicator into the models as a covariate. This allows for the effect 
of the facility environment (i.e., institutional culture, administrative practices, 
disciplinary practices, staff-inmate relationships, aggregated inmate characteristics and 
risk profiles, aggregated inmate misconduct trends) to exert a consistent effect on the 
dependent variable for all inmates housed within the same facility; it is reasonable to 
assume that the effect of the above-mentioned level-two characteristics will operate more 
similarly within facilities than between facilities (e.g., Logan et al., 2017). In a way, then, 
level-two characteristics of the facility are incorporated into the models via a fixed effect 
that represents the facility in which the inmate was incarcerated at the time of the 
interview.  
Potential Selection Bias and Correction with Sample Selection Models 
Like sentencing decisions in the court system, sentencing decisions following the 
inmate disciplinary process are one of the final decisions in a long system of decisions 
                                                 
11 A level-two dichotomous variable indicating whether a specific institution is within the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons or a State system will be included in multivariate models to account for the absence of level 
three indicators (which would allow for the clustering of prison facilities within larger State correctional 
systems.  
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(essentially a cumulative decision) made by a multitude of correctional (and other 
criminal justice) officials. It is possible that by the time the sentencing decision following 
inmate misconduct proceedings is made, a host of other processes have occurred that 
might or might not have been influenced by the quasi- and extra-legal factors under 
observation in this research.  
The nature of the dependent variable inherently relies on the non-random subset 
of the total sample who report having received a formal misconduct ticket that resulted in 
them going through the inmate disciplinary process. This dependence of the dependent 
variable on selection into the inmate disciplinary process creates a situation where there 
is a potential for sample selection bias to be introduced into the models (Berk, 1983; Berk 
& Ray, 1992). Various strategies exist to account for sample selection, and employing the 
strategy most appropriate for the type of dependence and analyses to be run allows the 
researcher to be assured that the opportunity for sample selection bias has been 
minimized (Beck, 1983; Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007).  
The problem of sample selection can also be viewed as a form of missing data 
(Berk, 1983). Since the presence of a response to the dependent variable necessitates that 
an inmate has received a formal misconduct ticket that resulted in their going through the 
disciplinary process, those inmates who have not received a formal misconduct ticket 
during the current period of observation will have missing data on the variable/s under 
observation. Statistical methods to account for sample selection bias can, then, be 
considered to correct for this unique form of missing data. 
The Heckman two-step correction is one of the statistical procedures most 
commonly used to correct for implicit (as opposed to random/explicit) sample selection 
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bias (Bushway et al., 2007). Statistically, Heckman’s two-step procedure corrects for 
sample selection by correcting for the influence of the hazard of selection on the 
dependent variable (citation). As outlined by Heckman (1976; see also, Berk, 1983; 
Bushway et al., 2007), this approach involves three steps. First, a probit model for 
selection is estimated. In this probit model, selection into the substantive dependent 
variable is coded as “1”. From this probit model for selection, the second step occurs 
when the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is calculated. Finally, this correction factor, the IMR, 
is then inserted into the model of interest predicting the dependent variable.  
Heckman’s two-step procedure has been used for analyses on various criminal 
justice decision points, including police arrests (D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 2003), bail 
amounts (Demuth, 2003), and sentencing outcomes (e.g., Nobling, Spohn, & Delone, 
1998; Steffensemeier & Demuth, 2001; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004), as well as when 
examining outcomes across multiple stages of the criminal justice process (e.g., 
Kingsnorth et al., 2008; Leiber & Mack, 2003; Spohn & Horney, 1996; Wooldredge & 
Thistelwaite, 2004). Most relevant to the current study, Hagan and colleagues conducted 
multiple analyses that demonstrated the prominence of selection effects in sentencing 
research (e.g., Hagan & Palloni, 1986; Hagan & Parker, 1985; Peterson & Hagan, 1984; 
Zatz & Hagan, 1985). Once again following the lead of similar sentencing research, the 
current analyses employ the Heckman correction method to minimize the potential for 
sample selection bias. 
There are, however, some criticisms of the Heckman method that should be 
recognized (Bushway et al., 2007). Maddala (1985) argued that the Heckman correction 
is dependent on a specific structural form of missing data, so the results derived from 
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analyses using the Heckman method are sensitive to distribution assumptions. After a 
comprehensive analysis of over 25 criminal justice studies that employ the Heckman 
method, Bushway and colleagues (2007) concluded that there are some important 
problems with the way the Heckman correction has been applied in a good deal of 
studies. Errors identified include: use of a logit rather than probit model at the first stage, 
failure to correct heteroskedastic errors, improper calculation of the Inverse Mills Ratio, 
and use of models other than OLS in the second stage (Bushway et al., 2007). Other 
research evidence suggests that, at times, the Heckman correction can inflate standard 
errors in the second stage model due to collinearity between the selection variable and the 
dependent variable (Moffit, 199; Puhani, 2000; Stolzenberg & Relles, 1990). 
The current analysis addresses all these potential problems that threaten the 
efficacy of the Heckman correction method. For example, Stata 14 includes built-in 
procedures for running the Heckman two-step procedure with many types of regression 
analyses. The first stage model predicting selection is a probit model in all of Stata’s 
Heckman procedures. The Stata Heckman command calculates the IMR in the process of 
completing the analyses, all but eliminating the risk of miscalculating the correction 
factor. Due to the nested nature of all institutional data where inmates (level one) are 
housed within facilities (level two), it is necessary to use cluster robust standard errors, 
which helps to address any potential heteroscedasticity among errors terms in the 
analyses.  
Finally, in order to address the issue of inflated standard errors, exclusion 
restrictions are included into the selection model (the first stage of the two-step method). 
Exclusion restrictions are variables that influence the selection process but not the 
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substantive relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Bushway et 
al., 2007). Statistically, exclusion restriction variables are significantly associated with 
the selection variable, but not with the dependent variable of interest. Exclusion 
restrictions help to reduce the correlation between the selection variable and the 
dependent variable, acting to further strengthen the bias-minimizing effect of the 
Heckman correction method (Bushway et al., 2007). Five variables are included as 
exclusion restrictions in all Heckman models run in the current dissertation. Due to the 
lack of independence between the dependent and selection variables, the vast majority of 
the independent variables under observation are statistically associated with both the 
selection and dependent variables. Prior to selecting the exclusion restrictions employed 
here, the author conducted a literature review to identify a set of variables that have been 
used in prior research that looks at formal inmate misconduct (the selection variable) but 
might not be associated with the dependent variable of punishment option following 
disciplinary proceeding. Of this group of variables five variables emerged as strong 
exclusion restrictions. As is discussed below in the section on Operationalization and 
Measurement, exclusion restrictions include a mental health scale, a scale measuring 
negative affect, a categorical suicidal thoughts/attempts indicator, having a GED/high 
school diploma, and being married.   
Limitations of the Data 
 While the data used for this research are ideal for addressing the questions under 
observation, there are some limitations of the dataset itself that must be acknowledged. 
Most importantly, all of the data are inmate self-report data. This means that both the 
dependent variable (disciplinary punishment outcome) and some of the key independent 
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variables, for example instant misconduct offense and prior misconduct history, are self-
reported with no official records to verify the accuracy of the data. Prior research, 
however, has compared the validity of self-report and official data and generally 
concludes that both are valid measures of offending (Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weiss, 1981; 
Kirk, 2006; Thornberry & Krohn, 2000) and inmate misconduct specifically (Simon, 
1993; Steiner & Wooldredge, 2014; Van Voorhis, 1994). Prior research comparing the 
same series (SISFCF) of data to official or administrative data has demonstrated that 
inmate self-report data is a valid and reliable measure of inmate behavior while 
incarcerated (Daggett & Camp, 2009).  
 As is the case with all secondary data sources that were not designed to collect 
data to address the exact research questions for which they are used, there are a couple of 
important variables that should be included that are omitted by necessity. Most prominent 
of these would be an indicator of membership in a prison gang. Similarly, the data 
contain no level-two variables that indicate differences in prison environmental 
characteristics across facilities that could impact the punishment outcome received within 
and between institutions. Beyond not being able to include any fixed or random-effects 
measures at level two, the sampling strategy and sampling weight correction provided do 
not allow for the aggregation of level-one data to level two clustered by the facility 
indicator. This is due to the sampling strategy which did not call for a random selection 
(and therefore generalizable sample) of inmates within sampled facilities and lack of 
information regarding how representative the inmate sample is for each facility, which 
introduces some degree of unmeasurable bias into the prospect of using aggregated level-
one data to proxy information at level two.  
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Also representing a limitation of the data, the selection variable suffers from 
double barreled language (Fowler, 1995), in that in one single question the item asks 
whether an inmate “received an official write-up for and/or was found guilty of” each 
type of misconduct. In an ideal situation it would be possible to separate those cases 
which were found guilty of misconduct at the disciplinary proceeding versus those who 
received a formal write-up but either did not advance through the disciplinary process or 
were found guilty. However, as mentioned in the Chapter 1, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that misconduct tickets that make it to a formal disciplinary hearing are nearly universally 
upheld (e.g., Freeman, 2003; Jackson, 1974).  
 Finally, due to the way the questionnaire was written, there is no anchor present in 
the items on formal misconduct or those on disciplinary action to determine that those 
events occurred within the facility that the inmate resided in at the time of the interview. 
While the language of the interview items do, in fact, specify that responses should be 
anchored in a time period that started at the most recent admission (meaning the current 
prison term only), it is possible that some inmates experienced transfer between the 
formal misconduct and disciplinary events they report and the time they were interviewed 
for the 2004 SISFCF. This mismatch could lead to the prison environment characteristics 
captured in the facility identification number to be incorrectly applied in the case of such 
movement. The data contain no way by which to estimate the extent to which this 
potential limitation may actually be true, but we can be reasonably comfortable that 
likelihood of this is limited due to use of the “most recent” formal 
misconduct/disciplinary proceeding and consequent punishment outcome in the current 
analyses. 
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Operationalization and Measurement 
 The research questions address the effect of various inmate-level characteristics 
on choice of punishment outcome. The dependent variable in the estimation models of 
interest, then, is related to the punishment outcome received. As described below, the 
dependent variable is operationalized in two different ways. The key independent 
variables are all measured at the inmate level and are divided into three groups – legal 
factors, quasi-legal factors, and extra-legal factors. There also are a variety of variables 
included as statistical controls. Descriptive univariate statistics for all variables are 
included in Table 2 and described below, while bivariate correlations can be found in 
Table 3. Following the description of all variables included in the estimation models, this 
section will conclude with a brief overview of the selection variable and exclusion 
restrictions used in the sample selection model. 
Dependent Variable: Punishment Outcome Following Disciplinary Proceeding 
The dependent variable under observation in this research is the punishment 
outcome, or institutional disciplinary response, following a guilty misconduct finding 
during the inmate disciplinary process. Of the 8,300 state and federal inmates who self-
report receiving a formal misconduct ticket leading to a disciplinary hearing, data on the 
punishment outcome variables were available for 7,496 inmates (90.3%). After handling 
missing data, these roughly 7,500 inmates include those for which there are complete 
data in the subsample of interest.  
Among the significant contributions to the literature base made by this study is 
that it is the first methodologically rigorous empirical examination of the outcome of the 
prison disciplinary process operationalized as a continuum of sanctions that objectively 
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vary in severity from lesser to more severe. Due to the extremely limited number of 
empirical studies in this area, the author is aware of no prior research that has 
operationalized the dependent variable in this way (for an exception focused on 
disciplinary segregation, see Clark, 2018). Instead, prior research has focused simply on 
the presence or absence of one or two specific punishment outcomes following the 
inmate disciplinary process, such as placement in disciplinary segregation (e.g., Butler & 
Steiner, 2016) and removal of accumulated good time (e.g., Steiner & Cain, 2017).  
The survey instrument asked inmates, “What disciplinary action took place for the 
(rules violation)”,12 a closed-ended question referencing eleven potential disciplinary or 
punishment outcomes.13,14 These include: received no (or suspended punishment), 
received formal reprimand, loss of privileges, loss or change of work assignment, given 
extra work, received a new sentence, loss of good time, transfer to another facility, higher 
custody level within facility, confinement to cell, and solitary confinement or 
segregation. These potential punishment outcomes vary in severity based on further 
restrictions that they place on the inmate (from no change, to limitations on work, 
programming, and privileges, through increased restrictions on freedom of movement and 
finally complete segregation within the prison facility). The eleven individual 
disciplinary outcomes were grouped into an ordered categorical scale with five different 
categories that reflect increasing punishment severity15. Therefore, the place in which 
                                                 
12 See prior section for discussion of institutional misconduct variable. 
13 The option for “other punishment” (n=721) was removed due to lack of specificity and to ensure 
consistency of operationalization. 
14 The punishment outcome questions specified that the time-anchor is the current period of incarceration. 
15 In situations where an inmate received multiple punishment options for their most recent disciplinary 
hearing (mean = 1.5 punishment categories), the most severe punishment outcome was coded for the 
dependent variable. 
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each punishment outcome falls on this scale reflects a greater or lesser severity of 
punishment in the form of further restrictions on inmate movement or personal 
liberties/freedom(s) within the institutional setting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72
 
 73
 74
 
 75
Table 3. continued, Variable list 
1 Dependent Variable 
2 Most serious misconduct – Assault: staff 
3 Most serious misconduct – Assault: inmate 
4 Most serious misconduct – Property/contraband 
5 Most serious misconduct – Drug/alcohol 
6 Most serious misconduct – Disruptive behavior 
7 Most serious misconduct – Violations of security/order 
8 Prior misconduct history 
9 Offense of incarceration – Person  
10 Offense of incarceration – Drug 
11 Offense of incarceration – Property/financial 
12 Offense of incarceration – Public order/misdemeanor 
13 Offense of incarceration – Other 
14 Prison job 
15 Program participation 
16 Time served 
17 Prior incarceration 
18 Male 
19 Race – White (non-Hispanic) 
20 Race – Black (non-Hispanic) 
21 Race – Hispanic 
22 Race – Other 
23 Facility 
24 Federal 
25 Age 
 
As shown in Table 4, categories include: no punishment (coded 1 – includes: 
received no [or suspended] punishment, received formal reprimand), modification of 
privileges (coded 2 – includes: given extra work, loss/change of work assignment, loss of 
privileges), upwards custody modification – internal to current facility (coded 3 – 
includes: confinement to own cell/quarters), upwards custody modification – solitary or 
external to current facility (coded 4 – includes: solitary confinement or segregation 
[current facility], transfer to higher custody level within facility, transfer to another 
facility), and modification of original sentence/time added to original sentence (coded 5 
includes: loss of good time, received a new sentence). Table 4 presents the punishment 
outcome scale that is used as an ordered categorical dependent variable in the analyses.  
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Coding, Dependent Variable: Sanction Severity Scale a,b,c 
Original SISFCF Categorization – 
Punishment Outcome 
Recoding – Punishment 
Outcome Category 
Level of  
Severity 
Total N (%) 
per  
Level of 
Severityd  
    
Received no (or suspended) 
punishment (n=143)e 
No punishment 1 303 (4.5%) 
    
Received formal reprimand (n=251)    
    
Given extra work (n=708) 
 
Modification of privileges 2 1991 (29.4%) 
Loss/change of work assignment 
(n=347) 
   
    
Loss of privileges (n=2933)    
    
Confinement to own cell/quarters 
(n=1190) 
Custody modification –internal to 
facility 
3 823 (12.1%) 
    
    
Solitary confinement or segregation 
(current facility) (n=2578) 
 
Custody modification – solitary 
confinement or external transfer 
4 2132 (31.5%) 
Transfer to higher custody level 
within facility (n=401) 
   
    
Transfer to another facility (higher 
custody) (n=213) 
   
    
Loss of good time (n=1482) 
 
Modification of original sentence 5 1526 (22.5%) 
Received a new sentence (n=68)    
    
Total number of punishment 
decisions (n=10314) 
  6775 
Notes: 
a Punishment outcomes range in severity from (1) lowest severity to (5) highest severity 
b Ordered categorical operationalization of variable 
c “Other punishment option” category (n= 721, 8.7%) removed; missing = 804 (9.7%) 
d Most severe coded if received multiple punishment outcomes 
e Individual punishment options total (n=10314) exceeds 6775 as the categories are not mutually 
exclusive (can have more than one punishment option); Sanction Severity Scale includes only the most 
severe punishment option 
 
This ordered categorical is scale is incorporated into the present analyses in two 
ways. First, referring to the dependent variable as the Sanction Severity Scale, it is treated 
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as an ordered interval-level numeric scale ranging 1-5. By way of descriptive statistics, 
when looking at the outcome variable in this form, the mean value on the Sanction 
Severity Scale is 3.38 with a standard deviation of 1.24. In other analyses, the dependent 
variable of punishment option takes the form of an ordered categorical variable 
(punishment category), where we are interested in the relationship between the predictor 
variables and each category of the dependent variable in comparison to the reference 
(category 1) of receiving no formal punishment. As is shown on Table 4, fewer than five 
percent (4.47%, n=303) of the disciplinary hearing subsample received no formal 
punishment, roughly thirty percent (29.39%, n=1,991) received a modification of 
privileges, just over twelve percent (12.15%, n=823) received a custody modification 
internal to the current facility while over thirty percent (31.47%, n=2,132) received a 
custody modification external to the facility or that resulted in segregation, and, finally, 
nearly twenty three percent (22.52%, n=1,526) received a modification (increase) of their 
original sentence.  
Independent Variables: Legal, Quasi-legal, and Extra-legal Factors 
Legal factors. Modeled after research within the field of criminal court 
sentencing and the very few studies on the decision point of interest from which the 
current study builds, two inmate-level variables make up the category of legal factors 
examined in the current analyses. These include the type of misconduct/rules violation 
for which the guilty finding was received (most serious misconduct offense) and prior 
misconduct history since admission during the current term of incarceration. The survey 
instrument includes a series of questions with the text “Since your admission, have you 
been written up or found guilty of a/an ______ violation?”, with one item for each of 
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fourteen varieties of misconduct (see Table 5). For analysis, the series of variables from 
the survey was recoded into categories and then transformed into a series of mutually 
exclusive dichotomous indicators to facilitate identification of the most serious form of 
misconduct charged at most recent disciplinary proceeding.  
Table 5 contains information on the coding scheme for instant misconduct offense 
variable (most serious misconduct offense), which includes six categories. While treated 
as and considered a nominal variable representing categories of misconduct, the most 
serious misconduct type is indicated in the variable used in analyses (i.e., most serious 
misconduct offense is a nominal/categorical, not ordered categorical, variable). Final 
categories include disruptive behavior (reference category; 23.13%, n=1,913), violation 
of security/order related rules (n=563, 6.76%), drug/alcohol misconduct (n=569, 6.84%), 
property/contraband offenses (n=1,668, 20.08%), assault of another inmate (n=1,856, 
22.35%), and assault perpetrated against a staff member (n=1,731, 20.84%). 
Prior misconduct history is a variety score that ranges from 0-12 (mean = 2.05, 
standard deviation = 1.77), indicating the categories of misconduct that the inmate has 
previously received a formal misconduct ticket for during their current period of 
incarceration. Due to the nature of the item asked on the SISFCF, any formal misconduct 
and consequent disciplinary proceedings that occurred in a prior term of incarceration are 
excluded from the analysis. The value of the prior misconduct history variety score, then, 
is a count of the types of misconduct violations inmates have been found guilty of since 
their most recent admission (not including the most recent infraction that resulted in the  
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Coding, Instant Misconduct Offense Variable a 
 
 
Most 
Serious 
Misconduct 
Offense 
(nb) Original Outcome and Wording 
from SISFCF 
Re-code for Current Study n (%)d N(%) 
(1496) Any minor violations relating to 
facility orderliness and operation, 
such as abusive language, 
horseplay, failing to follow 
sanitary regulations, etc. 
Violation of institutional rules 
– disruptive behavior c 
1,496 
(8.9%) 
1913 
(23.13%) 
 
(514) Any other major violation, 
including work slowdowns, food 
strikes, setting fires, rioting, etc. 
Violation of institutional rules 
– security/order related 
6,636 
(39.3%) 
563  
(6.76%) 
(2,378) Being out of place Drug/alcohol 1,346  569 
(3,744) Disobeying orders (8.0%) (6.84%) 
(923) Drug violation, such as possession, 
use or dealing in drugs 
    
(423) 
 
Alcohol violation, including 
unauthorized possession, use or 
sale 
Property/contraband 2,820 
(16.7%) 
1668 
(20.08%) 
(528) Possession of weapon     
(188) Possession of stolen property     
(2,104) Possession of any other 
unauthorized item 
    
(798) 
(2,037) 
Verbal assault of another inmate 
Physical assault on another inmate 
Assault of Inmate 2,835 
(16.8%) 
1856 
(22.35%) 
(1,291) 
 
(422) 
Verbal assault on a CO/other staff 
member 
Physical assault on a CO/other 
staff member 
Assault of Institutional 
Personnel/Corrections 
Officer 
1,733 
(10.3%) 
1731 
(20.84%) 
 
 Total  16,866  8300 
Notes: 
a Categorical operationalization of variable 
b Individual misconduct categories total (n=16866) exceeds 8300 as the categories are not mutually 
exclusive (can have more than one misconduct offense per disciplinary hearing; mean 2.03); if multiple 
indicated in the data, the most serious is included in the Most Serious Misconduct Offense column 
c Reference category = disruptive behavior  
d Figures represent the percentage of total punishments given (out of 16,866) that fall within each 
category  
 
most recent disciplinary hearing and the observed punishment/dependent variable). For 
example, if an inmate reported that he or she had previously received a misconduct ticket 
for two of the categories of misconduct offense, that inmate was assigned a value of two 
on the prior misconduct history variety scale. While it is true that use of a variety score 
leads to the potential of ignoring important variability in the frequency of each type of 
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infraction, thus potentially skewing the true nature of prior misconduct history from that 
which is observed, prior research indicates that offense variety, frequency, and 
seriousness are commonly interrelated (Sweeten, 2012). As such, the variety scale 
operationalization of prior misconduct history was employed.  
 Quasi-legal factors. Various criminal history variables are used in the current 
study as an indicator of perceived criminognic risk. Prior research in this area has 
considered these variables to be extra-legal factors (e.g., Butler & Steiner, 2016), 
however, they are instead considered here to be quasi-legal. Within the general 
sentencing literature, information on criminal history and offender risk level is not only 
considered in the sentencing process, but is, at times, incorporated into formal sentencing 
guidelines (Stith & Cabranes, 1998)16. Hence, the literature suggests that variables related 
to risk level and criminal history should be considered quasi-legal as this is, in a way, a 
study of the sentencing process within prisons. Pre-prison criminal history is measured by 
two variables. The first is a categorical variable indicating offense for current 
incarceration17 (person [12.42%], property/financial [17.92], drug [62.81%]– reference, 
public order offense [<1%], and other [6.05%]). The second variable representing 
criminal history is a dichotomous indicator representing prior incarceration (yes/no), 
with over half of the subsample (52.2%) reporting that this is not their first time in prison.  
Additionally, an early review of the inmate disciplinary processes in 42 American 
correctional systems suggests that some form of an inmate “jacket” containing, at a 
minimum, information on prior misconduct/disciplinary proceedings during the current 
                                                 
16 This is especially true in prisons, where the risk of misconduct in primary to level of security.  
17 Figures for all variables described in the quasi-legal and extra-legal factors sections are for the inmates 
included in the formal misconduct subsample only, see Table A1 for comparison to full SISFCF sample. 
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incarceration and prior incarceration history will be available for disciplinary committee 
personnel to reference during the disciplinary proceedings (Babcock, 1981, p.1041). 
Consistent with this conceptualization, variables indicating an inmates’ level of 
institutional adjustment and involvement in pro-social activities within the prison setting 
are also categorized as quasi-legal factors. Having a prison job (yes/no) and participation 
in (non-recreational) programming (yes/no) are included in the models as indicators of 
institutional adjustment and involvement in conventional activities within a prison-
specific context, with over seventy percent (71.2%) of inmates holding a prison job at 
time of interview and over two thirds (68.24%) having either previous or current 
involvement in some variety of non-recreational/non-religious programming within the 
institution. Finally, the duration of time incarcerated is represented by the natural log of 
time served as captured in months between the date of admission and interview date. 
Extra-legal factors. Two inmate demographic variables, gender and 
race/ethnicity, represent important extra-legal factors. Beyond their hypothesized direct 
effects, these extra-legal factors are also hypothesized to interact with the legal factors to 
condition the effect of the legal factors on choice of disciplinary punishment outcome. 
The gender variable is represented as a value of one if the subject is male, and zero if 
female, with over eighty percent of inmates being male. Race/ethnicity is operationalized 
as a categorical variable including White – non-Hispanic (reference, 34.5%), Black – 
non-Hispanic (43.34%), Hispanic (15.75%), and Other (6.42%).  
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Control Variables 
 Three variables are included in the models as statistical controls. First, there is a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate in incarcerated within a federal (Federal=1) 
or state facility. Second, there is a fixed-effect facility indicator that is used to identify all 
inmates who are housed within the same institution. This facility indicator variable is 
included for both substantive and methodological reasons. The inclusion of a fixed effect 
for the facility allows for the incorporation of all the unmeasured characteristics 
associated with the prison environment that could influence the dependent variable to be 
accounted for in the estimation of the relationship between the legal, quasi-legal, and 
extra-legal factors and punishment outcome. Such variables could include, for example, 
factors such as: institutional culture, administrative practices, disciplinary practices, staff-
inmate relationships, aggregated inmate characteristics and risk profiles, and aggregated 
inmate misconduct trends. In an ideal situation, data would be available to include the 
larger prison environmental factors into quantitative models by incorporating random-
effect variables at level two, but this is not possible given the specifics of the current data. 
It is also important to recognize that the prison environment characteristics will have a 
stronger relationship within the facility than between facilities, which would result in 
inappropriately correlated error terms among inmates within the same facilities biasing 
the standard errors and all statistics associated with them (such as significance levels of 
multivariate relationships). Incorporating a facility indicator into the models allows for 
the identification of that variable as a means by which to group (or cluster) cases to adjust 
for the biased estimation of standard errors.  
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Inmate age is the final control variable. Due to limitations in the data, age can 
only be calculated at the time of interview not at the time of disciplinary proceeding. 
Since there is no measure of how recent the “most recent” disciplinary event was, it is not 
possible to determine the age at which the disciplinary proceeding and consequent 
punishment decision took place, therefore limiting our ability to include age as a 
theoretically-informed extra-legal factor. Age at time of interview ranged from 16 to 84, 
with a mean of 34.65 and a standard deviation of 10.21. Inmate age in years was 
transformed by its natural log to normalize the distribution before inclusion into the 
models.  
Selection Variable 
 As discussed in prior sections, due to the nature of the research questions this 
study inherently relies on subsample of all inmates represented in the full dataset who 
have received a guilty disciplinary finding for some form of inmate misconduct following 
the inmate disciplinary process. Represented in the numbers associated with the SISFCF 
data, of the 18,185 inmates who agreed to participate in the study, over 46% (n=8,300) 
self-reported that they received a guilty finding following a misconduct disciplinary 
hearing.  
However, not all inmate misconduct is detected, and even among that which is 
detected by correctional officers, not all detected inmate misconduct is handled through 
the institutional disciplinary process which starts with the writing of a formal misconduct 
ticket. Therefore, it is likely that the group of inmates that is formally written up and 
processed through the institutional disciplinary process is qualitatively and quantitatively 
different than those inmates who engage in misconduct but are not formally processed 
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through the disciplinary system. Building on that assumption, it is also likely that those 
differences might also influence the choice of punishment outcome following the 
misconduct disciplinary proceeding. This sort of situation is a case of implicit selection 
(Berk & Ray, 1982; Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007) which has the potential to 
introduce harmful selection bias into the results, making it necessary to correct for this 
potential bias by running some form of a sample selection model (Berk, 1983; Berk & 
Ray, 1982; Bushway et al., 2007). Specifics of the selection models employed in the 
analyses will be discussed below in the Analytic Strategy section, but the variables 
included in the group of exclusion restrictions are introduced below.  
Exclusion Restrictions  
 In order to produce a good estimate of the hazard for selection to correct for the 
potential sample selection bias, exclusion restrictions (sometimes called auxiliary or 
instrument variables) must be strongly associated with the selection variable but not 
associated with the outcome variable (Berk, 1983). Following extensive review of prior 
literature on correlates and predictors of officially sanctioned inmate misconduct, a group 
of five exclusionary variables was identified. These five variables are all associated with 
selection (or receiving a formal inmate misconduct ticket that resulted in a guilty 
disciplinary proceeding), but are not statistically related to punishment outcome 
following disciplinary proceeding as it is currently operationalized. These five exclusion 
restrictions include a self-report mental health scale (range 0-4), a dichotomous indicator 
of negative affect, a suicidal thought and behavior indicator (range 0-2), and indicators 
for inmate education level (received high school diploma or GED) and marital status 
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(married=1). Descriptive statistics of the exclusion restriction variables are shown on 
Table 6. 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics: Exclusion Restrictions 
 N (%) Range 
Mental health scale  0-4 
   0 5,181 (62.72)  
   1 1,089 (13.18)  
   2 1,027 (12.43)  
   3 814 (9.85)  
   4 150 (1.82)  
Negative affect 3,726 (45.01) 0-1 
Suicide  0-2 
   Neither 5,951 (71.82)  
   Only thought about it 926 (11.18)  
   Prior attempt 1,409 (17.0)  
GED or HS diploma 5,541 (66.93) 0-1 
Married 1,196 (14.42) 0-1 
 
Analytic Strategy 
All data maintenance and analyses are conducted in Stata14 (StataCorp, 2015). 
Following an initial investigation into the structure and nature of the data, a series of 
recodes and variable transformations were undertaken in order to prepare the data for 
analysis (see prior section, Operationalization and Measurement). Before running the 
bivariate and later multivariate models, the weights (related to the inverse of an inmates’ 
probability of inclusion into the sample) supplied on the restricted access SISFCF dataset 
were applied to the data to correct for the complex, multi-stage sampling design. 
Bivariate relationships between the variables of interest – the legal, quasi-legal, and 
extra-legal factors – and punishment outcome were then confirmed and are presented in 
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table 3. A variance inflation test18 (VIF) was conducted, and none of the VIF’s reached 
the critical threshold value of four, in fact none were over 2.29 with a mean VIF of 1.40, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem (see Table 7).  
Table 7. Variance Inflation Factors – All Variables (estimation and sample selection models) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Legal Factors   
Most serious instant misconduct offensea   
   Security/order violation 1.19 0.838 
   Drug/alcohol 1.26 0.791 
   Property/contraband 1.56 0.639 
   Assault: inmate 1.75 0.573 
   Assault: staff 2.25 0.445 
Prior misconduct Hx 1.78 0.561 
Quasi-legal Factors   
Offense of convictionb   
   Drug 2.29 0.437 
   Property/financial 2.05 0.487 
   Public order/misdemeanor 1.06 0.945 
   Other 1.41 0.707 
Prison job 1.11 0.901 
Program participation 1.09 0.914 
Time served 1.62 0.618 
Prior incarceration  1.06 0.941 
Extra-legal Factors   
Male 1.19 0.838 
Racec   
   Black 1.53 0.655 
   Hispanic 1.41 0.712 
   Other 1.13 0.886 
Controls   
Facility 1.67 0.599 
Federal 1.72 0.582 
Age  1.34 0.744 
Exclusion Restrictions   
Mental health scale   
   1 1.12 0.892 
   2 1.23 0.811 
   3 1.31 0.761 
   4 1.11 0.902 
Negative affect 1.13 0.887 
Suicide   
                                                 
18 The VIF multicollinearity test involves treating the categorical variable dependent variable ranging 1-5 as 
continuous, running an ordered linear regression (OLS) with all predictors from both the estimation and 
selection models and asking Stata14 to calculate the VIF’s with the command “vif” after specifying the 
OLS regression equation. 
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   Only thought about it 1.10 0.907 
   Prior attempt 1.41 0.711 
GED or HS diploma 1.11 0.904 
Married 1.03 0.967 
Mean VIF 1.40  
 
Prior to beginning the analyses for the research questions under observation, a 
series of preliminary models was run in order to verify the strength of the exclusion 
restrictions and the overall selection model to ensure that it could provide an appropriate 
correction for the incidental selection inherent in both the research questions and the data 
file. The hallmark of good exclusion restrictions is that they are statistically associated 
with the selection variable but not the dependent variables. The statistically significant 
relationships between the exclusion restrictions and the selection variable and 
simultaneous non-significant relationships between the same exclusions restrictions and 
the dependent variable are demonstrated through bivariate correlations (Table 8) and a 
series of regression analyses (Tables 9-11). Table 9 contains the results of a probit model 
which show that all exclusion restrictions are significantly associated with selection. 
Table 10 contains the results of an ordered probit model (for the dependent variable 
operationalized as Sanction Severity Scale) and Table 11 shows findings from a 
multinomial logistic regression model (for the dependent variable operationalized as 
punishment category). Together the results of these three tables demonstrate that, while 
associated with the selection variable, the exclusion restrictions are not significant 
predictors of either operationalization of the dependent variable, verifying the strength of 
the selection model. 
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Table 8. Bivariate Correlation Matrix – Exclusion Restriction, Selection Variable, 
Sanction Severity Scale Dependent Variable  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Mental Health 
Scale 
--       
2 Negative Affect .20*** --      
3 Suicide .53*** .19*** --     
4 GED/HS .03*** -.02** .02** --    
5 Married -.03*** -.04*** -.03*** .02* --   
6 Selection 
Variable 
.30*** .34*** .20*** .03*** -.10*** --  
7 Dependent 
Variable 
.02 .04 -.02 -.02 -.02 .01 -- 
NOTE: 
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
 
 
Table 9. Probit Model – Exclusion Restrictions Predicting Selection Variable with 
cluster robust standard errors (326 clusters) 
 Coef SE z 
Controls    
Facility -.000 .000 -1.38 
Federal -.389 .098 -3.97*** 
Current age -.009 .001 -6.51*** 
    
Exclusion Restrictions    
Mental health scale    
   1 .120 .035 3.48*** 
   2 .104 .037 2.83** 
   3 .166 .041 4.02*** 
   4 .062 .081 0.77 
Negative affect .269 .021 12.94*** 
Suicide    
   Only thought about it .135 .033 4.03*** 
   Prior attempt .141 .033 4.32*** 
GED or HS diploma .143 .021 6.78*** 
Married -.234 .0257 -9.12*** 
    
Constant .225 .101 2.23* 
Psuedo R2 
Wald χ2 
Psuedo Loglikelihood 
.0468 
581.09*** 
-11584.553 
NOTE: 
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the goal of the current research is to investigate the 
direct and interactive effects of various inmate-level characteristics on the punishment 
outcome following institutional disciplinary proceedings. The two operationalizations of 
the punishment outcome dependent variable each require different modeling strategies. 
When looking at punishment outcome in the form of the numeric sanction severity scale 
ranging 1-5, multivariate ordered probit models will be used (Long, 1997). When 
observing the unique effect of the inmate characteristics on each category of punishment 
option (punishment categories), the most ideal models to employ will be multinomial 
logistic regression models (Long, 1997). All analyses will address two specific research 
questions –  
Research Question 1. What is the nature of the relationship between various 
inmate characteristics – categorized into groups of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-
legal factors – and punishment outcome? 
 
Research Question 2. Beyond the significant direct effects, do the extra-legal 
factors condition the effect of the legal and quasi-legal factors on punishment 
outcome?  
 
A series of multivariate models were estimated to address the direct effects of the 
various inmate characteristics on punishment outcome as called for in the first research 
question (see Chapter 4)19. First, in an exploratory fashion, the appropriate preliminary 
                                                 
19 Coefficients presented in all tables are standardized coefficients to allow for 
comparison across variables within the multivariate models.  
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models were run on the selection variable subsample (n=8,300) for both 
operationalizations of the dependent variable in order to provide some initial insight into 
the nature of the relationships between the various inmate-level characteristics and 
punishment outcome. These initial findings of various significant direct effects were then 
Table 10. Ordered Probit Model – Exclusion Restrictions Predicting Sanction Severity 
Scale with cluster robust standard errors (326 clusters) 
 Coef SE z 
Controls    
Facility .000 .000 0.69 
Federal .241 .092 2.62** 
Current age -.001 .001 -0.57 
    
Exclusion Restrictions    
Mental health scale    
   1 .085 .042 2.02* 
   2 .089 .044 2.04 
   3 .051 .050 1.02 
   4 .066 .095 0.69 
Negative affect .069 .029 2.36* 
Suicide    
   Only thought about it -.018 .042 -0.42 
   Prior attempt -.053 .043 -1.22 
GED or HS diploma -.050 .029 -1.74 
Married -.055 .039 -1.42 
    
Cut 1 -1.629 .107  
Cut 2 -.344 .097  
Cut 3 -.027 .099  
Cut 4 .832 .100  
Psuedo R2 
Wald χ2 
Psuedo Loglikelihood 
.0038 
45.99*** 
-9725.2022 
NOTE: 
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
 
 
confirmed with the use of multiple types of two-part models to account for sample  
selection. Multivariate models to address both hypothesis one and two are conducted on 
both the sanction severity and punishment categories outcome variables. 
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The first type of two-part model used was the Heckman model, which is a widely 
used and easily understood sample selection model. The effect of the independent 
variables on the first dependent variable, sanction severity, was estimated with a 
Heckman ordered probit model (‘heckoprobit’ in Stata14). While Stata14 is able to 
estimate most types of regression models with the Heckman correction, the multinomial 
logistic regression model is not one of them. As the goal of using the second 
operationalization of the dependent variable, that being the specific punishment 
categories outcome, is to obtain estimates of the unique effect of the independent 
variables on each category of the punishment variable, a series of nested Heckman probit 
models (‘heckprobit’ in Stata14) were run to approximate a multinomial model.  
By way of caveat, it should be acknowledged that the statistical strategy of 
estimating a series of nested Heckman probit models with dichotomous indicators for 
each category of punishment outcome operates differently for the middle range 
punishment categories (categories 2-4) than it does for those at the ends of the spectrum 
(categories 1 and 5). To illustrate this point, when considering the model where receipt of 
punishment category 5 (new conviction with sentence enhancement) is compared to all 
other categories, the outcome indicates receiving the most severe sanction versus all 
others. The same can be said in the opposite direction for punishment category 1 (no 
formal punishment) – the model compares those who receive the least severe sanction to 
all other punishment categories. However, for punishment categories 2-4, the same 
cannot be said. In this case, when estimating the model for the dichotomous outcome 
receipt of category 2 (modification of privilege), the comparison group includes inmates 
who received both a lesser and more severe sanction, potentially confusing interpretation 
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of the findings from these models. This same limitation holds for the dichotomous 
indicators for punishment categories 3 and 4 as well.  
Addressing this limitation of the nested Heckman probit models and in an effort 
retain the information of the categorical variable that is lost when forcing it into a series 
of mutually exclusive dichotomies that was necessary for the nested Heckman probit 
models, a final two-stage model was estimated. This process involved using the variables 
of interest and the exclusion restrictions to estimate a simple probit model predicting 
selection (whereby selection into the formal misconduct/disciplinary proceeding 
subsample=1), using that information to create the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) of the 
hazard for selection (using the Heckman post-hoc ‘mills’ command in Stata14), and then 
including the IMR as a covariate in the estimation equation (Duan, Manning, Morris, & 
Newhouse, 1984) – the multinomial logistic regression model (‘mlogit’ in Stata14).   
A second series of multivariate models were estimated to address the second 
research question, as to whether the extra-legal factors of race/ethnicity and gender 
condition the relationship between the legal and quasi-legal inmate characteristics and 
punishment outcome (see Chapter 5). Two different strategies were employed in order to 
examine the potential conditioning effect of the extra-legal factors. First, a series of 
interaction terms between the extra-legal factors and the legal factors (e.g., Male * Instant 
misconduct offense, Non-white * Prior misconduct history) were estimated, and included 
in the models as covariates (hypothesis three). The goal with these models is to examine 
the relationship between the legal factors and punishment outcome, controlling for all 
other relevant factors include the potential effect of the interaction between the extra-
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legal and legal factors. This same procedure is used for the quasi-legal factors (hypothesis 
four).  
Recognizing the complexities of interaction terms that include one or more 
categorical (including dichotomous) variables in the interaction, the conditioning effects 
are also examined with a split-sample methodology. In these models, which are run to 
address hypothesis three and four, the fully-saturated, multivariate, direct effects models 
are re-estimated on samples split by inmate gender (male versus female inmates) and a 
dichotomy of race/ethnicity (non-white versus white inmates). Differences in the 
magnitude, directionality, and/or significance level of the relationship between the focus 
independent variables (those being the legal factors and the quasi-legal factors) and 
punishment outcome between the two samples suggests that the specific extra-legal factor 
conditions the relationship between the independent variable/s and punishment outcome. 
The final analysis for this research involves calculating a final three-way 
interaction term (Male * Gender * Legal factor) and including that in the multivariate 
model while simultaneously controlling for all the direct and consequent interactive 
effects (extra-legal * legal factors, extra-legal * quasi-legal factors, male * 
gender/ethnicity). 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS: DIRECT EFFECTS MODELS 
Overview 
 This chapter presents the results of analyses designed to address the first research 
question surrounding the nature of the direct effects that various inmate characteristics 
exert on punishment outcome. Addressing hypothesis one and two, this chapter reviews 
the results of bivariate, (multivariate) partial, and fully-saturated multivariate models 
regressing punishment outcome on the legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal inmate 
characteristics. In order to accommodate both operationalizations of the dependent 
variable (the interval-level, ordered categorical scale representing sanction severity, and 
the individual punishment categories, which is a nominal variable), with the exception of 
the initial bivariate models, each type of model will be run twice. The sanction severity 
scale outcome variable is modeled with Heckman ordered probit models, while the 
punishment categories outcome is modeled with a series of nested Heckman probit 
models (to approximate a multinomial model) as well as a two-stage multinomial model 
for robustness purposes. Since the purpose of the bivariate models is to establish an initial 
relationship between each of the inmate characteristics and punishment outcome, these 
models will only be presented for the Sanction Severity scale operationalization of 
punishment outcome. 
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Table 12. Bivariate relationships, Heckman Ordered Probit Models – Collapsed 
Equations; Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity Scale 
 Collapsed Models 
 Coef Std. Error z 
Legal Factors    
Most serious instant misconduct offensea    
   Security/order violation -.284 .073 -3.89*** 
   Drug/alcohol .717 .073 9.84*** 
   Property/contraband .095 .058 1.64 
   Assault: inmate .540 .056 9.68*** 
   Assault: staff .472 .058 8.15*** 
Prior misconduct Hx .051 .010 5.12*** 
Quasi-legal Factors    
Offense of convictionb    
   Drug -.230 .046 -0.64 
   Property/financial -.012 .057 -0.20 
   Public order/misdemeanor .169 .222 0.76 
   Other .101 .072 1.40 
Prison job -.182 .039 -4.64*** 
Program participation -.109 .041 -2.69** 
Time served .051 .024 2.10* 
Prior incarceration  .107 .032 3.30*** 
Extra-legal Factors    
Male .173 .080 2.17* 
Racec    
   Black .121 .039 2.53** 
   Hispanic .046 .059 0.78 
   Other .108 .073 1.47 
Controls    
Facility .001 .000 3.44*** 
Federal .359 .057 6.33*** 
Age  .001 .002 0.29 
NOTES – Values are standardized coefficients and robust standard errors to adjust for 
clustering 
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
 
Bivariate Regression Models 
Table 12 reports the results of a series of bivariate regression equations in which 
sanction severity is regressed on each variable included, only one at a time, in the 
estimation model under observation – those being the variables within the categories of 
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legal, quasi-legal, extra-legal, and control variables discussed earlier.20 The bivariate 
Heckman ordered probit models in this table demonstrate that, with the exception of the 
quasi-legal factor of offense of conviction, all variables assumed to be associated with 
punishment outcome are significantly associated with Sanction Severity at or greater than 
the .05 significance level. Considering the literature on similar decision points in the 
criminal courts and the results of the few studies conducted to date on the current point, 
all relationships are in the expected direction.  
Looking more closely at the legal factors, it becomes clear that the more severe 
categories of inmate misconduct (assault on staff and inmates, drug/alcohol offenses, and 
those related to destruction of institutional property/possession of contraband) exert a 
positive influence on sanction severity such that committing one of those offenses 
increases the likelihood of receiving a more serious (or severe) punishment. Similarly, a 
single-unit increase in the metric of the variety scale representing prior misconduct 
results in an increase of .051 probit units on the sanction severity scale. Of the quasi-legal 
factors, there are some that represent criminogenic risk factors (e.g., offense of 
conviction, time served, prior incarceration) and some that represent engagement in 
prosocial activities within the prison setting (e.g., prison job and program participation). 
As is expected, the quasi-legal variables representing criminogenic risk factors have a 
positive association with sanction severity, and the variables representing engagement in 
prosocial activities have a negative association with sanction severity. The quasi-legal 
factor of offense of conviction is, however, not associated with sanction severity. Finally, 
                                                 
20 See also, bivariate correlation matrix (Table 3) for further evidence of initial 
relationships.  
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both extra-legal factors are associated with sanction severity at the bivariate level. Both 
male gender (compared to female) and Black race/ethnicity (compared to white; no other 
racial category significant) are positively associated with sanction severity in the 
bivariate analyses, such that being male or Black is associated with a more severe 
sanction following disciplinary proceeding. 
The control variables are not necessarily theoretically informed, but are included 
in the models due to their assumed (and previously demonstrated) impact on the 
dependent variable. The bivariate analyses presented in Table 12 indicate both the fixed 
effect for the facility within which inmates are housed and the indicator for whether that 
facility is within the Federal Bureau of Prisons or a state prison system are significantly 
associated with sanction outcome. Surprisingly, the third control variable, inmate age at 
time of interview, is not significantly associated with punishment outcome when 
operationalized as the Sanction Severity Scale. 
 
Partial Multivariate Models  
 Tables 13-16 present the results of a series of Heckman ordered probit models 
designed to address the first hypothesis of research question one. The hypothesis states 
that, holding constant all other variables internal to each set of factors included in the 
models, there will be a significant relationship between each individual variable and the 
dependent variables under observation. In order to examine this hypothesis for the first 
dependent variable operationalized as the sanction severity scale, a Heckman ordered 
probit model was estimated regressing sanction severity on the control variables. Then in 
a sequential fashion, each block of variables (i.e., legal, quasi-legal, extra-legal) was 
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included in a model with the controls to establish a baseline for how the individual 
factors are associated with sanction severity. As was discussed previously in Chapter 3, 
the table for each analysis completed with a Heckman selection bias correction includes 
two models – (1) one from a sample selection equation and (2) another from the 
estimation model of interest. While both models are presented in each table, incidental 
selection necessitating the selection bias correction has already been verified21, so only 
the results from the estimation models (or the Full Model) are presented and discussed in-
text below.  
 As is shown in Table 13, of the three control variables, only the federal system 
indicator is significantly associated with sanction severity (ß=.279, p<.01). While 
admittedly a very crude analysis at this point, this coefficient suggests that inmates 
housed in facilities within the federal system will likely receive a more severe 
punishment outcome than inmates not within the federal system. While the non-
significant facility indicator is not surprising at this point, the non-significant relationship 
between age of inmate and sanction severity is surprising. Even though the age variable 
indicates at age time of interview and not age at time of disciplinary proceeding, similar 
to the general finding of a negative relationship between inmate age and self-reported and 
official misconduct (Flanagan, 1983; Steiner et al., 2014), it was expected that inmate age  
 
 
                                                 
21 The significant value for the Wald test of independence of equations (2 = 4.66, p=0.0309) and the 
sample selection correction coefficient AthRho (ß=-.218, p<.05) reported on Table 13 indicate there is 
evidence of selection bias operating in the models, necessitating the use of a statistical technique to correct 
for sample selection. Use of a sample selection correction, such as the Heckman correction and the two-
stage model with IMR employed in this study, minimizes the risk of biased findings resulting from the 
sample selection. 
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Table 13. Preliminary Heckman Ordered Probit Regression Model with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity Scale 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct offensea       
   Security/order violation       
   Drug/alcohol       
   Property/contraband       
   Assault: inmate       
   Assault: staff       
Prior misconduct History       
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug       
   Property/financial       
   Public order/misdemeanor       
   Other       
Prison job       
Program participation       
Time served       
Prior incarceration        
Extra-legal Factors       
Male       
Racec       
   Black       
   Hispanic       
   Other       
Controls       
Facility -.001 .000 -1.44 .000 .000 0.88 
Federal -.301 .102 -3.14** .279 .093 2.99** 
Age  -.011 .001 -7.46*** .000 .002 0.06 
       
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .112 .037 3.07**    
   2 .116 .037 3.12**    
   3 .168 .043 3.89***    
   4 .108 .080 1.34    
Negative affect .277 .022 12.60***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .145 .036 4.08***    
   Prior attempt .137 .034 3.96***    
GED or HS diploma .141 .024 5.94***    
Married -.229 .026 -8.77***    
       
Constant 166 .108 1.55    
Rho -.214 .096     
Cut 1    -1.744 .111 -15.65*** 
Cut 2    -.480 .105 -4.56*** 
Cut 3    -.168 .111 -1.52 
Cut 4    .677 .119 5.69*** 
AthRho    -.218 .101 -2.16* 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
34.04*** 
-20143.42 
2 = 4.66, p=0.0309 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Table 14. Preliminary Heckman Ordered Probit Regression Model with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity Scale 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct offensea       
   Security/order violation -- -- -- -.206 .064 -3.22*** 
   Drug/alcohol -- -- -- .697 .064 10.92*** 
   Property/contraband -- -- -- .157 .051 3.07** 
   Assault: inmate -- -- -- .586 .048 12.28*** 
   Assault: staff -- -- -- .530 .054 9.87*** 
Prior misconduct History -- -- -- -.004 .010 -0.41 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug       
   Property/financial       
   Public order/misdemeanor       
   Other       
Prison job       
Program participation       
Time served       
Prior incarceration        
Extra-legal Factors       
Male       
Racec       
   Black       
   Hispanic       
   Other       
Controls       
Facility -.000 .000 -1.27 .000 .000 0.71 
Federal -.347 .107 -3.25*** .309 .094 3.29*** 
Age  -.011 .002 -7.37*** -.000 .002 -0.11 
       
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .126 .038 3.35***    
   2 .137 .038 3.61***    
   3 .179 .044 4.04***    
   4 .150 .082 1.83    
Negative affect .295 .023 12.84***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .152 .037 4.08***    
   Prior attempt .129 .036 3.55***    
GED or HS diploma .144 .024 5.95***    
Married -.242 .028 -8.67***    
       
Constant .070 .110 0.64    
Rho -.096 .103     
Cut 1    -1.481 .122 12.17*** 
Cut 2    -.178 .116 -1.55 
Cut 3    .154 .121 1.28 
Cut 4    1.078 .129 8.36*** 
AthRho    -.097 .104 -0.93 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
356.18*** 
-17946.29 
2 = 0.86, p=0.3536 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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would be significantly associated with sanction severity. Looking briefly at the 
coefficient for inmate age for the sample selection model in Table 13, it is clear that 
inmate age is significantly associated with likelihood of receiving a formal misconduct 
ticket/guilty finding at disciplinary hearing (the selection variable) in a negative direction, 
but this relationship is not sustained once controlling for the effect of selection on 
sanction severity.  
 Table 14 presents the second partial model, in which the legal factors are included 
in the control-only model. The first legal factor is an ordered categorical variable that 
indicates the type of misconduct offense from the most recent disciplinary hearing for 
which the punishment under observation is received. In this initial model with just legal 
factors and control variables, all categories of instant misconduct offense are significant 
predictors of sanction severity. When compared to the reference category of “disruptive 
behavior,” inmates who proceed through the disciplinary process for a security/order 
violation (ß=-.206) are significantly less likely to receive a punishment at the high end of 
the sanction severity scale for that offense. The categories of assault on another inmate 
(ß=.586), assault on institutional staff (ß=.530), misconduct related to institutional 
property and/or contraband (ß=.157), and drug/alcohol offense are all positively 
associated with the dependent variable (ß=.679), suggesting those offenses are likely to 
receive a more severe punishment outcome when compared with the offense of disruptive 
behavior. The other legal factor, prior misconduct history, is surprisingly not significantly 
associated with sanction severity. 
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Table 15. Preliminary Heckman Ordered Probit Regression Model with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity Scale 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct offensea       
   Security/order violation       
   Drug/alcohol       
   Property/contraband       
   Assault: inmate       
   Assault: staff       
Prior misconduct History       
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.024 .043 -0.55 -.031 .046 -0.68 
   Property/financial -0.876 .050 -1.74 .000 .056 0.02 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.076 .169 -0.45 .211 .221 0.96 
   Other -.198 .062 -3.17** .048 .074 0.65 
Prison job -.098 .037 -2.66** -.223 .041 -5.41*** 
Program participation .230 .033 6.87*** -.123 .042 -2.93** 
Time served .466 .022 21.40*** .081 .042 1.94* 
Prior incarceration  .216 .030 7.30*** .105 .036 2.92** 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male       
Racec       
   Black       
   Hispanic       
   Other       
Controls       
Facility -.000 .000 -0.36 .000 .000 0.33 
Federal -.484 .091 -5.29*** .355 .098 3.73*** 
Age  -.027 .002 -16.19*** -.004 .003 -1.17 
       
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .114 .045 2.53*    
   2 .149 .051 2.92**    
   3 .222 .054 4.11***    
   4 .114 .102 1.11    
Negative affect .311 .029 10.64***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .090 .047 1.93    
   Prior attempt .214 .044 4.83***    
GED or HS diploma .064 .029 2.20*    
Married -.188 .037 -5.14***    
       
Constant -.932 .107 -8.68***    
Rho -.170 .125     
Cut 1    -1.769 .183 -9.69*** 
Cut 2    -.490 .187 -2.62** 
Cut 3    -.158 .192 -0.82 
Cut 4    .709 .204 3.48*** 
AthRho    -.172 .129 -1.33 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
88.09*** 
-13422.40 
2 = 1.78, p=0.1822 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Table 16. Preliminary Heckman Ordered Probit Regression Model with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity Scale 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct offensea       
   Security/order violation       
   Drug/alcohol       
   Property/contraband       
   Assault: inmate       
   Assault: staff       
Prior misconduct History       
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug       
   Property/financial       
   Public order/misdemeanor       
   Other       
Prison job       
Program participation       
Time served       
Prior incarceration        
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .353 .058 6.07*** .141 .075 1.88 
Racec       
   Black .199 .031 6.50*** -.003 .034 -0.10 
   Hispanic -.036 .040 -0.90 .061 .048 1.28 
   Other .098 .049 1.99* .095 .058 1.62 
Controls       
Facility -.000 .000 -0.46 .000 .000 0.96 
Federal -.364 .091 -4.00*** .288 .090 3.21*** 
Age  -.011 .001 -7.22*** .001 .002 0.55 
       
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .170 .036 4.75***    
   2 .202 .035 5.73***    
   3 .245 .045 5.48***    
   4 .191 .078 2.44*    
Negative affect .281 .023 12.50***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .159 .036 4.46***    
   Prior attempt .201 .033 6.02***    
GED or HS diploma .149 .024 6.22***    
Married -.205 .026 -7.90***    
       
Constant -.349 .119 -2.94**    
Rho -.300 .085     
Cut 1    -1.631 .128 -12.70*** 
Cut 2    -.380 .126 -3.01** 
Cut 3    -.071 .133 -0.53 
Cut 4    .762 .144 5.28*** 
AthRho    -.309 .093 -3.32*** 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
57.95*** 
-19951.87 
2 = 11.00, p=0.0001 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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The partial model presented in Table 15 removes the legal factors and introduces 
the variables that make up the quasi-legal factors to establish these initial relationships. In 
this model with just the control variables, four of the five quasi-legal factors are 
significantly associated with sanction severity in the expected directions. Results indicate 
that having a job within the prison and program participation are each negatively 
associated with sanction severity (ß=-.223 and ß=-.123, respectively), such that those 
who work or are involved in inmate programming are likely to receive a sanction on the 
lower end of the sanction severity scale. Inmates who have been in prison prior to the 
current period of incarceration also are significantly more likely to receive a more severe 
punishment sanction than are those who are serving their first prison sentence (ß=.105). 
There is a positive relationship between time served in prison and sanction severity such 
that for each unit increase in number of months served, the value on the sanction severity 
scale raises .08 probit units (ß=.081). 
 Findings of the final partial model, with just the extra-legal factors and control 
variables, are presented in Table 16. Results of this partial model suggest that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between either inmate gender or race/ethnicity and 
punishment severity. Both of these factors are significantly related to selection, however, 
such that men are significantly more likely to receive a formal misconduct ticket/finding 
of guilty compared to women, as well as black inmates and those in the “other” 
racial/ethnic when compared to white inmates. The results of this Heckman selection 
model suggest that once controlling for the fact that male and black/other racial inmates 
are more likely to receive a formal misconduct ticket/guilty finding post-disciplinary 
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proceeding, gender and race/ethnicity do not exert an effect on sanction severity as 
currently operationalized in this partial, exploratory model.  
Each of the partial models presented in Tables 13-16 and discussed above is an 
ordered probit model, appropriate for the first operationalization of the dependent 
variable – the ordered categorical sanction severity scale. Partial models to establish 
relationships between the variables of interest are conducted with the first 
operationalization of the dependent variable, as the second operationalization of the 
dependent variables looks simply at each category of the sanction severity scale on its 
own. Since these relationships are already established, partial models will not be 
conducted for the second operationalization of the dependent variable.  
Figure 1. Overview of Significant Relationships; Theoretical Variables and Sanction Severity Scalea  
 Partial Model 2 Partial Model 3 Partial Model 4 
Legal Factors    
Most serious instant misconduct offenseb    
   Security/order violation -   
   Drug/alcohol +   
   Property/contraband +   
   Assault: inmate +   
   Assault: staff +   
Prior misconduct History    
Quasi-legal Factors    
Offense of convictionc    
   Drug    
   Property/financial    
   Public order/misdemeanor    
   Other  -  
Prison job  -  
Program participation  +  
Time served  +  
Prior incarceration     
Extra-legal Factors    
Male    
Raced    
   Black    
   Hispanic    
   Other    
a Information presented in Tables 14-16 
b Reference: Disruptive behavior c Reference: Person d Reference: White 
 
   Blank cell indicates non-significant relationship 
+ Indicates positive relationship, significant at least p<.05 
-  Indicates negative relationship, significant at least p<.05 
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The findings of the partial models presented in Figure 1 and in Tables 14-16 help 
to address the initial hypothesis that legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors will be 
significantly associated with sanction outcome. The results of this first set of analyses fail 
to support this hypothesis. Findings indicate that, when estimating models with just a 
single block of theoretical variables at a time, the legal factor of prior inmate misconduct 
history, quasi-legal factor of offense of conviction, and extra-legal factors of gender and 
race/ethnicity are not significantly related to sanction severity.  
 
Fully Saturated Multivariate Models 
While the partial models examined above are multivariate models in that they 
include the effect of various control variables as well as the other theoretical variables 
within each group, the models presented to this point have not been fully saturated 
multivariate models. Unlike the partial models that regress sanction severity on a single 
set of either legal, quasi-legal, or extra-legal factors (plus controls) at a time, the fully 
saturated model includes all of the variables. This allows for estimating the effect of each 
independent variable on the dependent variable, while holding constant the statistical 
effect of all other variables that have been included in the full model.  
Inmate Characteristics on Sanction Severity Scale Outcome Variable 
Table 17 shows the results of a fully saturated multivariate model where sanction 
severity is regressed on all variables under observation. In order to correct for the 
potential selection bias inherent in the research design, the Heckman correction is used 
with the ordered probit regression model. Starting with the legal factors, results of this 
full model indicate that both the severity of instant misconduct offense and inmate prior 
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misconduct history are significantly associated with sanction severity. Reflecting nearly 
the same pattern that was observed in the partial models (Table 14), when compared to 
the reference category of engaging in disruptive behavior, the category of security/order 
violation is negatively associated with sanction severity (ß=-.307) while assault of staff 
and fellow inmate and drug/alcohol misconduct are all positively associated with sanction 
severity (ß=.467, ß=.528, and ß=.649, respectively). Different from the partial model 
shown in Table 14, the misconduct category reflecting a property/contraband offense is 
not significantly related to sanction severity in the fully saturated model.  
Reflecting a large departure from the partial model in Table 14, the variable 
reflecting inmate prior misconduct history, which was not significantly related to sanction 
severity previously, achieves significance within the fully saturated model (Table 17). 
Contrary to expectations, however, the relationship between a prior misconduct history 
and sanction severity is negative, such that having a more extensive prior misconduct 
history significantly decreases the likelihood that an inmate will receive a punishment 
option at the higher end of the sanction severity scale (ß=-.023). As is reflected in the 
standardized coefficient, the magnitude of this relationship is, while negative and 
therefore counter-intuitive, relatively small. It is interesting that a variable that was not 
significant in a more trimmed, partial model achieves significance in a fully saturated 
model. This phenomena could be suggestive of some sort of hidden interaction between 
the variable of interest and another one in the fully saturated model that was not in the 
partial model. Among others, this potential interaction will be the subject of later 
analyses.  
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Table 17. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors (based on 326 groups); 
Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity Scale 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct offensea       
   Security/order violation    -.307 .074 -4.17*** 
   Drug/alcohol    .649 .068 9.55*** 
   Property/contraband    .095 .057 1.66 
   Assault: inmate    .528 .056 9.41*** 
   Assault: staff    .467 .064 7.28*** 
Prior misconduct History    -.023 .012 -1.94* 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.022 .045 -0.48 -.035 .051 -0.69 
   Property/financial -.095 .053 -1.81 .035 .060 0.58 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.039 .179 -0.22 .114 .232 0.49 
   Other -.163 .064 -2.55* .044 .077 0.58 
Prison job -.114 .038 -3.03** -.153 .043 -3.53*** 
Program participation .226 .035 6.52*** -.099 .044 -2.23* 
Time served .491 .024 20.44*** -.019 .049 -0.38 
Prior incarceration  .217 .030 7.32*** .068 .039 1.76 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .071 .063 1.13 .100 .081 1.23 
Racec       
   Black .060 .036 1.68 -.023 .041 -0.58 
   Hispanic -.153 .046 -3.31*** .013 .061 0.21 
   Other .027 .064 0.42 .093 .079 1.18 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.63 .000 .000 0.29 
Federal -.536 .093 -5.75*** .415 .099 4.21*** 
Age  -.029 .002 -15.59*** .002 .004 0.63 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .139 .047 2.95**    
   2 .191 .051 3.76***    
   3 .246 .057 4.32***    
   4 .144 .106 1.35    
Negative affect .337 .031 10.78***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .103 .049 2.12*    
   Prior attempt .219 .045 4.91***    
GED or HS diploma .047 .031 1.53    
Married -.188 .039 -4.86***    
       
Constant -1.179 .125 -9.43***    
Rho -.263 .141     
Cut 1    -1.737 .188 -9.25*** 
Cut 2    -.469 .197 -2.38* 
Cut 3    -.125 .205 -0.61 
Cut 4    .791 .225 3.51*** 
AthRho    -.270 .151 -1.79 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
319.57*** 
-11795.71 
2 = 3.19, p=0.0740 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Moving down the categories in the fully saturated Heckman ordered probit model 
presented in Table 17, some of the relationships between the quasi-legal factors and 
sanction severity have changed from those previously observed in the partial model 
(presented in Table 15). Offense of incarceration remains a non-significant predictor of 
sanction severity in the fully saturated model. Both having a having a prison job  
(ß=-.153) and involvement in programming (ß=-.099) maintain a statistically significant 
negative relationship with sanction severity. The effect of the dichotomous indicator for a 
prior incarceration, and the ratio indicator of time served, on the other hand, lose 
significance when included in the fully saturated model. Consistent with the findings of 
the partial model shown in Table 16, neither extra-legal factor – gender or race/ethnicity 
– is found to be significantly associated with sanction severity in the saturated model (see 
Table 17).  
Inmate Characteristics on Punishment Categories Outcome Variable 
 Nested Heckman probit models. Due to the number of individual models that 
are needed to run the series of nested Heckman probit models for the dependent variable 
when operationalized as Punishment Categories, the results of this analysis are reported 
in five tables – one for each category of the sanction option. Table 18.1 reveals the results 
of the Heckman probit model for the sanction category “no formal punishment.” As is 
observed on this table, relationships between the independent variables and this category 
of the dependent variable are almost the mirror opposite of what has been observed 
previously in the fully saturated Heckman ordered probit model (see Table 17). In the 
current model where the “no punishment” category is a dichotomous indicator, the 
majority of the categories of instant misconduct offense are significant, and in the 
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opposite direction as the previous analyses. Here the significant relationship between 
assault on staff and inmates, drug/alcohol misconduct offense, and the outcome are 
negative, while security/order violation is positively associated with this outcome of 
receiving no formal punishment. Prior history of misconduct, the second legal factor, is 
not a significant predictor in this model. Looking at the quasi-legal factors, prison job is 
significantly associated with sanction outcome (see Table 17). In this case, however, the 
effects are positive. Neither of the extra-legal factors are significantly associated with 
receiving no punishment. 
Table 18.2 presents the results of the Heckman probit model regressing the 
second sanction category (modification of inmate privileges) on the full group of 
independent and control variables. When looking at the block of legal factors, the results 
are consistent with those reported in Table 18.1: security/order violation is positively 
associated with modification of privileges, and the more serious misconduct offenses of 
assault and drug/alcohol offenses are negatively associated with privilege modification. 
Also, having a prison job and participation in institutional programming are positively 
associated with the sanction outcome of privilege modification.   
 112
Table 18.1 Series of nested Heckman Probit Models with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Punishment Category “No Formal Punishment” 
 Selection Model Sanction Category 1 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    .106 .146 0.73 
   Drug/alcohol    -.480 .174 -2.77*** 
   Property/contraband    -.048 .099 -0.48 
   Assault: inmate    -.386 .109 -3.53*** 
   Assault: staff    -.295 .122 -2.42** 
Prior misconduct History    .034 .023 1.48 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.022 .045 -0.48 .097 .110 0.88 
   Property/financial -.095 .053 -1.81 -.020 .131 -0.15 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.048 .178 -0.27 .676 .316 2.14* 
   Other -.164 .064 -2.56** -.063 .193 -0.33 
Prison job -.118 .038 -3.12** .238 .087 2.72** 
Program participation .227 .035 6.55*** .100 .088 1.14 
Time served .490 .024 20.42*** .010 .072 0.14 
Prior incarceration  .215 .030 7.25*** -.110 .073 -1.50 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .071 .063 1.12 .002 .127 0.01 
Racec       
   Black .060 .036 1.68 .015 .056 0.17 
   Hispanic -.151 .046 -3.28*** -.148 .142 -1.04 
   Other .032 .064 0.50 .073 .137 0.54 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.64 .001 .001 2.36* 
Federal -.535 .093 -5.72*** -.939 .248 -3.79*** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.66*** .005 .006 0.88 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .132 .047 2.79**    
   2 .178 .051 3.49***    
   3 .246 .059 4.19***    
   4 .145 .108 1.34    
Negative affect .339 .031 10.88***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .105 .049 2.16*    
   Prior attempt .225 .048 4.81***    
GED or HS diploma .050 .031 1.61    
Married -.192 .039 -4.92***    
       
Constant -1.181 .125 -9.42*** -2.306 .360 -6.40*** 
Rho -.029 .209     
AthRho    -0.29 .209 -0.14 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
79.73*** 
-6477.029 
2 = 0.02, p=0.8884 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Table 18.2. Series of nested Heckman Probit Models with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Punishment Category “Modification of Privileges”  
 Selection Model Sanction Category 2 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    .264 .094 2.81** 
   Drug/alcohol    -.682 .104 -6.55*** 
   Property/contraband    -.102 .061 -1.68 
   Assault: inmate    -.727 .076 -9.61*** 
   Assault: staff    -.617 .084 -7.33*** 
Prior misconduct History    .031 .016 1.92* 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.020 .045 -0.44 .005 .063 0.01 
   Property/financial -.096 .053 -1.83 -.016 .078 -0.21 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.047 .177 -0.27 -.739 .310 -2.38 
   Other -.164 .064 -2.58** -.168 .101 -1.66 
Prison job -.119 .038 -3.16** .190 .060 3.19*** 
Program participation .225 .035 6.47*** .123 .058 2.13* 
Time served .490 .024 20.47*** .061 .065 0.94 
Prior incarceration  .218 .030 7.35*** -.012 .051 -0.24 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .071 .063 1.14 -.215 .083 -2.58** 
Racec       
   Black .060 .036 1.68 -.001 .053 -0.02 
   Hispanic -.152 .045 -3.32*** .032 .071 0.45 
   Other .030 .064 0.46 -.236 .103 -2.30* 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.59 .002 .000 4.03*** 
Federal -.533 .093 -5.73*** -.509 .126 -4.05*** 
Age  -.029 .002 -15.67*** -.009 .004 -2.10* 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .136 .047 2.93**    
   2 .191 .050 3.84***    
   3 .260 .057 4.59***    
   4 .127 .104 1.22    
Negative affect .333 .032 10.44***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .109 .049 2.21*    
   Prior attempt .222 .044 5.00***    
GED or HS diploma .051 .030 1.70    
Married -.180 .039 -4.59***    
       
Constant -1.175 .126 -9.29*** -1.077 .277 -3.90*** 
Rho .482 .190     
AthRho    .526 .248 2.12* 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
321.89*** 
-8016.485 
2 = 4.50, p=0.0339 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Table 18.3. Series of nested Heckman Probit Models with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Punishment Category “Higher Custody - Internal” 
 Selection Model Sanction Category 3 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    .282 .132 2.14* 
   Drug/alcohol    -.123 .124 -0.99 
   Property/contraband    .093 .093 0.79 
   Assault: inmate    -.045 .091 -0.49 
   Assault: staff    -.198 .100 -1.98 
Prior misconduct History    .036 .019 1.84 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.022 .045 -0.48 .062 .092 0.68 
   Property/financial -.084 .053 -1.80 -.053 .110 -0.48 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.048 .178 -0.27 -.165 .454 -1.35 
   Other -.164 .064 -2.56** .356 .132 2.69** 
Prison job -.117 .038 -3.11** .110 .068 1.62 
Program participation .227 .035 6.55*** .073 .075 1.97 
Time served .490 .234 20.44*** .019 .066 -0.29 
Prior incarceration  .215 .030 7.25*** -.012 .060 -0.20 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .071 .063 1.12 .191 .101 1.89* 
Racec       
   Black .050 .025 1.67 .028 .067 0.42 
   Hispanic -.151 .046 -3.28*** .034 .099 0.35 
   Other .032 .064 0.49 .280 .126 2.22* 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.63 -.002 .001 -3.41*** 
Federal -.535 .094 -5.72*** -.510 .190 -2.68** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.64*** -.002 .005 -0.33 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .132 .047 2.79**    
   2 .179 .051 3.53***    
   3 .246 .058 4.21***    
   4 .145 .108 1.34    
Negative affect .339 .031 10.89***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .104 .049 2.14*    
   Prior attempt .225 .047 4.83***    
GED or HS diploma .049 .030 1.63    
Married -.193 .039 -4.90***    
       
Constant -1.180 .125 -9.41*** -.904 .35 -2.696** 
Rho .022 .077     
AthRho    .022 .177 0.13 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
84.52*** 
-7250.111 
2 = 0.02, p=0.9000 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Contrary to the previous analysis in model Table 18.1, both extra-legal factors are 
significantly associated with the outcome in this model predicting receiving the 
punishment option of modification of privileges (sanction category 2). Results indicate 
that males are significantly less likely to receive this punishment option than are females. 
Similarly, when compared to white inmates, those who fall into the Other racial/ethnic 
category are also significantly less likely to receive this punishment option. Black and 
Hispanic racial/ethnic categories are not significantly related to the dependent variable.  
 The results of the Heckman probit model for the sanction category transfer to 
higher custody within the same institution, are reported in Table 18.3. A different pattern 
of significance emerges in the current model. Only one category of the instant 
misconduct offense variable is significantly associated with transfer to higher custody. 
Compared to the disruptive behavior category, those inmates who are found guilty of a 
security/order violation are significantly more likely to receive an increase in custody 
modification internal to the current facility. Results indicate that, compared to the 
reference category of a person-related offense, the “other” offense of conviction category 
is positively associated (ß=.356, p≤.01) with custody transfer. Importantly, the extra-legal 
factors of “other” race/ethnicity and male gender are also positively associated with 
increase in custody (ß=.191 and ß=.280, respectively).  
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Table 18.4. Series of nested Heckman Probit Models with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Punishment Category “External CustodyTransfer/Solitary” 
 Selection Model Sanction Category 4 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    -.391 .105 -3.73*** 
   Drug/alcohol    .342 .092 3.73*** 
   Property/contraband    -.023 .065 -0.35 
   Assault: inmate    .569 .067 8.45*** 
   Assault: staff    .577 .071 8.11*** 
Prior misconduct Hx       
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.020 .045 -0.44 -.051 .068 -0.75 
   Property/financial -.095 .053 -1.79 .011 .085 0.13 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.047 .177 -0.27 .239 .253 0.94 
   Other -.161 .064 -2.51* -.065 .114 -0.57 
Prison job -.116 .038 -3.10** -.281 .054 -5.18*** 
Program participation .225 .035 6.48*** -.171 .048 -3.56*** 
Time served .490 .024 20.44*** -.068 .053 -1.29 
Prior incarceration  .216 .030 7.26*** .055 .048 -1.14 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .072 .063 1.14 .109 .079 1.38 
Racec       
   Black .059 .036 1.64 .039 .054 0.74 
   Hispanic -.153 .046 -3.32*** -.028 .069 -0.41 
   Other .033 .064 0.52 -.046 .105 -0.43 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.61 -.003 .000 -7.17*** 
Federal -.533 .094 -5.69*** .833 .113 7.34*** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.56*** .010 .004 2.73** 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .137 .047 2.93**    
   2 .186 .050 3.68***    
   3 .253 .058 4.35***    
   4 .125 .107 1.17    
Negative affect .341 .031 10.95***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .099 .049 2.02*    
   Prior attempt .220 .046 4.78***    
GED or HS diploma .043 .030 1.42    
Married -.189 .039 -4.38***    
       
Constant -1.18 .126 -9.37***    
Rho -.334 .140     
AthRho    -.347 .158 -2.20* 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
296.53*** 
-8241.612 
2 = 4.83, p=0.0280 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Table 18.5. Series of nested Heckman Probit Models with Huber White Cluster robust standard errors 
(based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Punishment Category “Received New Sentence” 
 Selection Model Sanction Category 5 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    -.336 .114 -2.95** 
   Drug/alcohol    .514 .090 5.70*** 
   Property/contraband    .109 .075 1.44 
   Assault: inmate    .241 .074 3.26*** 
   Assault: staff    .209 .086 2.42* 
Prior misconduct Hx    .007 .015 0.43 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.022 .046 -0.48 -.007 .069 -0.10 
   Property/financial -.096 .053 -1.81 .046 .080 0.58 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.046 .178 -0.26 .222 .235 0.95 
   Other -.164 .064 -2.57** -.003 .105 -0.03 
Prison job -.117 .038 -3.11** -.008 .061 -0.13 
Program participation .227 .035 6.56*** -.012 .059 -0.20 
Time served .490 .034 20.44*** .040 .056 0.72 
Prior incarceration  .215 .030 7.27*** .116 .049 2.37* 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .071 .063 1.13 .016 .118 0.14 
Racec       
   Black .060 .036 1.68 -.064 .057 -1.12 
   Hispanic -.151 .046 -3.28*** -.016 .075 -0.21 
   Other .030 .064 0.48 .111 .100 1.11 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.62 .003 .000 5.75*** 
Federal -.535 .093 -5.72*** -.108 .130 -0.83 
Age  -.029 .002 -15.63*** -.003 .004 -0.79 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .133 .017 2.82**    
   2 .181 .051 3.55***    
   3 .246 .058 4.21***    
   4 .147 .108 1.36    
Negative affect .338 .031 10.84***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .105 .049 2.16*    
   Prior attempt .224 .046 4.85***    
GED or HS diploma .050 .030 1.64    
Married -.192 .039 -4.94***    
       
Constant -1.180 .126 -9.39*** -1.673 .302 -5.54*** 
Rho -.093 .156     
AthRho    -.093 .157 -0.59 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
122.59*** 
-7959.42 
2 = 0.35, p=0.5528 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior b Reference: Person c Reference: White 
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Effects change more substantively when looking at the fourth sanction category, a 
transfer to another facility or solitary confinement (see Table 18.4). Consistent with the 
results of the fully saturated model for the sanction severity scale (see Table 17), 
committing a security/order violation is significantly and negatively associated with 
transfer to another location or solitary confinement (ß=-.391), while a drug/alcohol 
violation (ß=.342) and assault on fellow inmate (ß=.569) and staff (ß=.577) are 
significantly and positively associated with the issuance of this punishment. Also 
consistent with the results reported in Table 17, having a job within the prison (ß=-.281) 
and involvement in programming (ß=-.171) have a significant negative association with 
external transfer or placement in solitary confinement. Continuing the trend of 
consistency in findings with regard to the extra-legal factors, neither gender nor 
race/ethnicity is statistically associated with the sanction outcome.  
Table 18.5 presents the results of the final nested Heckman probit model for the 
most severe punishment category, crime conviction and receipt of a new sentence. 
Results of this model suggest that the legal factor of severity of instant misconduct 
offense is, with the exception of the quasi-legal factor of having been previously 
incarcerated, the only independent variable under observation in this final probit model 
that is significantly associated (ß=.241) with receiving this most severe of punishment 
options. As has been the trend in the majority of prior analyses, the observed pattern of 
results suggests that, compared to a disruptive behavior misconduct charge, the more 
serious varieties of inmate misconduct – those being assault on inmates and staff and 
drug/alcohol violations – maintain a significant positive association with receiving this 
most severe of punishment options (ß=.209 and ß=.514 respectively). The less serious 
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type of misconduct, committing a security/order violation, has a significantly negative 
association with receiving the most severe sanction option (ß=.-.336), which is consistent 
with expectations. The only other variable of all quasi- and extra-legal factors is the 
quasi-legal criminogenic risk indicator representing having been previously incarcerated 
prior to the current term of incarceration. The positive value of this statistically 
significant coefficient (ß=.116) suggests that, controlling for all other relevant factors, 
when an inmate has previously been incarcerated prior to their current sentence, the 
likelihood of receiving this punishment option increases by .116 probit units. 
Two-stage model with IMR. As was discussed in the Chapter 3, the strategy of 
estimating a series of nested Heckman probit models with dichotomous outcomes for 
each sanction category in the second dependent variable of punishment categories – the 
results of which are presented in the prior section, Tables 18.1 through 18.5 – was 
employed out of necessity. Stata14 does not have the capacity to estimate the preferred 
multinomial logistic regression model within the Heckman suite of analysis commands. 
One of the main limitations of this statistical approach is the inherent loss of data that 
accompanies forcing an ordered categorical variable into a series of dichotomies (which 
are inherently not-ordered). Stata14 does, however, allow for the ability to estimate the 
unique effect of all independent variables on each category of the dependent variable.  
While not used as frequently as the very popular Heckman method of correcting 
for sample selection bias, there is yet another way to run a two-stage model that results in 
an appropriate correction for sample selection with a multinomial logistic regression 
equation. As was described in the analytic strategy discussed in Chapter 3, this two-step 
process involves first estimating a probit model for selection and using that model to 
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calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (one of many ways to calculate the hazard for selection). 
Second, the Inverse Mills Ratio is inserted into the estimation model (in this case, a 
multinomial logistic regression) as a covariate to correct for the hazard for selection. This 
section discusses the results of this analytic approach to modeling the effects of the legal, 
quasi-legal, and extra-legal variables on the second dependent variable looking at the 
individual punishment categories. 
 Table 19 shows the results of this two-stage multinomial logistic regression model 
that includes the Inverse Mills Ratio to correct for potential sample selection bias. 
Consistent with presentation of the results from prior models, results from the sample 
selection model will not be discussed in favor of reporting and interpreting findings from 
the estimation model of interest. When looking at the column labeled Sanction Category 
2, which represents the likelihood of receiving a sanction in the category of modification 
of privileges as compared with the reference category (receiving no punishment), it is 
immediately obvious that the variables in the model are uniformly not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of receiving this punishment category. By way of 
interpretation, this means that the variables included within the groups of legal, quasi-
legal, and extra-legal factors are not significantly related to receiving the punishment 
outcome of modification of privileges. While beyond the scope of the current study, it is 
possible to surmise from this finding that receiving a sanction related to modification of 
privileges is rather random, and cannot be predicted by the constellation of variables 
under observation in the current study.  
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Looking at the third sanction category, a custody increase modification internal to 
the current facility, compared to the reference category of no punishment, it seems that 
the predictive ability of the legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors is little improved. 
Representing a slight improvement over sanction category two, there is one legal factor 
that is significantly associated with likelihood of receiving a punishment option resulting 
in custody modification internal to the current facility. When comparing the misconduct 
category of committing an assault on a staff member to the reference category of 
disruptive behavior, holding the effect on the dependent variable of all legal, quasi-legal, 
and extra-legal factors constant, committing a staff assault significantly increases the 
likelihood (ß=.765) that an inmate will receive a sanction in the punishment category of 
an increased modification to custody level internal to the current facility. 
 Results of the multinomial logistic regression equation for sanction category four 
(custody modification external to the facility and/or solitary confinement) suggest that 
multiple variables within the groups of legal and quasi-legal factors are significantly 
associated with likelihood of receiving this punishment outcome compared to the 
reference category of receiving no punishment. Consistent with the fully saturated 
Heckman ordered probit model presented in Table 19, the misconduct category of 
security/order violation is negatively associated with receiving sanction category four 
(ß=-.805), while committing a drug/alcohol misconduct offense (ß=1.477), and assault on 
either institutional staff (ß=1.319) or another inmate (ß=1.484) significantly increase the 
likelihood of receiving this punishment option. The second legal factor representing prior 
inmate misconduct history has a significant negative relationship with this punishment 
category, meaning that a more extensive misconduct history decreases the likelihood that 
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an inmate will receive the sanction category of custody modification external to current 
facility/solitary confinement. As was also established in the fully saturated Heckman 
ordered probit model, the quasi-legal factors of having a prison job and program 
participation are negatively associated with the category of the dependent variable  
(ß=-.839 and ß=-.464 respectively). By way of interpretation, this means that controlling 
for all other legal, quasi-legal, extra-legal, and control variables, having a job within the 
prison and involvement in programming significantly decrease the likelihood that an 
inmate will receive the disciplinary sanction of an external custody 
modification/placement in solitary confinement. 
 While we have already observed a difference in some of the unique relationship 
between independent variables and each category of the dependent variable of 
punishment option, these differences become even more pronounced when looking at the 
results of this analysis for the last category of the dependent outcome. Sanction category 
five represents the most severe punishment outcome as currently operationalized, that of 
receiving a new sentence resulting in a lengthening of the period of incarceration. 
Looking first at the legal factors, the same relationship between categories of the instant 
misconduct offense and dependent variable that has been observed for sanction category 
four is present in the results for sanction category five. There is a significant negative 
coefficient for security/order violations (ß=-.764), and a significant positive coefficient 
for drug/alcohol misconduct (ß=1.695), assault on institutional staff (ß=.940), and assault 
on a fellow inmate (ß=1.142). Interestingly though, prior inmate misconduct history 
again fails to achieve statistical significance in predicting the most severe punishment 
category in the multinomial model. Looking to the effect of the quasi-legal variables on 
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receiving this punishment option, the long established significant negative effects of 
maintaining a job within the prison remains for this punishment category (ß=-.524). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that prior incarceration, a quasi-legal variable which has not 
previously emerged as having a significant relationship with either operationalization of 
the dependent variable is significantly (ß=.345) associated with the likelihood of receipt 
of a new sentence. Interpreting this relationship suggests that holding all other factors 
constant, inmates who have been previously incarcerated are more likely than other 
inmates to be charged and convicted of a new crime or receive a sentence enhancement. 
  
Conclusion 
 All of the analyses presented above in Tables 17 through 19 were designed to 
address the second hypothesis. Hypothesis two assumes that in a fully saturated model 
the majority of the legal and quasi-legal factors will be significant predictors of sanction 
outcome, while the relationship between the extra-legal factors and sanction outcome will 
be reduced to nonsignificance. By way of overview, Figure 2 presents a visual of the 
statistically significant relationships established in the analyses discussed above. While 
three different sets of analyses were undertaken to address this research hypothesis, a 
semi-consistent pattern of findings has emerged in the results of the three different fully 
saturated models.  
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Compared to the reference category, four of the five categories of most serious 
misconduct offense are significantly associated with sanction severity as operationalized 
in both measures of the dependent variable. These include: security/order violation, 
drug/alcohol offense, assault of a fellow inmate, and assault of a staff member. While the 
directionality reflected in the specific coefficients changes across the three different 
models, the overall trend remains: Controlling for the effect of all other variables in the 
model, the less serious types of inmate misconduct (security/order violation and the 
reference category of disruptive behavior) tend to be associated with receiving a 
punishment in the lower end of the sanction severity scale, while the more serious types 
of inmate misconduct (drug/alcohol violations, assault) are associated with receiving a 
punishment in the higher end of the sanction severity scale. The second extra-legal factor, 
a variety scale reflecting prior history of inmate misconduct during the current period of 
incarceration, is not consistently associated with sanction severity throughout the models. 
This initial direct effect relationship presents initial evidence for the conclusion that 
misconduct type/severity has an effect on punishment type and severity.   
A very strong trend is observed in the effect of the quasi-legal factors on sanction 
severity. These analyses consistently indicate that offense of conviction for the current 
incarceration, while highly significant in all the sample selection models predicting 
receiving a formal misconduct ticket, is not associated with sanction outcome as currently 
operationalized. This means that after accounting for the influence that offense of 
conviction has on receiving a formal misconduct ticket, it does not exert any additional 
statistical influence on punishment outcome post-disciplinary proceeding. The two 
variables representing engagement in prosocial activities within the prison setting, prison 
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job and program participation, consistently act to influence sanction severity in a negative 
direction. Looking across the directionality of these variables for all three different 
analyses, it is clear that the only two punishment categories which observe a positive 
relationship between these prosocial factors and punishment outcome are in the two 
nested Heckman probit models that predict receiving the two least severe punishment 
outcomes (receiving no formal punishment and modification of inmate privileges). Then 
while not at all consistently significant predictors of sanction outcome across all three 
analyses, there is somewhat of a trend within the nested Heckman probit models where 
the indicators of risk are positively associated with sanction severity. This means that, 
controlling for the effect of all other variables, having served a prior term of incarceration 
and having served more time in prison for the current period of incarceration are 
associated with more post-disciplinary severe sanction outcomes.  
Finally, consistent with the second hypothesis, once all legal, quasi-legal, and 
control variables are introduced into the model with the previously significant (see Table 
12) extra-legal factors, gender and race/ethnicity exert no significant effects on sanction 
severity. Taking all of this into consideration, the results of the models presented in 
Tables 17-19 offer strong and consistent support for the hypothesis that the legal and 
quasi-legal factors are significantly associated with sanction outcome, while the extra-
legal factors are not.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS: CONDITIONING EFFECTS OF EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS 
Overview 
 This chapter presents the results of analyses designed to address the second 
research question, which asks whether the extra-legal factors (inmate race/ethnicity and 
gender) condition the relationship between the legal and quasi-legal factors and 
punishment outcome. Addressing hypotheses three through five, this set of analyses uses 
two different statistical approaches to examine a potential conditioning effect. As an 
aside, for parsimony of model specification, race/ethnicity is dichotomized into non-
white (=1) and white (=0) in the interactive models.  
One of the most common ways to look at a conditioning relationship is to create 
an interaction term between the variables of interest and then include that interactive term 
into the regression model. This strategy helps to uncover a statistical moderating effect 
whereby the value of one variable influences the relationship between another 
independent variable and the dependent variable. Inclusion of interactive terms into the 
model are a preferred strategy to investigate conditioning relationships under certain 
circumstances. Following this strategy, a set of two-way interaction terms will be 
calculated and included as covariates in the models to examine whether those interaction 
terms attenuate the relationship between the legal and quasi-legal factors of interest and 
punishment outcome. The calculated two-way interaction terms include Gender (male=1) 
* Legal Factors and Race/ethnicity (non-white=1) * Legal Factors, as well as Gender 
(male=1) * Quasi-legal Factors and Race/ethnicity (non-white=1) * Quasi-legal Factors. 
An additional two-way interactive term between the two extra-legal factors, Gender * 
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Race/ethnicity, will also be included in a final two-way interactive model. Beyond the 
two-way interactions, one final interactive term will be calculated and inserted into the 
models, which looks at a three-way interaction of Gender * Race/ethnicity * Legal-
factors. Additionally, all of the above models are estimated for both operationalizations 
of the dependent variable. 
However, interactive terms are not the preferred method for analyses when the 
interactive terms are made of discrete (i.e., categorical) variables (Long, 1997), as is the 
case in this research. As such, the conditioning relationships are investigated using an 
alternative method in which the original direct effect equations are re-run on samples that 
are split based on the extra-legal factors. Using this strategy, it is possible to determine if 
the magnitude, significance level, and/or directionality of the relationships between 
punishment outcome and inmate characteristics differ based on the extra-legal factors of 
gender and race/ethnicity. With a split-sample methodology, in order to look at the effect 
of gender on the observed effect of the legal factors on sanction severity, the direct 
effects model will be re-run twice. First with all male inmates and then with all female 
inmates. The same method will be undertaken for the extra-legal factor of race/ethnicity 
by looking at split samples of non-white and white inmates. This split-sample strategy 
also provides an opportunity to look at the interaction between extra-legal factors. The 
two different strategies to explore the conditioning effect of the extra-legal factors on the 
legal factors outlined above are conducted with both operationalizations of the dependent 
variable – those being sanction severity and punishment categories. 
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Two-way Interaction Terms: Extra-legal and Legal Factors 
The third hypothesis involves a potential conditioning effect of the two extra-legal 
variables (gender and race/ethnicity) on the relationship between the legal factors and 
punishment outcome. Each of the sets of analyses, inclusion of interactive terms and the 
split-sample models, are conducted for both operationalizations of the punishment 
outcome dependent variable. 
Sanction Severity Outcome Variable   
Gender * legal factors. Table 20 presents the results of the Heckman ordered 
probit model that includes the interaction terms between gender and the legal factors. In 
order to test the significance of the interactive term, both direct effects and interaction 
effects are included in the model. Results of this model indicate that there is no 
significant interaction between the legal factors and inmate gender in predicting sanction 
severity. The significant relationships between multiple of the categories of instant 
misconduct offense identified in the direct effects models (see overview Figure 2) remain 
unaffected once the interactive terms are included. Similarly, the interactive term 
between a prior history of inmate misconduct and male gender failed to reach statistical 
significance. Turning to the other non-interactive variables in this model, the significant 
negative relationship between the two quasi-legal factors representing prosocial inmate 
activities (having a prison job and program participation) remains robust to the inclusion 
of the Gender * Legal-factors interaction terms in this model (ß=-.155 and -.098, 
respectively).  
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Table 20. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster Robust Standard Errors (based on 
326 groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity, Interactions = Male X Legal Factors 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    -.221 .149 -1.49 
   Drug/alcohol    .492 .257 1.92* 
   Property/contraband    .149 .126 1.18 
   Assault: inmate    .602 .127 4.73*** 
   Assault: staff    .382 .144 2.66** 
Prior misconduct History    .124 .033 0.73 
2-way Interactions (Male * Legal Factors) 
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation * M    -.117 .172 -0.68 
   Drug/alcohol * M    .155 .268 0.58 
   Property/contraband * M    -.072 .143 -0.50 
   Assault: inmate * M    -.101 .141 -0.72 
   Assault: staff * M    .081 .160 0.51 
Prior misconduct Hx * M    -.051 .035 -1.47 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.023 0.45 -0.51 -0.31 .051 -0.61 
   Property/financial -.096 .053 -1.82 .041 .060 0.68 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.051 .180 -0.28 .117 .232 0.51 
   Other -.185 .064 -2.89** .051 .077 0.65 
Prison job -.103 .038 -2.71** -.155 .043 -3.59*** 
Program participation .227 .035 6.47*** -.098 .044 -2.24* 
Time served .491 .024 20.32*** -.020 .048 -0.42 
Prior incarceration  .226 .030 7.50**** .066 .039 1.72 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .068 .063 1.08 .236 .125 1.89 
Non-white .000 .034 0.01 -.005 .038 -0.14 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.14 .000 .000 0.36 
Federal -.521 .094 -5.51*** .414 .098 4.23*** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.33*** .002 .004 0.68 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .139 .047 2.95**    
   2 .189 .051 3.74***    
   3 .250 .057 4.37***    
   4 .151 .107 1.41    
Negative affect .345 .031 11.14***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .102 .049 2.09*    
   Prior attempt .213 .045 4.79***    
GED or HS diploma .059 .031 1.93*    
Married -.204 .038 -5.32***    
       
Constant -1.176 .126 -9.36***    
Rho -.260 .138     
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Cut 1    -1.615 .190 -8.50*** 
Cut 2    -.346 .198 -1.75 
Cut 3    -.002 .206 -0.01 
Cut 4    .915 .226 4.04*** 
AthRho    -.266 .148 -1.81 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
325.93*** 
-11810.10 
2 = 3.26, p=0.0711 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior, b Reference: Person 
 
Non-white * legal factors. Table 21 shows the results of the Heckman ordered 
probit model with the interaction between the second extra-legal factor (a dichotomous 
indicator for non-white race/ethnicity) and the legal factors. As was seen in Table 20, the 
interactive terms between non-white race/ethnicity and the legal factors are also not 
significantly associated with sanction severity.  
The same significant direct-effect relationships that have been consistent through 
nearly all models remain in this one. Of the instant misconduct offense categories, 
drug/alcohol misconduct (ß=.694) and the two assault categories of staff (ß=.369) and 
inmates (ß=.496) continue to have a significant positive effect on sanction severity, while 
security/order violations exert a significant negative effect on sanction severity (ß=-.413). 
The two prosocial inmate activities quasi-legal variables – having a prison job (ß=-.156) 
and program participation (ß=-.098) – are also still negatively related to sanction severity. 
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Table 21. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster Robust Standard Errors (based on 326 groups); 
Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity, Interactions = Non-white X Legal Factors 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct offensea       
   Security/order violation    -.413 .123 -3.35*** 
   Drug/alcohol    .694 .123 5.66*** 
   Property/contraband    .017 .091 0.19 
   Assault: inmate    .496 .098 5.08*** 
   Assault: staff    .369 .109 3.39*** 
Prior misconduct History    -.013 .019 -0.71 
2-way Interactions (Non-white * Legal Factors) 
Most serious instant misconduct offensea       
   Security/order violation * NW    .161 .159 1.01 
   Drug/alcohol * NW    -.071 .157 -0.45 
   Property/contraband * NW    .124 .111 1.12 
   Assault: inmate * NW    .043 .117 0.37 
   Assault: staff * NW    .131 .137 0.96 
Prior misconduct Hx * NW    -.012 .022 -0.55 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.023 0.45 -0.51 -.034 .051 -0.67 
   Property/financial -.096 .053 -1.82 .035 .060 0.59 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.051 .180 -0.28 .122 .233 0.52 
   Other -.185 .064 -2.89** .049 .077 0.64 
Prison job -.103 .038 -2.71** -.156 .043 -3.62*** 
Program participation .227 .035 6.47*** -.098 .044 -2.22* 
Time served .491 .024 20.32*** -.019 .048 -0.39 
Prior incarceration  .226 .030 7.58**** .068 .039 1.75 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .070 .063 1.10 .098 .081 1.21 
Non-white .000 .034 0.01 -.043 .090 -0.48 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.14 .000 .000 0.34 
Federal -.521 .094 -5.51*** .416 .098 4.25*** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.33*** .002 .003 0.61 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .139 .047 2.95**    
   2 .189 .051 3.74***    
   3 .250 .057 4.37***    
   4 .151 .107 1.41    
Negative affect .345 .031 11.14***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .102 .049 2.09*    
   Prior attempt .213 .045 4.79***    
GED or HS diploma .059 .031 1.93*    
Married -.204 .038 -5.32***    
       
Constant -1.176 .126 -9.38***    
Rho -.262 .136     
Cut 1    -1.763 .196 -9.02*** 
Cut 2    -.494 .202 -2.44* 
Cut 3    -.150 .210 -0.72 
Cut 4    .766 .229 3.34*** 
AthRho    -.268 .146 -1.84 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
333.53*** 
-11810.93 
2 = 3.38, p=0.0661 
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NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior, b Reference: Person 
 
 
Punishment Categories Outcome Variable 
 
 Tables 22-23 show the results of a series of two-stage multinomial logistic 
regression models that control for sample selection by inclusion of the IMR (Inverse 
Mills Ratio) as a covariate. In these models, the punishment categories dependent 
variable is regressed on fully saturated models that include various interactive terms. Due 
to the complexity of including interactions among categorical variables in a multinomial 
logistic regression model, the interval-level ordered categorical independent variable of 
instant misconduct offense was operationalized as a continuous variable in this set of 
models. 
 Gender * legal factors and Race/ethnicity * legal factors. Looking at Tables 22 
and 23, it is clear that the trend of non-significant interactive terms identified in the 
models for the first dependent variable, sanction severity, continues when 
operationalizing the dependent variable as separate punishment categories. Neither of the 
interactive terms between male gender and a more severe instant misconduct offense or a 
prior history of inmate misconduct are significantly related to any category of the 
punishment outcome. Similarly, neither the interaction terms between non-white 
race/ethnicity and more severe instant misconduct offense or prior history of inmate 
misconduct are significantly related to any category of the punishment outcome.   
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Split-sample Models: Extra-legal Factors Conditioning Direct Effects of Legal 
Factors on Punishment Outcome 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the results presented above and in 
Tables 20-23 all take the first approach to examining a potential conditioning effect of the 
extra-legal factors on the relationship between the legal-factors and punishment outcome; 
they include statistical interactive terms between the extra-legal and legal factors as 
covariates in the multivariate models to examine the direct effect between legal factors 
and punishment outcome controlling for that potential interactive effect. Yet, this 
approach is not always the most appropriate method of modeling conditioning effects, 
especially when one or both variables included in the interaction are categorical (or 
dictohomous, as that is a special case of a categorical variable with only two categories). 
Therefore, in order to examine the conditioning effects of our two dichotomous extra-
legal variables on the other relationships, the split-sample technique discussed in Chapter 
3 and above will be employed to conduct analyses reported in Tables 24-27. 
Sanction Severity Scale Outcome Variable 
 Male – female inmate split samples. Table 24 presents the results of the fully-
saturated Heckman ordered probit direct effects model conducted on subsamples split by 
gender.22 This set of split-sample models is the second method by which hypothesis 
three, regarding the conditioning effect of the extra-legal factors on the relationship 
between the legal factors and punishment outcome, is investigated. With the nature of 
                                                 
22 While not the focus of the current research, a look at the sample selection models 
between genders suggests there are significant differences in the effect that the 
independent variables, control variables, and exclusion restrictions have on selection into 
the estimation subsample of interest.  
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this model conducted on samples split by gender, relationships between the independent 
variables and sanction severity that are conditional on gender will be identified when 
comparing the magnitude of the standardized coefficients and significance level between 
the male and female inmate subsamples. If the magnitude and/or significance level of the 
relationships differs between the gender-based subsamples, for example, it lends support 
to the conclusion that the relationships between those independent variables and the 
dependent variable are conditioned by inmate gender.  
Looking to the legal factors on Table 24, there are some clear differences between 
both the magnitude of the standardized coefficients and the significance level of the 
relationships between the two legal factors and sanction severity. For males, the pattern 
of relationships that has been observed previously throughout all saturated multivariate 
analyses exists between the categories of inmate misconduct and sanction severity. The 
misconduct offense of security/order violations maintains a significant negative 
relationship with sanction severity (ß=-.344), while drug/alcohol misconduct (ß=.652), 
assault on institutional staff (ß=.471), and assault on fellow inmates (ß=.505) all maintain 
a significant positive relationship with sanction severity. When looking at the same 
variable (categories of instant misconduct offense) among female inmates, however, the 
results indicate that only the most serious categories of misconduct – assault on fellow 
inmates (ß=.597) and assault on institutional staff (ß=.382) – are significantly associated 
with severity of sanction outcome. Additionally, the effect of prior inmate misconduct 
history on sanctions severity is significant (and negative) for male inmates (ß=-.028) but 
not for female inmates. However, the magnitude of the significant relationship for the 
male inmate subsample is very small and not in the expected direction. Significant 
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differences in magnitude and significance level of relationships for the quasi-legal and 
extra-legal variables will be discussed in a later section on hypothesis four.  
 Non-white – white inmate split samples. Table 25 contains the results of the 
Heckman ordered probit direct effects model conducted on the sample split by non-white 
versus white race/ethnicity. When looking at the legal factor of severity of instant 
misconduct offense, relationships do not differ much between the non-white and white 
inmate subsamples. Committing a security/order misconduct offense maintains the 
previously established significant negative relationship with sanction severity for both 
non-white (ß=-.250) and white inmates (ß=-.415), with the standardized coefficient 
indicating the magnitude of the relationship is larger for white inmates than non-white 
inmates. Drug/alcohol violations (non-white ß=.626, white ß=.685), assault on a fellow 
inmate (non-white ß=.548, white ß=.481), and assault on institutional staff (non-white 
ß=.510, white ß=.357) are all significantly related to sanction severity across both 
race/ethnicity-based subsamples, with the magnitude of those relationships remaining 
consistent across both racial/ethnic subsamples as well. Interestingly, the misconduct 
offense category of a property or contraband violation, which has had a non-significant 
relationship with sanction severity throughout the majority of the prior analyses, has a 
significant positive relationship with sanction severity for non-white inmates (ß=.140), 
but not for white inmates. Finally, prior misconduct history has a significant negative 
relationship with sanction severity (ß=-.027) for non-white inmates but not white 
inmates. Yet, as was the case in the results of the gender-based split-sample analysis 
presented in Table 24, the magnitude of this significant relationship is very small such 
that, holding the effect of all other variables in the model constant, a one unit increase in 
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the prior inmate misconduct offense variable results in a decrease of less than .03 probit 
units on the sanction severity scale. Significant differences in magnitude and significance 
level of relationships for the quasi-legal and extra-legal variables also will be discussed 
later.  
Punishment Categories Outcome Variable  
 Male – female inmate split samples. The results of the split-sample multinomial 
models (with the IMR included as a covariate) that examine the effect of gender on the 
relationship of the legal factors on the dependent variable when operationalized as 
separate punishment categories are presented in Tables 26.1 and 26.2. There is a 
significant positive relationship with a similar magnitude between the legal variable of 
severity of instant misconduct offense and the most severe punishment categories, 
external custody transfer/solitary confinement and modification of original sentence, for 
both the male (ß=.285 and .200, respectively) and female (ß=.389 and .280, respectively) 
inmate sub-samples. The second extra-legal variable, prior inmate misconduct history, 
has a nearly non-significant relationship with all punishment categories for both genders, 
with the exception of sanction category four (external transfer/solitary confinement) for 
female inmates (ß=-.129). Strangely, but consistent with prior findings in this study, this 
significant relationship is negative, suggesting that those female inmates who have more 
extensive misconduct histories are less likely to receive an external custody transfer or 
solitary confinement as their punishment. Again, the relationship between quasi-legal 
factors and the punishment categories outcome variable will be discussed later.  
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Table 24. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity, Split-sample Direct Effects Models by Gender 
 Male Inmates Female Inmates 
 Selection 
Model 
Estimation 
Model 
Selection 
Model 
Estimation 
Model 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Legal Factors     
Most serious instant misconduct offensea    
   Security/order violation  -.344(.085)***  -.186(.144) 
   Drug/alcohol  .652(.072)***  .408(.235) 
   Property/contraband  .078(.065)  .162(.114) 
   Assault: inmate  .505(.063)***  .597(.122)*** 
   Assault: staff  .471(.071)***  .382(.141)** 
Prior misconduct Hx  -.028(.012)*  .012(.033) 
Quasi-legal Factors     
Offense of convictionb     
   Drug -.009(.051) -.030(.055) -.011(.109) -.019(.134) 
   Property/financial -.096(.058) .078(.069) -.041(.126) -.063(.134) 
   Public order/misdemeanor .092(.196) .231(.243) -.692(.425) -.554(.611) 
   Other -.183(.072)* .035(.085) -.132(.138) .129(.185) 
Prison job -.140(.04)*** -.162(.050)*** .046(.083) -.128(.091) 
Program participation .253(.040)*** -.070(.049) .116(.072)  -.244(.122)* 
Time served .490(.027)*** -.014(.057) .512(.053)*** -.076(.081) 
Prior incarceration  .218(.034)*** .071(.044) .253(.065)*** .041(.083) 
Extra-legal Factors     
Non-white  -.018(.038) .011(.042) .066(.075) -.076(.095) 
Controls     
Facility .000(.000) .000(.000) -.001(.001) -.000(.000) 
Federal -.452(.11)*** .397(.105)*** -.706(.19)*** .555(.229)* 
Age  -.028(.00)*** .002(.004) -.030(.00)*** .007(.007) 
Exclusion Restrictions     
Mental health scale     
   1 .191(.054)***  .029(.094)  
   2 .226(.066)***  .133(.077)  
   3 .191(.067)**  .303(.110)**  
   4 .200(.158)  .061(.140)  
Negative affect .302(.035)***  .488(.064)***  
Suicide     
   Only thought about it .111(.055)*  .085(.106)  
   Prior attempt .171(.059)**  .243(.063)***  
GED or HS diploma .083(.035)*  -.039(.061)  
Married -.192(.04)***  -.237(.07)***  
     
Constant -.148(.13)***  -.983(.23)***  
Rho -.245(.166)  -.453(.195)  
Cut 1  -1.73(.21)***  -2.12(.38)*** 
Cut 2  -.529(.218)*  -.653(.390) 
Cut 3  -.160(.229)  -.414(.398) 
Cut 4  .794(.255)**  .316(.415) 
AthRho  -.250(.177)  -.488(.245)* 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test  
281.55*** 
-9511.569 
2 = 1.99, p=0.1580 
54.43*** 
-2244.035 
2 = 3.97, p=0.0464 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior, b Reference: Person 
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Table 25. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster Robust Standard Errors  
Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity, Split-sample Direct Effects Models by Race/ethnicity 
 Non-White Inmates White Inmates 
 Selection 
Model 
Estimation 
Model 
Selection 
Model 
Estimation 
Model 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Legal Factors     
Most serious instant misconduct offensea    
   Security/order violation  -.250(.095)**  -.415(.12)*** 
   Drug/alcohol  .626(.088)***  .685(.125)*** 
   Property/contraband  .140(.070)*  .017(.089) 
   Assault: inmate  .548(.068)***  .481(.101)*** 
   Assault: staff  .510(.080)***  .357(.108)*** 
Prior misconduct Hx  -.027(.014)*  -.009(.019) 
Quasi-legal Factors     
Offense of convictionb     
   Drug -.065(.054) -.035(.058) .092(.077) -.038(.085) 
   Property/financial -.169(.063)** .061(.074) .055(.089) -.019(.104) 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.224(.206) -.232(.314) .175(.286) .463(.323) 
   Other -.230(.077)** .102(.101) -.076(.108) -.053(.132) 
Prison job -.091(.042)* -.139(.052)** -.126(.061)* -.176(.073) 
Program participation .236(.041)*** -.116(.050)* .218(.053)*** -.070(.068) 
Time served .486(.027)*** -.006(.050) .504(.030)*** -.069(.074) 
Prior incarceration  .219(.037)*** .076(.045) .229(.051)*** .048(.064) 
Extra-legal Factors     
Male .058(.075) .212(.094) .108(.073) .051(.095) 
Controls     
Facility -.000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) -.000(.000) 
Federal -.473(.10)*** .357(.106)*** -.646(.13)*** .605(.136)*** 
Age  -.028(.00)*** .002(.004) -.028(.00)*** .003(.005) 
Exclusion Restrictions     
Mental health scale     
   1 .176(.056)**  .093(.070)  
   2 .201(.065)**  .186(.072)**  
   3 .322(.083)***  .178(.077)*  
   4 .061(.170)  .208(.133)  
Negative affect .372(.034)***  .282(.054)***  
Suicide     
   Only thought about it .199(.065)**  -.015(.075)  
   Prior attempt .222(.060)***  .187(.070)**  
GED or HS diploma .086(.033)**  -.024(.063)  
Married -.16(.046)***  -.28(.066)***  
     
Constant -1.16(.16)***  -1.22(.19)***  
Rho -.259(.149)  -.336(.196)  
     
Cut 1  -1.61(.20)***  -2.08(.26)*** 
Cut 2  -.346(.207)  -.802(.292)** 
Cut 3  .005(.216)  -.472(.300) 
Cut 4  .943(.236)***  .393(.337) 
AthRho  -.265(.159)  -.349(.221) 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
207.55*** 
-8025.428 
2 = 2.76, p=0.0964 
155.30*** 
-3811.13 
2 = 2.50, p=0.1141 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior, b Reference: Person 
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Non-white – white inmate split samples. The results of the final analysis to 
address hypothesis three are presented in Table 27.1 and 27.2, where the direct effects 
Heckman ordered probit model is modeled on the non-white and white inmate sub-
samples. Results suggest that there are significant differences between non-white and 
white inmates in the magnitude and significance of the effects of severity of misconduct 
offense on likelihood of receiving specific punishment categories. For the white inmate 
sub-sample, severity of instant misconduct offense has a significant positive relationship 
with only sanction category four (external transfer/solitary confinement; ß=.272). For 
non-white inmates, however, this same severity of instant misconduct offense variable is 
significantly related to almost all punishment categories. With the exception of the least 
severe category of modification of privileges, misconduct severity significantly affects 
sanction category three (ß=.137), sanction category four (ß=.328), and sanction category 
five (ß=.252) for non-white inmates. With one exception, the extent of prior inmate 
misconduct has a consistently insignificant effect on likelihood of receiving each 
punishment category for both race/ethnicity sub-samples. Results indicate that when non-
white inmates have a more extensive prior misconduct history, they are significantly less 
likely to receive the disciplinary sanction of external custody transfer/solitary 
confinement (ß=-.188).  
Conclusion – Hypothesis Three 
 Taken together, all the analyses discussed thus far in Chapter 4 (and reported in 
Tables 20-27) have been undertaken to address hypothesis three, which states that the 
extra-legal factors will condition the relationship between the legal-factors and 
punishment outcome. By way of review, two types of analyses were conducted on both 
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punishment outcome variables – the sanction severity scale and the punishment 
categories variable. The first of these strategies (Tables 20-21 and 22-23) involved 
calculating statistical interaction terms (extra-legal by legal factors) and including those 
as covariates in the multivariate models, while the second strategy (Tables 24-25 and 26-
27) involved re-estimating direct effects models on sub-samples split by (1) gender and 
(2) race/ethnicity.  
 Results of the models using the interaction term strategy uniformly find that the 
calculated interaction terms are not significantly associated with either the sanction 
severity outcome variable or the punishment categories outcome variable. Findings of 
these analyses indicate that the same pattern of significant and non-significant direct 
effects between the legal factors and the outcome variables of sanction severity and 
receiving specific punishment categories remain significant even after the inclusion of the 
interaction terms into the multivariate models. Of course, this finding of non-significant 
interaction terms must be taken with the proverbial “grain of salt,” as the calculated 
interaction terms include at least one categorical variable, which is not the ideal situation 
for this statistical technique. As such, we turn to the results of the split-sample models. 
 Results of the first split-sample model where the direct effects model was re-
estimated on the sample split by inmate gender lead to a different conclusion than do the 
interaction-term models. Table 24 reports that the significance level and directionality of 
effects of the legal factor of instant misconduct offense categories on sanction severity 
differs by inmate gender. For male inmates, the same pattern of results that was observed 
in the fully-saturated models for research question one remains – the more serious 
misconduct categories (assault on inmates and staff, drug/alcohol misconduct) are 
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positively associated with sanction severity while the less serious misconduct categories 
(security/order violation, property/contraband offense) are either negatively or non-
significantly associated with increased sanction severity. For female inmates, on the other 
hand, only the most severe categories of misconduct – the two assault categories - are 
significant, and those relationships are positive. As was also discussed previously, the 
prior misconduct history variety score is not associated with increased sanction severity 
for female inmates but it is for male inmates, yet, while statistically significant, the 
magnitude of this relationship is quite small. As is reported on Table 26, this pattern of 
differing relationships by gender is not maintained in the models predicting the individual 
punishment categories.  
 Finally, looking to the analyses split by race/ethnicity into non-white and white 
inmate subsamples, Table 25 reports that while the directionality and significance level of 
the misconduct category – sanction severity relationship is consistent across non-white 
and white inmates, there is a disparity in the magnitude of the relationships. Broadly, it 
appears that the protective effect (the significant, negative relationship) of committing a 
less-serious misconduct offense (security/order violation) is greater for white inmates 
than for non-whites. And reflecting the exact opposite pattern, the significant positive 
relationship between the more serious assault-based misconduct categories and sanction 
severity is stronger for non-white inmates than for white inmates. As was the case in the 
gender-based split sample analysis, there is a difference in significance level of the prior 
misconduct offense history variable, whereby this variable is only significantly 
negatively associated with sanction severity for non-white inmates. Yet, again, the 
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magnitude of this relationship is minimal, suggesting that while significant, this effect is 
quite small.  
 Considering all this together in light of hypothesis three, results discussed above 
lend support to the assertion that the relationship between the legal factor of severity of 
misconduct offense and punishment outcome is conditioned by the extra-legal factors of 
inmate gender and race/ethnicity.  
 
Two-way Interaction Terms: Extra-legal and Quasi-legal Factors 
Hypothesis four assumes that the extra-legal factors (gender and race/ethnicity) 
will condition the direct effect of the quasi-legal factors on punishment outcome. Tables 
28 and 29 present the results of the Heckman ordered probit models which include the 
calculated interaction terms between the extra-legal and quasi-legal factors.  
Sanction Severity Outcome Variable 
Gender * quasi-legal factors. While the pattern of direct effects that has been 
established in prior relationships remains significant, it is evident in Table 28 that the interactions 
between the extra-legal factor of gender and all the quasi-legal factors have non-significant 
relationships with sanction severity. Looking at the other relationships in the model beyond the 
interactions between male gender and the quasi-legal factors, all the previously established direct 
effects relationships between the instant misconduct offense categories and sanction severity 
remain significantly associated with sanction severity with the relationships remaining in the 
same directions (security/order violation ß=-.312, drug/alcohol violation ß=.648, assault on 
inmate ß=.526, assault on staff ß=.463). The significant negative direct effect of the prosocial 
inmate activity quasi-legal factor of program participation on sanction severity remains, even 
with the inclusion of the male by quasi-legal factors interaction terms into the models (ß=-.239).  
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Table 28. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster Robust Standard Errors (based 326 
groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity, Interactions = Male X Quasi-legal Factors 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    -.312 .073 -4.27*** 
   Drug/alcohol    .648 .068 9.55*** 
   Property/contraband    .097 .058 1.68 
   Assault: inmate    .526 .056 9.41*** 
   Assault: staff    .463 .063 7.32*** 
Prior misconduct Hx    -.022 .012 -1.92 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Prison job -.103 .038 -2.71** -.162 .089 -1.83 
Program participation .228 .035 6.48*** -.239 .120 -2.00* 
Time served .491 .024 20.31*** .006 .058 0.10 
Prior incarceration  .225 .030 7.57**** .089 .078 1.14 
Interactions       
Prison job * M    .003 .097 0.03 
Program participation * M    .170 .125 1.36 
Time served * M    -.032 .039 -0.82 
Prior incarceration * M    -.012 .085 -0.15 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .070 .063 1.10 .079 .161 0.49 
Non-white .001 .034 0.03 -.011 .038 -0.29 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.13 .000 .000 0.50 
Federal -.520 .094 -5.50*** .399 .098 4.07*** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.32*** .002 .004 0.58 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .139 .047 2.94**    
   2 .190 .051 3.72***    
   3 .250 .057 4.37***    
   4 .152 .107 1.42    
Negative affect .345 .031 11.19***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .102 .049 2.20*    
   Prior attempt .213 .045 4.77***    
GED or HS diploma .059 .031 1.93*    
Married -.204 .038 -5.34***    
       
Constant -1.177 .126 -9.38***    
Rho -.247 .137     
Cut 1    -1.735 .219 -7.93*** 
Cut 2    -.464 .226 -2.05* 
Cut 3    -.119 .234 -0.51 
Cut 4    .798 .251 3.18*** 
AthRho    -.253 .146 -1.73 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
308.38*** 
-11812.85 
2 = 2.98, p=0.0842 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior 
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Table 29. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster Robust Standard Errors (326 groups); 
Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity, Interactions = Non-white X Quasi-legal Factors 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    -.313 .074 -4.26*** 
   Drug/alcohol    .647 .068 9.45*** 
   Property/contraband    .096 .058 1.67 
   Assault: inmate    .535 .056 9.35*** 
   Assault: staff    .462 .064 7.27*** 
Prior misconduct Hx    -.022 .011 -1.89 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Prison job -.103 .038 -2.72** -.193 .066 -2.90** 
Program participation .227 .035 6.47*** -.055 .068 -0.81 
Time served .491 .024 20.31*** -.040 .051 -0.79 
Prior incarceration  .225 .030 7.57**** .055 .060 0.91 
Interactions       
Prison job * NW    .049 .077 0.63 
Program participation * NW    -.061 .072 -0.85 
Time served * NW    .031 .031 1.00 
Prior incarceration * NW    .031 .068 0.46 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .070 .063 1.10 .094 .080 1.17 
Non-white .001 .034 0.04 -.134 .140 -0.96 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.13 .000 .000 0.50 
Federal -.520 .095 -5.50*** .400 .098 4.06*** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.32*** .002 .003 0.59 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .139 .047 2.94**    
   2 .190 .051 3.72***    
   3 .250 .057 4.36***    
   4 .152 .107 1.43    
Negative affect .345 .031 11.19***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .102 .049 2.10*    
   Prior attempt .214 .045 4.80***    
GED or HS diploma .059 .031 1.93*    
Married -.204 .038 -5.33***    
       
Constant -1.177 .125 -9.38***    
Rho -.243 .137     
Cut 1       
Cut 2       
Cut 3       
Cut 4       
AthRho       
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
308.66*** 
-11813.51 
2 = 2.91, p=0.0881 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior 
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 Race/ethnicity * quasi-legal factors. The results of the Heckman ordered probit 
model with the interaction terms between the second extra-legal factor, race/ethnicity, 
and the quasi-legal factors are presented in Table 29. Looking directly to the interactive 
terms under observation in this model, results suggest that there are no significant 
interactions between race/ethnicity and the quasi-legal factors on the outcome variable of 
sanction severity. The same pattern of results in the direct effects for the misconduct 
offense variable that has been discovered previously remains in this model (see Table 29 
for standardized coefficients). Finally, the direct effect of having a prison job remains a 
protective factor against severe disciplinary sanctions (ß=-.193).  
 
Split-sample Models: Extra-legal Factors Conditioning Direct Effects of 
Quasi-legal Factors on Punishment Outcome 
Again, however, including interactive terms in regression models is not the only 
way to examine the conditional effect of the extra-legal factors of race/ethnicity and 
gender on the relationship between the quasi-legal factors and sanction severity. As was 
done in the analyses for hypothesis three, the same direct-effect models were run on 
samples split first by gender and then by race/ethnicity to observe any variations in 
relationships between the direct effects of the independent variables and the sanction 
severity scale dependent variable.  
Sanction Severity Scale Outcome Variable 
 Male – female inmate split samples. A review of Table 24, which presents the 
findings of the split-sample analysis for male versus female inmates, finds that there is 
less variation in the significance and magnitude of the relationships between the quasi-
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legal factors and sanction severity across genders than was observed among the legal-
factors and sanction severity across genders. Interestingly, of all the quasi-legal factors, 
significance is found in gender-based differences in the relationships of the two variables 
representing prosocial inmate activities and sanction severity, with no significance found 
for the variables representing criminogenic risk. Specifically, the inmate prosocial 
activity of having a prison job has a significant negative relationship with sanction 
severity for male inmates (ß=-.162), but this same relationship is nonsignificant for 
female inmates. Program participation, on the other hand, has a significant negative 
relationship (ß=-.244) with sanction severity for female inmates, yet the relationship is 
nonsignificant for male inmates. Consistent with results to be presented later in Table 30, 
the interaction term between inmate gender and non-white race/ethnicity (indicated by 
the non-white variable in the gender-based split-sample model) is not significant for 
either male or female inmates. The non-significant race/ethnicity variable in Table 24 
provides additional evidence that the interaction between the extra-legal factors (male 
gender and non-white race/ethnicity) is not significantly related to sanction severity. 
Non-white – white inmate split samples. Results of the split-sample analysis for 
non-white and white inmates presented in Table 25 suggest there are also some 
differences in the effect of the quasi-legal factors on sanction severity that are conditional 
on race/ethnicity. Interestingly, both prosocial inmate activities are significantly and 
negatively related to sanction severity for non-white inmates (prison job ß=-.139 and 
program participation ß=-.116), yet these relationships are non-significant for white 
inmates. The non-significant gender variable in this table once again confirms that the 
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interaction between male gender and non-white race/ethnicity is not a significant 
predictor of sanction severity.  
Conclusion – Hypothesis Four 
An overview of the results of the set of analyses conducted on the sanction 
severity dependent variable that were designed to address hypothesis four suggest that, 
while not a consistent effect, the extra-legal factors of inmate gender and race/ethnicity 
might exert a conditioning effect on the relationship between the group of quasi-legal 
factors that represent prosocial inmate activities on sanction severity. As is shown in 
Tables 28 and 29, the calculated interactive terms have a non-significant relationship with 
sanction severity. Yet, when examining the split sample models shown in Tables 24 and 
25, significant differences in level and directionality of relationships are observed, 
suggesting that the extra-legal factors do condition the relationship between some of the 
quasi-legal factors and sanction severity. Specifically, this statistically significant 
conditioning effect of race/ethnicity and gender is found for the quasi-legal factors 
representing prosocial inmate activities (see Tables 24 and 25).  
Turning directly to hypothesis four, these results suggest that, while not consistent 
across all variables considered quasi-legal factors in these analyses, the extra-legal factors 
of non-white race/ethnicity and male gender do condition the effect of the quasi-legal 
factors representing prosocial inmate activities on punishment outcome specifically for 
the more serious punishment categories.  
Two-way Interaction Among Extra-legal Factors – Gender * Race/ethnicity 
Sanction Severity Outcome Variable 
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Looking towards the last model with interactive terms for the sanction severity 
dependent variable, Table 30 reports that the interactive term between the two extra-legal 
factors – male gender and non-white race/ethnicity – is not a significant predictor of 
sanction severity. All the significant direct effects relationships, however, remain 
significant in this model. For the legal factors, the instant misconduct offense categories 
of drug/alcohol offense (ß=.644) and assault on a fellow inmate (ß=.526) and assault on a 
staff member (ß=.461) are positively related to sanction severity, while security/order 
violation (ß=-.309) has a negative relationship with sanction severity. The two quasi-legal 
factors of having a prison job (ß=-.155) and program participation (ß=-.099) are both still 
negatively associated with sanction outcome. 
Three-way Interaction Among Legal and Extra-legal Factors 
 The fifth and final hypothesis addresses the possibility that three-way interactions 
between the two extra-legal factors and the legal factors may influence punishment 
outcome. For these analyses, the three-way interactions under observation are as follows: 
(1) Gender * Race/ethnicity * Misconduct severity and (2) Gender * Race/ethnicity * 
Prior history of misconduct. Due to the operationalization of variables, the first 
interactive term included in the model is actually male * non-white * misconduct 
severity, while the second becomes male * non-white * misconduct history. These 
interactive terms are included in models for both operationalizations of the dependent 
variable – both sanction severity and punishment categories.  
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Table 30. Heckman Ordered Probit Model with Huber White Cluster Robust Standard Errors (based on 326 
groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity, Interaction Among Extra-legal Factors (Male X Non-white) 
 Selection Model Full Model 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z 
Legal Factors       
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
      
   Security/order violation    -.309 .074 -4.21*** 
   Drug/alcohol    .644 .067 9.57*** 
   Property/contraband    .096 .057 1.68 
   Assault: inmate    .526 .056 9.32*** 
   Assault: staff    .461 .063 7.26*** 
Prior misconduct Hx    -.022 .012 -1.88 
Quasi-legal Factors       
Offense of convictionb       
   Drug -.023 0.45 -0.51 -.035 .051 -0.68 
   Property/financial -.096 .053 -1.82 .037 .059 0.62 
   Public order/misdemeanor -.051 .180 -0.28 .125 .230 0.54 
   Other -.185 .064 -2.89** .052 .077 0.67 
Prison job -.103 .038 -2.71** -.155 .043 -3.58*** 
Program participation .227 .035 6.47*** -.099 .044 -2.27* 
Time served .491 .024 20.32*** -.021 .048 -0.45 
Prior incarceration  .226 .030 7.58**** .065 .038 1.68 
Extra-legal Factors       
Male .070 .063 1.10 .063 .098 0.64 
Non-white .000 .034 0.01 -.046 .091 -0.51 
Male * Non-white -- -- -- .054 .098 0.55 
Controls       
Facility .000 .000 0.14 .000 .000 0.37 
Federal -.521 .094 -5.51*** .416 .097 4.27*** 
Age  -.028 .002 -15.33*** .002 .003 0.70 
Exclusion Restrictions       
Mental health scale       
   1 .139 .047 2.95**    
   2 .189 .051 3.74***    
   3 .250 .057 4.37***    
   4 .151 .107 1.41    
Negative affect .345 .031 11.14***    
Suicide       
   Only thought about it .102 .049 2.09*    
   Prior attempt .213 .045 4.79***    
GED or HS diploma .059 .031 1.93*    
Married -.204 .038 -5.32***    
       
Constant -1.177 .125 -9.38***    
Rho -.269 .135     
Cut 1    -1.767 .189 -9.35*** 
Cut 2    -.498 .197 -2.52* 
Cut 3    -.154 .205 -0.75 
Cut 4    .760 .225 3.38*** 
AthRho    -.275 .146 -1.89 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
318.60*** 
-11812.50 
2 = 3.57, p=0.0589 
NOTES –  
*** p ≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤.05 
a Reference: Disruptive behavior, b Reference: Person 
 162
Sanction Severity Outcome Variable  
 Table 31 presents the results of the Heckman ordered probit models where 
sanction severity is regressed on all legal, quasi-legal, extra-legal, and control variables 
with the three-way interactions and all partial (two-way) interactions included in the 
models. The first analysis that included a three-way interaction included the legal factor 
of severity of misconduct offense, as well as the individual direct effect and component 
two-way interactions. Looking at the focal two-way and three-way interactions of extra-
legal factors and misconduct severity, results suggest that there is no significant 
relationship between gender and race/ethnicity, nor race/ethnicity and gender. As for the 
direct effects for this model, results indicate that, by and large, the same pattern of 
significance and directionality observed previously is again maintained for the direct 
effects of misconduct offense (see Table 31 for findings). Additionally, the direct effect 
of the legal factor prior misconduct offense has a nonsignificant relationship with 
sanction severity. As was observed for the legal factors, the same pattern of significance 
and directionality previously established for the direct effects of the quasi-legal factors on 
sanction severity are maintained in the current model. As such, the two significant quasi-
legal factors are the effect of those representing prosocial inmate activities – having a 
prison job and program participation – on the outcome of sanction severity.  
 The second Heckman ordered probit model examining three-way interactions 
includes the second legal factor of prior misconduct history. Results indicate that both the 
two and three-way interactions with the extra-legal factors and prior misconduct history 
are significantly related to sanction severity. Interestingly, though, while all are  
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statistically significant, the two-way interactions and the single three-way interaction 
actually have different directionality. The two-way interactions of prior misconduct 
history with male gender and non-white race/ethnicity are both negatively associated with 
sanction severity (ß=-.147 and ß=-.149, respectively). The variable that represents the 
three-way interaction of Male * Nonwhite * Prior misconduct history, on the other hand, 
has a positive association with sanction severity (ß=.168), such that with a one unit 
increase in prior misconduct history, there is a corresponding .168 probit unit increase on 
the sanction severity scale. Direct effects of the legal and quasi-legal factors in this model 
are largely consistent with those established in prior analyses. Notably, even though it is 
incorporated into the two and three-way interaction terms included in this model, the 
direct effect of male gender has a significant positive association with sanction severity 
(ß=.364), such that holding the effect of all other variables constant, male gender 
increases sanction severity by .364 probit units.  
 Results of the final model incorporating two-way and three-way interactions are 
reported in Table 31. Looking specifically to the interactions, as was the case in the 
partial models, results suggest that none of the two or three-way interactions that include 
the legal factor of severity of misconduct offense are significantly associated with 
sanction severity. The interactions that include the other legal factor, prior misconduct 
offense, are, on the other hand, significantly associated with sanction severity in this fully 
saturated model with all two and three-way interactions. As was observed in the partial 
model discussed above, there is a directionality switch in the nature of the statistically 
significant relationships between the interaction terms and sanction severity when 
looking at the two two-way interactions and the three-way interaction with prior 
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misconduct history. The two-way interaction terms are both negatively associated with 
sanction severity such that, rather un-intuitively, male inmates (ß=-.197) and non-white 
inmates (ß=-.208) with a more extensive prior misconduct history are less likely to 
receive a punishment option that is at the highest (i.e., most severe) end of the sanctions 
severity scale. The three-way interactive term representing male – non-white inmates – 
with a more extensive prior misconduct history is positively associated with sanction 
severity in the current models. This suggests that, holding the effect of all other factors 
constant, non-white males with a more extensive prior misconduct history are 
significantly more likely to receive a disciplinary sanction at the higher end of the 
sanction severity scale. While not the focus of the current model, direct effects of the 
block of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors are consistent with previously 
established patterns and relationships discussed in direct and interactive effect models. 
Punishment Categories Outcome Variable 
 Table 32 shows the results of the same set of two and three-way interactive 
analyses conducted for the second operationalization of the dependent variable – 
individual punishment categories. Table 32 contains the results of a two-stage 
multinomial logistic regression model where each of the individual punishment 
categories is regressed on the full model under observation. As was the case for the two-
way interactions for the punishment categories dependent variable that also used two-
stage multinomial logistic regression models, for ease of interpretation the interval-level 
severity of misconduct offense variable is operationalized as a continuous variable in 
these models. 
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 Looking directly to the interactive terms in Table 32, it is immediately clear that, 
as was the case with the sanction severity operationalization of the dependent variable, 
the two- and three-way interactive terms with the misconduct offense variable are not 
significantly related to disciplinary sanction when operationalized as the individual 
punishment categories. As was the case with sanction severity scale operationalization of 
punishment outcome discussed above, the two and three-way interaction terms with the 
second legal factor, prior inmate misconduct history, are all significantly associated with 
the more serious punishment categories (external custody modification/solitary 
confinement and receiving a new sentence), but not with the less serious punishment 
categories (modification of inmate privileges and internal custody modification). But, as 
has been observed in the other analyses that include both two and three-way interactions 
(see Table 31), all are statistically significant but the directionality between the two-way 
interactions and punishment outcome and the three-way interactions and punishment 
outcome is inconsistent. As has been observed in Table 32, the two-way interactions 
between prior inmate misconduct history and inmate gender and race/ethnicity are 
negative for punishment category four (external custody modification/solitary 
confinement; ß=-.870 and ß=-1.086 respectively) and punishment category five 
(receiving a new sentence; ß=-1.086 and ß=-1.184 respectively). Yet the three-way 
interaction representing non-white-male inmates-with a more extensive prior inmate 
misconduct history is positively associated with receiving a disciplinary sanction within 
punishment category four (ß=1.007) and punishment category five (ß=1.137).  
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Conclusion – Hypothesis Five 
 Hypothesis five, the last hypothesis tested  in this research, examines a potential 
three-way interaction among the extra-legal factors (gender and race/ethnicity) and the 
legal factors of misconduct severity and prior misconduct record in their influence on 
punishment outcome. Findings presented in Tables 31 and 32 suggest that, controlling for 
the three-way interaction between inmate gender – race/ethnicity – and all possible two-
way interactions comprised of those variables, the previously-established direct effects of 
the legal factors of severity of misconduct offense and prior misconduct history remain 
significantly associated with both sanctions severity and the likelihood of receiving 
specific punishment options. Results of this study support failing to reject the null 
hypothesis, acknowledging that the three-way interaction between inmate 
gender*race/ethnicity*and the legal factors does significantly impact punishment 
outcome post-disciplinary proceeding. 
Interestingly, when the three-way interactions are included in the models, the 
majority of the two-way interaction terms between the extra-legal and legal factors, as 
well as the two-way interaction between the extra-legal factors of gender and 
race/ethnicity, emerge as significant predictors of sanction severity and receiving specific 
punishment outcomes. More research is needed to flush out the specifics of this 
relationship where the interactive terms gain significance with further interactions 
included in the models, but it is possible that this somewhat counter-intuitive finding 
could be associated with issues of multicollinearity between the direct effects, two-way, 
and three-way interaction terms (McClelland & Judd, 1993). 
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Summary 
 Chapter 5 reported results from a series of multivariate models designed to 
address whether the extra-legal inmate characteristics of gender and race/ethnicity 
condition the previously-established significant relationships between the legal and quasi-
legal factors and punishment outcome. Three interactive hypotheses were examined: (1) a 
two-way interaction between the extra-legal and legal factors, (2) a two-way interaction 
between the extra-legal factors and quasi-legal factors, and (3) a three-way interaction 
between the two extra-legal factors and the legal factors in their influence on punishment 
outcome.  
 While the two-way statistical interaction terms between the extra-legal and legal 
and extra-legal and quasi-legal factors were not significantly associated with punishment 
outcome, the split-sample models indicate that the extra-legal factors seem to at least 
partially condition the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. 
Thinking about the effect of the extra-legal factor of inmate gender, results of the split-
sample models presented in Tables 24 and 26.1-26.2 suggest that the relationship 
between misconduct severity (a legal factor) and punishment outcome varies for male and 
female inmates. For male inmates, committing one of the more severe categories of 
misconduct increases the likelihood that the inmate will receive a more serious 
punishment outcome on the sanction severity scale and one of the more serious 
punishment categories, while committing one of the less severe varieties of misconduct is 
significantly related to receiving a less-severe punishment outcome. Looking at female 
inmates, though, while the more severe forms of misconduct are significantly associated 
with receiving a more severe punishment outcome, committing one of the less severe 
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misconduct offenses does not exhibit that same protective relationship against receiving a 
serious punishment outcome.  
While results in Tables 24 and 26.1-26.2 do indicate that there are gender-based 
differences in significance level and magnitude relationships between the quasi-legal 
factors representing prosocial inmate activities and punishment outcome, the results do 
not suggest a consistent trend conditional on inmate gender.  
 Tables 25 and 27.1-27.2 report the results of the direct effects models for the 
sanction severity scale and punishment categories outcome variables regressed on inmate 
characteristics with the samples split by inmate race/ethnicity. Results of these analyses 
suggest that inmate race/ethnicity at least partially conditions the effects of the legal 
factors and the quasi-legal factors representing prosocial inmate activities on punishment 
outcome. Looking to the legal factors, results indicate that the finding from Chapter 4 that 
severity of misconduct offense influences severity of punishment outcome is not 
consistent across white and non-white inmates. The magnitude of the positive 
relationship between the more severe forms of inmate misconduct and punishment 
outcome is significantly greater for non-white than white inmates, whereas the negative 
relationship between the less severe forms of inmate misconduct and sanction severity is 
significantly stronger for white inmates. This trend is consistent across both 
operationalizations of the punishment outcome dependent variable.  
 Patterns change once again when looking at the relationship between the quasi-
legal factors and punishment outcome on the race/ethnicity-based split sample models. 
When looking at the sanction severity outcome variable, the quasi-legal factors 
representing prosocial inmate activities – which include holding a prison job and program 
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participation – exert a significant negative (i.e., protective) effect against receiving a 
more severe punishment outcome for non-white inmates. Yet this same finding of the 
protective nature of prosocial inmate activities on sanction severity does not hold for 
white inmates.  
When considering the results of the race/ethnicity split sample models regressing 
the punishment categories outcome variable on relevant inmate characteristics, an even 
more pronounced trend of relationships conditional on inmate race/ethnicity is observed 
(see Tables 27.1 and 27.2). In these models, all the previously significant quasi-legal 
factors (which include the two indicators of prosocial inmate activities and the 
criminogenic risk factor of having been previously incarcerated) exert a significant 
influence on the likelihood of receiving a sanction that falls in one of the most serious 
punishment categories for non-white inmates, but not for white inmates. These 
differences in the significance level and magnitude of the relationships between the 
quasi-legal factors and sanction outcome between the samples of inmates suggests that 
the extra-legal factor of inmate race/ethnicity at least partially conditions these 
previously-established relationships.  
 The final set of analyses in this research was undertaken as a form of robustness 
check, to examine the direct effects of the legal factors on punishment outcome 
controlling for all possible two- and three-way interactions between the legal, quasi-legal, 
and extra-legal factors. Results indicate that after controlling for the direct and interactive 
effects of the extra-legal factors, the significant direct effect between the legal factors and 
punishment outcome remains significant. However, with the inclusion of the three-way 
interaction between inmate gender, race/ethnicity, and the legal factors into the 
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multivariate models, the relationship between all the partial two-way interactions and 
punishment outcome achieves conventional levels of statistical significance. While these 
interactive terms are significantly associated with punishment outcome, the significant 
direct effects of the legal factors remain. This finding suggests that, while inmate 
race/ethnicity and gender might partially condition the relationship between misconduct 
severity and prior misconduct history on punishment outcome, these relationships are not 
fully conditional on the extra-legal factors and do exert a direct effect on punishment 
outcome beyond that which is conditioned by the extra-legal factors. 
Taking a step back from these three specific hypotheses and thinking about the 
second research question that encompasses hypothesis three through five, results lead to 
the conclusion that inmate race/ethnicity and gender do seem to condition the relationship 
between some of the legal factors and punishment outcome. Results of the split sample 
and interaction term analyses suggest that this conditioning impact of the extra-legal 
inmate characteristics is only partial, as the direct effects of the legal factors remain 
significantly associated with sanction severity and likelihood of receiving specific 
punishment options even when controlling for the two- and three-way interactions of 
interest.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
While an everyday occurrence with direct implications for inmate life and 
freedom of movement within the prison setting, institutional disciplinary proceedings are 
a largely hidden process that has not been subject to a great deal of rigorous, systematic 
empirical examination. The main goal of this research project is to examine the impact of 
various inmate factors on the punishment outcome following inmate misconduct 
proceedings. Following the model of criminal sentencing research, inmate characteristics 
are divided into groups of theoretically informed legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal 
factors. Making a departure from the prior research on this decision point that looks at the 
presence or absence of one specific punishment option, this research observes the 
influence of inmate characteristics on the full range of potential disciplinary punishment 
options. The research is guided by two specific research questions. First, what is the 
nature of the direct relationships between the inmate characteristics and punishment 
outcome? Second, do the extra-legal factors condition the previously-established 
relationships between the legal factors and quasi-legal factors and punishment outcome? 
The final chapter of this research project provides an overview of the main 
findings of this research as they relate to theory and institutional policy and practice. 
Following a review of the results of the analyses, the limitations of the data and the study 
itself are revisited before proceeding to a discussion of the substantive contributions of 
the findings. Findings are interpreted in terms of their application to both the theoretical 
model set forth by the focal concerns perspective and the implications for institutional 
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policy and practice. The chapter concludes with suggestions regarding directions for 
future research that evolve from this study.  
 
Recap of Main Findings 
 The first research question concerned the nature of the relationship between 
inmate characteristics and punishment outcome. Analyses for this study began with 
bivariate models, progressed through partial multivariate models, and concluded with 
fully-saturated multivariate examinations of both direct and interactive effects of the 
theoretically relevant legal and extra-legal factors on punishment outcome. Advancing 
the extant body of literature beyond the predictive power of these factors on just the 
presence or absence of a specific punishment option, this study operationalized 
punishment outcome in two different ways to consider the full range of possible sanction 
options available to disciplinary personnel. The first operationalization of punishment 
outcome was the interval-level, ordered “Sanction Severity Scale,” for which ordered 
probit models were run. The second measure of punishment outcome used “Punishment 
Categories,” which was an ordered, nominal-level categorical variable that necessitated 
the use of multinomial regression models. To account for the incidental sample selection 
inherent in the research problem, all models were estimated with some form of correction 
for potential sample selection bias.  
Bivariate Relationships  
Bivariate regression models, which were completed only for the sanction severity 
scale, were estimated to provide evidence of an initial relationship between each of the 
legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors and sanction severity, prior to parsing out 
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specifics of the relationships when controlling for the effects of other variables in a 
multivariate context. Results of these models indicated that, with the exception of the 
offense of current conviction, all theoretically-informed legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal 
factors were significant predictors of sanction severity. Offense severity, prior 
misconduct history (both legal factors), amount of time served and a prior incarceration 
(quasi-legal factors), and the extra-legal factors of male gender and inmate race/ethnicity 
had a significant positive effect of sanction severity. Specifically, and consistent with 
prior research (Butler & Steiner, 2016; Logan et al., 2017), when compared to white 
inmates, Black inmates were significantly more likely to receive a sanction that fell 
higher on the severity scale; Hispanic ethnicity and “other” race/ethnicity were not 
significantly associated with sanction severity at the bivariate level. In addition, a 
significant but negative effect on sanction severity was observed among inmates with less 
serious misconduct offenses and for each of the two quasi-legal factors having a prison 
job and involvement in (non-recreational/non-religious) inmate programming 
opportunities. Interestingly, the control variable of inmate age at time of interview was 
not significantly associated with sanction severity even at the bivariate level, counter to 
the negative relationship typically found between age and misconduct activities (e.g., 
Steiner et al., 2014) and age and disciplinary outcome (Butler & Steiner, 2017; Clark, 
2018; Logan et al., 2017).  
Partial Multivariate Models 
The next step in the analyses estimated a series of partial multivariate models. In 
these partial multivariate models, each block of theoretical variables – the legal factors, 
the quasi-legal factors, and the extra-legal factors – was included in a Heckman ordered 
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probit model with only the control variables to assess the influence of each block on 
sanction severity. When both legal factors were included in the multivariate model with 
the control variables, the previously-established relationship between misconduct severity 
and sanction severity remained significant, while the effect of prior misconduct history 
diminished. Each of the significant effects of the quasi-legal factors persisted (with the 
exception of offense of incarceration, which was not significant at the bivariate level) 
when controlling for the effect of the other quasi-legal factors and the control variables. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Logan et al., 2017), neither of the extra-legal factors 
of inmate gender or race/ethnicity were found to be significantly associated with sanction 
severity once the control variables and other extra-legal factor were included in the 
models.  
Full Multivariate Models  
Direct effects. The final set of models to address the first research question 
regresses the sanction severity scale and each of the punishment categories outcomes, 
separately, on all legal, quasi-legal, extra-legal, and control variables to observe the effect 
of the predictor variables on the measures of punishment outcome. The fully-saturated 
Heckman ordered probit model, holding constant the effect of all other theoretical and 
control variables, revealed that sanction severity was significantly associated with the 
legal factors of misconduct severity and prior misconduct and the quasi-legal factors of 
having a prison job and program participation. As was stated in Chapter 4, the series of 
nested Heckman probit models is not the preferred statistical technique to examine the 
unique impact of each of the theoretical variables on each punishment category, so a two-
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stage multinomial model controlling for sample selection bias through the calculation and 
inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio was used.  
Results of this full multivariate model for the outcome variable observing the 
likelihood of receiving each of the punishment categories when compared to the 
reference category of receiving no formal punishment suggested that, once again, there 
was a strong, positive, statistically significant relationship between misconduct severity 
and severity punishment. Also consistent with the full model for the sanction severity 
scale operationalization of punishment outcome, the quasi-legal prosocial inmate activity 
variables – holding a job and program participation – had a negative effect on receipt of 
one of the two higher levels of punishment (Categories 4 and 5). In a way, it seemed as if 
these prosocial inmate activity variables act almost as protective factors, whereby 
controlling for the effect of misconduct severity and all other theoretical variables, having 
a prison job and participation in institutional programming significantly decreased the 
likelihood that an inmate would receive a more severe post-disciplinary punishment. One 
other significant finding emerged when the separate punishment categories were 
regressed on the fully-saturated models. The quasi-legal criminogenic risk factor of prior 
incarceration had a significant positive effect on receiving the most serious punishment 
category. This relationship had not reached the appropriate level of statistical significance 
in either the previous full model using the sanction severity scale or for the other, less-
serious punishment categories in the current model.  
Statistical interaction and conditional effects. The second research question 
that guided this study involved potential two-way and three-way interactions between the 
extra-legal variables of inmate gender and race/ethnicity and the legal and quasi-legal 
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factors. Four sets of two-way interaction terms were calculated for inclusion in the 
models: male*legal factors, male*quasi-legal factors, non-white*legal factors, and non-
white*quasi-legal factors. The multivariate models with sanction severity were regressed 
on the direct and interactive effects, as were the models with the punishment categories. 
The same patterns of results were found uniformly across all models that included the 
two-way statistical interaction terms: while the interaction terms were not significantly 
associated with punishment outcome, all the variables with previously-established 
significant effects remained robust to the inclusion of the interaction terms in the models. 
Yet the non-significance of these interaction terms could have been an artifact of the 
statistical method, as creating interactions between one or more categorical variables is 
not ideal and can create problems in the models at times (Long, 1997). 
Therefore, a series of split-sample models were estimated to determine whether 
the relationships between the legal and quasi-legal factors and punishment outcome were 
conditioned by the extra-legal factors of inmate gender and race/ethnicity. The observed 
difference in significance level and magnitude of effects between the male and female 
inmate subsamples suggested that the relationships between the legal factors (misconduct 
severity and prior misconducts) and quasi-legal prosocial inmate activity factors (prison 
job and program participation) were conditioned by inmate gender.  
A similar pattern of results occurred when data were partitioned by the 
race/ethnicity of the inmate. In these models, a clear difference was observed in the 
magnitude and significance level of relationships between the legal factors and 
punishment outcome between non-white and white inmates. Furthermore, the protective 
(significant negative) relationship between the prosocial inmate activities factors and both 
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operationalizations of punishment outcome, and the significant positive effect of prior 
incarceration on receiving the most severe punishment category (Category 5) were found 
to hold only for the non-white inmate subsample. Taken together, the results of the split-
sample analyses suggest that the extra-legal factors of inmate race/ethnicity and gender 
did, in fact, condition the relationships between some of the legal and quasi-legal factors 
and punishment outcome.  
Finally, in order to take the analyses one step further, a final set of Heckman 
ordered probit (for the sanction severity scale measure) and two-stage multinomial 
models with IMR correction (for the punishment categories outcome measure) were 
estimated that include a three-way interaction term between inmate 
gender*race/ethnicity*the legal factors. This three-way interaction of male*non-
white*misconduct severity was not significantly associated with sanction severity, while 
the three-way interaction with the second legal factor of prior misconducts history did 
exert a strong positive relationship with sanction severity. This finding suggests that, 
holding all other direct and interactive effects constant, non-white male inmates who 
committed a more severe form of inmate misconduct were significantly more likely to 
receive a more severe sanction outcome than were other inmates who did not have that 
same constellation of intersecting extra-legal and legally-relevant characteristics. Even 
with the inclusion of this significant three-way interaction into the model, all significant 
direct effects relationships remained, indicating that the three-way interaction did not 
fully condition the relationships between legal and quasi-legal factors and sanction 
severity. 
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When each of the separate punishment categories were regressed on the direct 
effects and the two-way and three-way interaction terms, it was again observed that while 
the interaction with the misconduct severity legal factors was not significant, the three-
way interaction with prior misconduct was also a significant predictor of this 
operationalization of the dependent variable. In this model, however, the previously 
significant effect of misconduct severity on likelihood of receiving specific punishment 
categories was reduced to non-significance with the inclusion of the three-way interaction 
terms. Due to the change in operationalization of the misconduct severity variable from 
categorical to continuous for this model that was described in Chapter 5, it was not 
possible to determine whether the loss of significance was an artifact of the different 
operationalization of misconduct severity, or whether the three-way interaction terms 
fully conditioned the relationship between the legal factors and likelihood of receiving 
specific punishment categories. 
Methodological Contributions to the Study of Prison-Imposed Sanction 
 Beyond the substantive findings related to the research questions and hypotheses 
under observation, this study also makes some methodological contributions to the 
literature on inmate disciplinary proceedings and punishment outcome. First, and perhaps 
most significantly, this study is the first empirically rigorous examination of the prison 
disciplinary outcome that extends beyond previous studies that examined predictors of 
any one specific outcome. With the exception of one study (Steiner & Cain, 2017), all 
contemporary research on this decision point looks at factors that influence receiving 
disciplinary segregation/solitary confinement as the sole punishment option. While 
disciplinary segregation/solitary confinement is a very serious disciplinary sanction that 
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has recently been the subject of an increased amount research and public attention due to 
the negative physical and mental health and behavior outcomes with which it is 
associated, disciplinary segregation is not the only form of punishment that institutional 
disciplinary personnel have at their disposal. Rather, as is the case in criminal sentencing 
outside the institutional setting, there is a wide range of possible disciplinary sanctions 
that could be applied in any specific case. These punishment options range from 
receiving no formal punishment to modification or removal of privileges (such as losing 
job within the prison setting, restrictions on visitation privileges, and removal from 
inmate programming), to further restricting inmate freedom of movement by internal or 
external transfer to an increased custody setting, placement in disciplinary 
segregation/solitary confinement, or even receiving a criminal conviction and new 
incarcerative sentence. The findings reported here reveal that inmate characteristics are 
associated with the receipt of varying punishment options, indicating that it is important 
to consider the full range of disciplinary punishment options when assessing the 
predictive effects of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors.  
 This research also emphasizes the necessity of employing statistical techniques to 
control for potential sample selection bias when observing this decision point within the 
criminal justice system. Sample selection models, such as the Heckman two-step model 
and the two-stage model predicting selection and then using that equation to calculate the 
IMR which is included as an additional covariate in a second estimation model of 
interest, are the norm within research on other criminal justice decision points that have 
inherent incident selection. In criminal sentencing research (which this current research 
closely parallels in multiple ways), for example, the analytic plan tends to start with an 
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initial model for the “in-out decision” – whether a defendant is sentenced to an 
incarcerative term or not – and a second set of models that controls for selection into an 
incarcerative sentence before estimating sentence length.  
While there has been an increase in the number of studies recently published that 
examine the predictors of an institutional punishment options, none of these studies 
included statistical techniques to control for any potential bias introduced into the models 
due to inherent sample selection of inmates into the subsample of interest. As this study 
demonstrates, controlling for sample selection at this current decision point is important 
as research confirms that inmate characteristics that impact whether an instance of inmate 
misconduct is (1) officially identified and then (2) handled officially through institutional 
disciplinary proceedings also (3) impact the punishment option that is received following 
the disciplinary proceeding. Thus, it is very possible that the findings of prior research on 
disciplinary actions that fails to correct for sample selection has produced biased results. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to conduct post-hoc tests to determine the extent and/or 
impact of that potential bias on research findings or conclusions drawn from those 
findings.  
 
Limitations  
 While this study makes various important substantive and methodological 
contributions to the literature on post-disciplinary institutional punishment options, the 
findings and conclusions must be considered in light of its limitations. This study is a 
secondary analysis of published Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional 
Facilities (SISFCF) data that was previously collected for a different purpose. As such, 
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some of the desired constructs are not included in the data, and the specific 
operationalization of some variables is less than ideal. Most basically, the SISFCF data 
do not indicate inmate security level or security level of the facility, both of which are 
likely to be associated with selection into the formal disciplinary proceeding subsample 
and choice of punishment option. One inmate-level variable that prior research indicates 
would be important to include in models estimating disciplinary punishment option is an 
indicator of inmate gang status. Beyond any impact that inmate gang status could have on 
punishment outcome, it is very likely that gang status impacts selection into the formal 
misconduct/disciplinary proceeding subsample. As such, without the inclusion of this 
variable, there is a possibility that both the sample selection and estimation (called “full 
models” on the tables) models are under-specified.  
Additionally, as was mentioned in Chapter 3, the double-barreled wording of the 
misconduct/disciplinary proceeding question is less than ideal. These SISFCF survey 
items ask inmates whether they have ever received a formal misconduct ticket and/or 
were found guilty of each of a variety of misconduct offenses. The wording of this 
question, then, does not allow for the confirmation that each inmate received a guilty 
misconduct finding at the disciplinary proceeding. However, prior research indicates that 
by the time a disciplinary misconduct ticket makes it to the formal disciplinary 
proceeding, these misconduct tickets are nearly uniformly upheld with a guilty 
misconduct determination. Further complicating matters, the data do not allow us to be 
certain that the most recent misconduct event/disciplinary proceeding and punishment 
outcome occurred at the facility the inmate is housed within at the time of the interview. 
It is possible that transfer to the current institution at the time of the interview was the 
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result of the most recent disciplinary proceeding, but this sort of situation would not be 
captured in the current data.  
Operationalizaton of inmate age is also less than ideal for purposes of the current 
research questions. The inmate age variable present on the SISFCF data indicates age at 
time of interview, not age at the time of disciplinary proceeding and punishment decision.  
In addition, there was no time anchor in the data to indicate how recently the “most 
recent” disciplinary proceeding occurred, that would allow for calculation of inmate age 
at time of disciplinary proceeding and punishment decision. Similarly, the data contain no 
measures that could be used to calculated the amount of time (in months or years) or 
proportion of sentence served at the time that the disciplinary proceeding and punishment 
decision occurred. 
 Due to the nature of the data collection protocol for the SISFCF, a “facility 
indicator” variable is present on the dataset that allows for the identification of all 
inmates housed within a single facility, but that facility indicator is not consistent with 
the facility indicators used in either the Census of Correctional Facilities or any facility-
level dataset. As such, this research is not able to incorporate any level two (facility-
level) variables or characteristics that would be expected to influence punishment 
outcome. While it is true that some scholars choose to aggregate individual-level data up 
to the institution-level in order to generate aggregated level-one characteristics as a proxy 
for having this information at level-two (for instance, aggregating inmate race/ethnicity 
or current offense information up to determine the overall racial/ethnic or current offense 
makeup of the inmate population within that facility), the SISFCF data do not include any 
information on how representative the inmates sampled within each facility are of the 
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larger facility. In other words, aggregative level-one information up for inclusion as 
level-two variables in the multivariate models has the possibility of introducing an 
untestable amount of bias into the models as there is no way to verify that the sampled 
inmates from each facility are representative of the full inmate population within that 
facility.  
 Finally, the current data do not allow for parsing out the difference between the 
effect of male versus female gender and the organizational differences and variations in 
supervisory and disciplinary practices that accompany housing within male versus female 
correctional institutions. In other words, it is not possible to identify the differing 
influence of male or female gender and housing within a male or female prison facility. 
Illustrating this issue, in criminal sentencing research it is possible to observe disparities 
in sentencing outcome within the same court system (or courtroom or judge) across male 
and female defendants who have the same constellation of legal, quasi-legal, and extra-
legal characteristics. The same cannot be done with the prison disciplinary outcome data, 
as there is essentially no circumstance in institutional corrections where male and female 
inmates are housed within the same institutional setting with disciplinary decisions made 
by the same disciplinary personnel operating in the same custodial environment and 
circumstance. As such, there is no real way to separate the effect of gender from the 
effect of housing in a male or female correctional institution.  
 
So, What Have We Learned? 
 Despite these limitations, the research findings arguably add important 
contributions to the extant body of literature on how various legal, quasi-legal, and extra-
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legal inmate characteristics influence disciplinary punishment within prisons. Focal 
concerns theory offers a useful heuristic device to interpret these findings and locate them 
within the broader literature on criminal sentencing. After situating the findings within 
the focal concerns framework, a discussion of the policy implications informed by this 
research is followed by suggestions for future research on this largely hidden, but 
important, criminal justice decision point. 
Previous Assumptions and Hypotheses  
This study provided a systematic examination of the direct and interactive effects 
of various legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal inmate characteristics on institutional 
disciplinary punishment options. The analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5 and 
reviewed at the beginning of the current chapter were designed to address five specific 
hypotheses. Looking directly to these hypotheses allows for making certain statements 
regarding the direct and interactive effects of the legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors 
on punishment outcome. This section will contextualize the main findings of the study in 
terms of these five hypotheses.  
 Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis moved beyond the significant bivariate 
relationships established in the preliminary stages of this research. This hypothesis stated 
that, when observing partial multivariate models with only a single group of factors 
included in the models with the controls, all of the theoretically-informed variables will 
be significant predictors of post-disciplinary sanction severity. Looking at the models 
presented in Chapter 4, it was observed that the majority of the legal and quasi-legal 
inmate-level characteristics influence sanction severity. Those theoretically-informed 
variables that were not significantly associated with sanction severity include: the legal 
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factor of prior inmate misconduct history, and the quasi-legal factor of offense of 
conviction. The previously-significant extra-legal factors (gender and race/ethnicity) also 
lost significance when the control variables were included in the partial multivariate 
model. Thus, results of the partial multivariate models suggest that we should reject the 
assumption made in the first hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 2. Moving on to the second hypothesis, it was assumed that in fully-
saturated multivariate models where all the theoretical variables and control variables 
were included at one time, the legal and quasi-legal factors would remain significant 
predictors of punishment outcome and the extra-legal factors would not. Results of the 
full regression models, both for sanction severity and the individual punishment 
categories, provide support for this assumption made in hypothesis two.  
Looking beyond the significance level to the magnitude of the standardized 
coefficient for the relationship between the relevant legal and quasi-legal factors on 
punishment outcome, results indicated that the legal factor of misconduct severity was 
more strongly associated with (or predictive of) punishment outcome for the more serious 
categories of misconduct. Additionally, when we observed the outcome variable of the 
specific punishment categories, there was a clear trend where the more severe misconduct 
categories were positively associated with likelihood of receiving the more serious 
punishment categories.  
Another clear trend was observed with the effect of the quasi-legal factors on 
sanction severity and the individual punishment categories. Across the full multivariate 
models, the quasi-legal factors that represented prosocial inmate activities – prison job 
and program participation – exerted a consistent protective effect over receiving a more 
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severe disciplinary sanction. This protective relationship is indicated by varying 
directionality on the different models. The prosocial inmate activity variables were 
negatively associated with the sanction severity outcome measure and those punishment 
categories that represent the more serious punishment categories, but were positively 
associated with the likelihood of receiving the less-serious categories of disciplinary 
punishment. Taken together, those findings suggest that, controlling for the influence of 
the legal and other factors, having a prison job and program participation significantly 
decreased the likelihood that an inmate would receive a more-serious post-disciplinary 
punishment. Those quasi-legal factors that represented criminogenic risk, on the other 
hand – offense of conviction, time served in prison, and prior incarceration – were either 
inconsistently related to or non-significant predictors of punishment outcome, so concrete 
conclusions unfortunately cannot be made about these variables.  
 Hypothesis 3. The remainder of the hypotheses for this study involved the 
conditional and interactive influence of the extra-legal factors on the relationship between 
the legal factors and punishment outcome. Specifically, the third hypothesis assumed that 
the extra-legal factors of inmate gender and race/ethnicity would interact with the legal 
factors to significantly influence punishment outcome, attenuating the direct effects of the 
legal factors. Results of the study suggest that this assumption was accurate. 
While the two-way statistical interaction terms were not significantly associated 
with punishment outcome, the direct-effects model re-run on samples split by inmate 
gender suggested that inmate gender does condition the effect of the legal factors on 
punishment outcome. Across both sanction severity and the specific punishment 
categories, there was a much more consistent relationship between misconduct severity 
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and punishment outcome for male inmates than female inmates. For males, committing a 
more serious misconduct offense increased the likelihood of receiving a more serious or 
severe punishment, while committing a less serious misconduct offense increased the 
likelihood of receiving a less serious/severe punishment outcome. This relationship was 
not replicated for female inmates, however, as only the positive relationship between the 
severe misconduct categories and the more severe punishment categories were 
significantly associated among the female inmate subsample.  
As was the case for the gender*legal factors interaction, the statistical interaction 
terms between non-white inmate race/ethnicity and the legal factors were also not 
significant predictors of either sanction severity or specific punishment categories. The 
race/ethnicity-based split-sample models for the non-white*legal factors interaction also 
suggested that inmate race/ethnicity conditioned the relationship between the legal factors 
and punishment outcome. While the directionality and significance of the effects of 
misconduct severity on punishment outcome were consistent across the non-white and 
white inmate subsamples, the magnitude of these relationships differed such that, holding 
all other factors constant, non-white inmates who committed more serious misconduct 
offenses were more likely to receive a severe disciplinary sanction than were white 
inmates who committed the same misconduct offenses.    
 Hypothesis 4. Turning towards the quasi-legal factors, the fourth hypothesis for 
the study predicted that inmate gender and race/ethnicity would significantly condition 
the relationship between the quasi-legal factors and punishment outcome. The results of 
this study cannot fully confirm the assumptions on which this hypothesis was grounded. 
As was the case for hypothesis three, neither of the interactive terms (gender*quasi-legal 
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factors and non-white*quasi-legal factors) were significantly associated with punishment 
outcome. Results of the gender-based split sample models also were rather inconclusive.  
When the direct-effects models were re-run on the samples split by inmate 
race/ethnicity, however, it appeared that the predictive ability of the pro-social inmate 
behavior quasi-legal factors (prison job and program participation) differed by 
race/ethnicity across both the sanction severity and punishment categories outcome 
variables, with the negative/protective effect exhibiting a significant effect largely for 
only the non-white inmates. The criminogenic risk-related quasi-legal factor of previous 
incarceration was also only significantly associated with punishment outcome for non-
white inmates. Taken together, these findings indicated that this quasi-legal variable has 
an inconsistent effect on punishment outcome across race/ethnicity. 
 Hypothesis 5. The final hypothesis for this study involved the existence of a 
three-way interaction between inmate gender*race/ethnicity*and the legal factors. In a 
way, this hypothesis essentially served as a robustness to check on the direct effects of 
the legal factors on punishment outcome controlling for all possible two- and three-way 
interactions between the legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors. Results of the final 
analyses indicated that, after controlling for the direct and interactive effects of the extra-
legal factors, the significant direct effect between the legal factors and punishment 
outcome remained significant. With the inclusion of the three-way interaction into the 
multivariate models, however, the relationship between all of the partial two-way 
interactions and punishment outcome achieved statistical significance. This was an 
interesting finding, because in previous models with only the two-way interactions, they 
were found to be non-significant predictors of punishment outcome. While these 
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interactive terms are significantly associated with punishment outcome, the significant 
direct effects of the legal factors remained. These significant direct effects while 
controlling for all the two- and three-way interactions suggested that, even though inmate 
race/ethnicity and gender might partially condition the effect of misconduct severity on 
punishment outcome, these relationships are not, in fact, fully conditional on the extra-
legal factors. 
Focal Concerns 
 The focal concerns perspective is a theoretical framework that is used to explain 
why various individual, offense, community, and case processing/contextual factors 
influence decision making by criminal justice actors. This theoretical framework is 
commonly applied in criminal sentencing research, but has also been applied at other 
decision points (e.g., the police decision to arrest, prosecutorial charging decisions, and 
parole release decisions). Recently, in fact, the focal concerns perspective has been 
applied to institutional disciplinary punishment decisions (Butler & Steiner, 2016; Logan 
et al., 2017). Following the model of sentencing research, this study uses the focal 
concerns perspective as a mechanism by which to understand why various inmate 
characteristics are associated with post-disciplinary punishment outcome.    
 As was discussed in the literature review in Chapter 1, there are three focal 
concerns that influence sanctioning decisions: perceptions regarding individual (offender) 
blameworthiness, a desire to protect the community, and practical constraints and 
consequences. While it is possible to find parallels between each of the focal concerns as 
perceived in sentencing research and the institutional disciplinary sanction decision, 
operationalization of these focal concerns within the prison institutional context differs 
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from that which is common in criminal sentencing research. For purposes of the current 
study, the inmate characteristics and variables that make up the legal, quasi-legal, and 
extra-legal factors have been aligned with the three focal concerns, in order to help 
understand and contextualize why the significant variables exert an effect on prison 
disciplinary punishment decisions. As an aside, this study is not a test of focal concerns 
per se; instead focal concerns theory is used as a lens through which to understand why 
the various legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal factors are significantly associated with 
punishment outcome.  Figure 3 below shows how the theoretical variables observed in 
this study align with the focal concerns surrounding punishment decisions following 
inmate misconduct proceedings. 
Figure 3. Overview of Independent Variables and Focal Concerns 
Variable Focal Concerna Directionality/Significance 
Legal Factors   
   Instant misc offfense Blameworthiness 
 
+ (more severe misconduct, 
more severe sanction); * p≤.05 
   Prior misconduct Hx Blameworthiness ns 
Quasi-legal Factors   
   Offense of cnvction  Protection of the community ns 
   Prison job Protection of the community - ; * p≤.05 
   Program participation Protection of the community - ; * p≤.05 
   Time served Protection of the community ns 
   Prior incarceration Protection of the community ns 
Extra-legal Factors   
   Gender Protection of the community (bias 
regarding risk perceptions and 
gender) 
mixed findings on directionality 
and significance 
   Race/ethnicity Protection of the community (bias 
regarding risk perceptions and 
race/ethnicity) 
mixed findings on directionality 
and significance 
Controls   
   Facility Practical constraints/consequences * p≤.05 
   Federal v. State  Practical constraints/consequences * p≤.05 
   Inmate age  --  - ; * p≤.05 
NOTES: 
a Common conceptualization in prior research 
 
+   indicates positive relationship;  -    indicates negative relationship 
*   p≤.05 
ns Not significant 
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 Starting with blameworthiness of the offender, this first focal concern involves 
specifics of the offense and offender that are associated largely with offense seriousness. 
For purpose of the current research, the legal factors of misconduct severity and 
institutional misconduct history are the inmate and misconduct offense characteristics 
that are most closely aligned with offense seriousness, and hence, blameworthiness. 
Results indicate that the legal factor of misconduct severity is the most consistent and 
strongest (in terms of magnitude of standardized effect size) predictor of punishment 
outcome when operationalized as both sanction severity and likelihood of receiving a 
specific punishment category. Findings of this study indicate that those inmates who 
committed the most serious categories of misconduct and with the most extensive prior 
misconduct history were considered the most “blameworthy,” and, hence, were more 
likely to receive a severe disciplinary sanction. Additionally, the legal factors remained 
significant predictors of punishment outcome through the addition of the direct and 
interactive effects of the quasi-legal and extra-legal factors, indicating that 
blameworthiness is a primary concern in the institutional decision regarding disciplinary 
punishment outcome.  
It seems logical that in a total institution (Goffman, 1961) that is first and 
foremost concerned with maintaining safety and stability (such as prison settings), the 
second focal concern of desire for the protection of the institutional community would be 
highly important. Elements that might impact judgments regarding the punishment option 
that is needed for protection of the institutional community could be considered to be 
those (quasi-legal factors) associated with prosocial inmate behavior and criminogenic 
risk. Findings of this study indicate that the prosocial inmate behavior quasi-legal factor 
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of having a prison job and involvement in inmate programming opportunities are 
significantly associated with punishment outcome. In terms of this focal concern, it could 
be that, holding the effect of misconduct severity constant, institutional disciplinary 
personnel view inmates who are involved in these prosocial activities to have a greater 
stake in the institutional community. This embeddedness in the institutional community 
represented by the prosocial inmate behaviors, then, could suggest to disciplinary 
personnel that these inmates inherently represent minimal threat to the future stability of 
the institution, minimizing the need to disrupt those prosocial ties by subjecting them to 
severe disciplinary sanctions.  
 The second group of inmate-level factors that are considered to align with the 
focal concern of protection of the institutional community are the quasi-legal factors 
representing criminogenic risk (offense of conviction, time served, and prior 
incarceration). Results of this study indicate that two of the three risk-related variables – 
offense of conviction and time served – are not significantly associated with punishment 
outcome across nearly all models explored. While beyond the scope of the data and 
analyses for this study, it could be assumed that offense of conviction and time served do 
not actually represent factors that increase perceptions of risk within the institutional 
setting. It could be that, in the view of correctional officers and institutional disciplinary 
personnel, all inmates are just viewed as “inmates” regardless of the offense for which 
they were incarcerated and the amount of time they have served in the current term of 
incarceration. If this is the case, these factors would not necessarily be associated with an 
inmate who represents a high level of risk.  
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The third quasi-legal criminogenic risk factor, prior incarceration, is significantly 
associated with receiving a punishment that falls within the most serious punishment 
categories, and appears to have a different effect on sanction severity across the extra-
legal factors of inmate gender and race/ethnicity. The results of this study cannot be used 
to make concrete statements about these relationships, but the findings do indicate that 
there may be gender- and/or racial/ethnic-based disparities in the relationship between the 
criminogenic risk factors and punishment outcome. In a way, then, it is possible that risk-
related perceptions and judgements made by institutional disciplinary personnel 
regarding the severity of punishment outcome that is necessary to maintain protection of 
the institutional community could differ based on extra-legal characteristics of inmates. 
 As is shown in Figure 3, the final focal concern of practical constraints and 
consequences of punishment decisions is challenging to operationalize given the 
limitations of the SISFCF data used for this study. In theory, it seems very likely that 
there could be institution- and even system-level constraints on the type of punishment 
options that disciplinary committees are able to use in determining the appropriate post-
disciplinary sanction. For example, in order to formally sanction an inmate to be 
transferred to a different facility with a higher custody level in response to their 
disciplinary misconduct, there would have to be available bed space in a higher-custody 
facility within that larger state or Federal system. Similarly, in higher custody facilities 
and/or under-resourced facilities or state systems, inmates may have fewer opportunities 
for privileges (such as visitation, canteen, prison employment, and opportunities to 
engage with various programming options), in which case the punishment category of 
“modification of inmate privileges” is not a feasible option.  
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Unfortunately, this sort of information (as well as general case processing factors) 
is absent from the SISFCF data, and it is equally likely that it is not captured on other 
institutional corrections datasets. With the information that is available in the data used 
for this study, the closest data elements to indicators of the focal concern of practical 
constraints and consequences include the facility ID variable and the variable indicating 
which facilities are part of the Federal system. It is clear that these variables are not true 
indicators of this focal concern, yet, they are included in the models and considered here 
to be proxy variables due to the acknowledgement that some of the practical constrains of 
various punishment options (e.g., availability of solitary cells and whether there are 
various inmate privileges to revoke) would be somewhat consistent across all disciplinary 
cases within the same institution.  
Through the exercise of walking through the results of this study in the context of 
this perspective it is clear that, like other discretionary decision points, focal concerns can 
be considered a heuristic device to help contextualize why certain inmate-level factors are 
associated with prison disciplinary punishment decisions. 
Policy Implications 
 The findings of this research on the direct and interactive effects of various legal, 
quasi-legal, and extra-legal inmate characteristics on punishment outcome have direct 
implications for disciplinary policy and practice within prisons. This research finds that, 
controlling for the quasi-legal and extra-legal characteristics of inmates, the legal factor 
of misconduct severity is significantly associated with punishment outcome received. 
According to these data, the relationship between misconduct severity and punishment 
outcome is stronger at the higher end of both spectrums; the more-severe varieties of 
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misconduct are more strongly associated with more-severe sanction outcomes than are 
the less-serious forms of misconduct associated with the less-severe punishment 
outcomes. It is likely that more serious misconduct is viewed as representing a greater 
threat to the social order of the institution and is therefore taken more seriously by the 
disciplinary committee, resulting in a higher severity disciplinary sanction than would be 
the case if the misconduct event was perceived as less of a threat to the institutional 
community.  
Another interpretation of this finding would be that there appears to be higher 
levels of discretion in what influences choice of punishment option at the lower end of 
the categories of misconduct severity than there is at the higher end (meaning when more 
severe varieties of misconduct are committed). This finding of higher levels of discretion 
among lesser misconduct offenses is consistent with the long-standing findings from 
research on other discretionary decision points in the criminal justice system, whereby 
greater levels of discretion are inherent in the handling of lower-level offenses than 
higher-level, more serious offenses (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1987; Walker, 1983). It 
is clear from this current research that more severe inmate misconduct is statistically 
associated with receiving a more severe/serious punishment outcome.  
Results indicate that while misconduct severity is associated with punishment 
outcome at all levels of the sanction severity scale, the quasi-legal and extra-legal factors 
are more likely to condition the relationship between the legal factors and punishment 
outcome for lesser misconduct offenses. This finding makes intuitive sense. When a very 
serious misconduct offense is committed, such as a physical assault on a fellow inmate or 
a corrections officer, it makes sense that a very serious punishment outcome would 
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accompany that very serious misconduct offense, regardless of the quasi-legal and extra-
legal factors. However, when a less-serious misconduct offense is committed that 
represents a minimal threat to the stability and safety of the institutional setting, that is 
where room for other considerations regarding inmate behavior (both prosocial and 
negative/criminogenic), enter into determination of the most appropriate punishment 
option in each unique disciplinary situation. In other words, when misconduct severity is 
low, what influences the punishment outcome that is received? Results of this study 
indicate that indicators of prosocial inmate behaviors within the institutional setting and 
various elements that indicate an inmates’ level of risk to the social order and 
safety/stability of the prison influence choice of punishment outcome when misconduct 
severity is low. 
 Overall, it is important to be assured that holding legal factors related to 
misconduct severity (and history of misconduct) constant, disparities based on extra-legal 
factors do not result in certain groups of inmates being more likely to be exposed to more 
severe disciplinary sanctions. In a time when the research community and public is 
sensitive to and aware of issues of racial/ethnic disparities prevalent in our criminal 
justice system, it is of the utmost importance to be assured there is consistency in the 
manner formal social control is exerted. This need for consistency in application of 
formal social control via disciplinary punishment is exacerbated in institutional settings 
like prisons, as there is already a high likelihood for strained power relations that can 
have direct implications for perceptions of procedural and distributive justice. 
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Directions for Future Research  
Various avenues for future research are suggested by the findings from this 
research. This study identified significant race/ethnicity and gender-based conditional and 
three-way interactive effects in the relationships between various legal and quasi-legal 
factors and punishment outcome, but more research is required before any concrete 
claims of race/ethnicity and/or gender-based disparities exist in the determination of post-
disciplinary punishment option. At minimum, this research should be replicated with 
different data that includes some of the important missing variables – principally inmate 
gang membership status, inmate age at the time of disciplinary proceeding, and more 
encompassing indicators of inmate mental health at the time of disciplinary proceeding. 
Any replication also should take steps necessary to avoid (i.e., control for) the sample 
selection bias present in the data used for this study.  
 Beyond mere replication, this line of research should be extended to include 
appropriate level-two (facility/institution-level) and even level-three (state/Federal prison 
system) data. The nature of this research problem is truly a multilevel research question, 
as it is very likely that disciplinary practices could change based on institution-specific 
factors (e.g., inmate demographic and criminogenic makeup, level of overcrowding, 
available disciplinary resources, etc.) and even system-level factors (e.g., disciplinary 
practices that are consistent for all institutions within a larger state department of 
corrections system). With the inclusion of various fixed and random effects variables at 
level two, it would be possible to statistically isolate the effects that the legal, quasi-legal, 
and extra-legal inmate characteristics have on punishment outcome from the effects of 
the institution-level influences on punishment outcome. Additionally, with the inclusion 
 202
of level-two variables in the models, it would be possible to identify and estimate cross-
level interactions whereby certain inmates might be treated differently in specific 
institutional contexts based on a variety of inmate legal, quasi-legal, and extra-legal 
characteristics.   
 Thinking about the larger disciplinary process, there is need for future research to 
be conducted in a longitudinal framework. Publically-available (even restricted access) 
institutional longitudinal data that tracks inmates throughout their full term of 
incarceration is rare, but this research area could be greatly impacted by the ability to 
study the institutional disciplinary process in a longitudinal context. For instance, while 
the SISFCF data allow for the development of the prior misconduct history variety score 
that was used in this research, it does not include important information regarding 
whether an inmate has received specific disciplinary punishment outcomes in the past. It 
is very likely that, just as prior misconduct history effects punishment outcome, prior 
disciplinary sanctions could also impact choice of punishment outcome in subsequent 
disciplinary proceedings.  
 Finally, the knowledge base regarding inmate disciplinary proceedings and the 
consequent punishment outcome that follows a guilty misconduct determination would be 
greatly improved by a line of qualitative, observational research that observes and 
documents the full institutional disciplinary process. Disciplinary processes within 
correctional institutions are conducted fully internal to the facility, so knowledge of 
exactly what happens during these proceedings is somewhat of a “black box.” It can be 
assumed, for instance, based on information available in inmate case files, inmate 
handbooks, and prior research, that institutional disciplinary personnel have access to 
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various pieces of information to help guide their disciplinary and punishment decisions. 
But, of course, at this time there is no definitive confirmation that this is true. The 
disciplinary process technically involves three separate discretionary decision points: the 
filing of a formal misconduct ticket, the finding of guilt for that misconduct offense, and 
the consequent punishment option. Qualitative research in which a researcher observes 
the full disciplinary proceeding and decision-making process(es) would shed light onto 
this topic in a way that cannot be done with current inmate self-report or administrative 
data. Similarly, it is likely that, as is the case with criminal sentencing, various case 
processing factors (e.g., whether the inmate provided commentary on the misconduct 
event, and the role that the reporting correctional officer plays in the disciplinary process) 
could influence the punishment outcome of the disciplinary process. Until such data are 
collected, however, we cannot examine the validity of this assumption. 
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The full sample size for the 2004 SISFCF is 18,158 inmates. Since the outcome 
variable of estimation models for the substantive models of interest is punishment or 
sanction outcome following disciplinary proceeding, models are estimated on a 
subsample of the full dataset. This subsample includes only those 8,300 inmates (45.6% 
of 18,185) who received a formal misconduct ticket that resulted in the initiation of the 
formal inmate disciplinary process. This type of circumstance where the presence of data 
on a variable of interest is fully conditional on another variable, is a case of incidental 
selection which can result in the introduction of sample selection bias (Berk, 1983; Berk 
& Ray, 1982). The current research minimizes this potential bias for damaging levels of 
selection bias through the use of various two-part sample selection models that allows the 
researcher to distinguish between the two different processes – first estimating an 
equation for selection, and then modeling the estimation equation of interest while 
controlling for the effect of selection on observed levels of the dependent variable 
(Bushway et al., 2007; Heckman, 1987). This issue of selection, which can be thought of 
as a case of missing data where the data are missing not at random (Allison, 2001), is 
distinct from problems surrounding incomplete information on the variables of interest, 
or missing data more generally (Allison, 2001; Graham, 2009).23 Procedures for handling 
the more general meaning of missing data as incomplete information will be discussed in 
this section.  
                                                 
23 For information on sample selection models used in the research, see Chapter 3. 
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Missing data can be handled in a variety of different ways. One way is complete 
case analysis.24 In complete case analysis, cases that have data missing on any of the 
variables under observation are deleted in a listwise fashion. This can be a problematic 
strategy to employ when listwise deletion results in diminished statistical power to detect 
significant results. However, when only a small amount of data are missing25 and 
missingness diagnostics (discussed further below) suggest that the data either meet the 
criteria for missing completely at random or the less-stringent assumption of missing at 
random, complete case analysis may be preferable as it will not bias standard errors and 
all other relevant statistics that are based on standard errors (Allison, 2001, footnote 1).  
 Even though there are 8,300 inmates who self-report that they received a formal 
misconduct ticket/guilty finding following disciplinary proceeding, the data only contain 
punishment outcome information for ninety percent of those inmates (n=7496). Of those, 
all cases in the “other punishment received” option were removed (n=721), leaving a 
subsample of 6,775 inmates with a punishment decision to analyze (see Tables 1 and 2) 
for breakdown of figures.  
After initial data cleaning and transformation, a missing data audit was conducted 
in Stata14 (StataCorp, 2015) to observe the extent and patterns of missingness among the 
complete subsample of 6,775 inmates for which we have data on the most recent 
punishment decision. The two-stage process of the missing data audit included observing 
                                                 
24 Other methods of handling missing data include imputing the missing values through 
either mean value imputation, maximum likelihood estimation, “hot deck” imputation, 
and multiple imputation (Allison, 2001).  
25 There is no real standard metric for what constitutes “too much” missing, instead it is a 
judgement that must be made within the context of each research problem (Allison, 
2001).  
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frequencies and extent of missing for each variable (‘mv’ post-estimation command in 
Stata14) included in the estimation and selection models, and then looking at patterns of 
missingness (‘mi: … , problems’ command in Stata14). Results of the missing data 
analysis indicate that 93 percent (n=6,304) of the 6,775 inmates that have full, complete 
data on all variables of interest in the estimation model and sample selection model.  
As has been established in a good deal of methodologically rigorous literature 
published in criminology and criminal justice journals, the sampling strategy employed in 
constructing the current dataset (the 2004 Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Survey of Inmates 
in State and Federal Correctional Facilities/SISFCF) has resulted in a highly 
representative sample of male and female inmates incarcerated within state and federal 
correctional facilities (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004). Prior research with the same 
series of data demonstrates the generalizability of the sample and the degree to which it is 
representative of the full population of inmates, and therefore of inmate misconduct 
(Camp, 1999; Camp, Gaes, Klein-Saffran, Daggett, & Saylor, 2002; Harrison & Beck, 
2007), making it an ideal choice for this study. Beyond the assurance of 
representativeness of the dataset used in this study (USDOJ, 2004), a review of the 
literature that uses these same data (e.g., Butler & Steiner, 2016; Logan et al., 2017; 
Olson, 2016) suggests that the vast majority of this research does not handle missing data 
in a way that preserves missing information. Instead, that research employs a complete 
case analysis strategy to handle missing data, whereby cases that are missing information 
on any of the variables of interest are removed from the sample (e.g., Butler & Steiner, 
2016; Logan et al., 2017).  
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In order to determine whether there are difference between the full SISFCF 
sample (n=18,185), the selection variable sample (n=8,300), the sample which has 
information present on the dependent variable (n=6,775), and the subsample for which all 
data is present on variables on interest (i.e., sample after list-wise deletion; n=6,304), 
descriptive statistics are calculated for each subsample. Additional analyses were able to 
identify variables with statistically significant differences in mean values (in the form of 
t-tests and chi-square analyses) across the sub-samples (see Table A1). A comparison of 
the descriptive statistics and significant differences of means reveals that the majority of 
the statistically significant differences on variables of interest across subsamples occurs 
between the full SISFCF sample and the selection variable sample, and between the 
selection variable sample and the subsample that has data present for the dependent 
variable. This means, then, that the descriptive statistics and comparison of mean values 
on these descriptive statistics indicate there is minimal-to-no statistically significant 
difference between the sample for which data on the dependent variable is available and 
the final subsample following list-wise deletion of cases missing any value on the 
variables of interest in either the estimation or sample selection models (for exception, 
see values for offense of conviction and program participation).  
Since the representativeness and generalizability of the data are well established 
(e.g., Camp et al., 2002), coupled with the observation discussed above regarding 
minimal statistically significant differences in mean values of all variables of interest 
between the dependent variable and full information subsamples, list-wise deletion was 
employed to handle missing values. While not always the case in all analyses, list-wise 
deletion resulting in complete case analysis is the preferred method for handling missing 
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values in this research for various reasons. First, of the 6,775 inmates for which data are 
present on the dependent variable that would be considered the sample of interest for the 
research questions under observation, over 93% (n=6,304) of the data are retained with 
list-wise deletion. With a sample size so high, the concern that list-wise deletion will 
effect statistical power, and therefore minimize the likelihood of statistically detecting 
significant relations in the data even when they do exist within the population, is nearly 
eliminated (Allison, 2001); a decrease in statistical power as a result of list-wise deletion 
of 471 cases (with a final sample size of 6,304) is not a concern in the current analyses. 
Second, while it is true that there is no way to distinguish whether data is missing at 
random (MAR) or missing completely at random (MCAR) (Berk, 1983; Graham, 2009), 
there is no reason to assume that the data are not at least MAR – which is the lesser 
restrictive of the two missingness assumptions (Allison, 2001). When statistical power is 
not effected and there is no reason to not assume MAR, list-wise deletion is one of the 
appropriate methods to handle missing data as list-wise deletion under these 
circumstances (appropriate statistical power and an assumption of MAR or MCAR) will 
not bias estimates of regression coefficients or standard errors (or anything that depends 
on standard errors, such as p-values/significance levels) (Allison, 2001, footnote 1).  
Further reinforcing the decision to use list-wise deletion (of 471 cases) to handle 
missing data on the variables of interest, it is important to acknowledge the inherent 
instability that is introduced into the models when either an incidental selection issue or 
interactive effects are included into imputation models. Both of these methodological 
hurdles allow for the introduction of bias into otherwise methodologically and 
conceptually appropriate models, especially when outcome variables follow a distribution 
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that is non-normal (Allison, 2001) and the multiplicative influence of both of them in 
combination can be hard to overcome. In this type of situation employing multiple 
imputation procedures can result in specifying an inappropriate imputation model, which 
produces imputed estimates that are not reflective of the distribution of the variables of 
interest as observed in the full dataset.  
As an additional concern within the context of this research, Stata14 will not 
inherently run Heckman sample selection models within the multiple imputation 
commands. While it is true that it is possible to use to ‘cmdok’ command in Stata14 to 
force the program to run Heckman models within the multiple imputation (‘mi:’ ) 
framework, an examination of degrees of freedom associated with the fully-saturated 
Heckman ordered probit model for sanction severity (a diagnostic commonly used to 
justify the strength of imputation models [Allen, 2001]), suggests that this model, when 
run within the multiple imputation framework, is not statistically appropriate (see Table 
A2). Common practice suggests that a degree of freedom threshold of 100 should be 
reached before an imputation protocol can be considered appropriately modeled (Allen, 
2001). But, as reported on Table A2, degrees of freedom for the Heckman ordered probit 
model are enormously inflated, as are the standard errors, suggesting that the imputation 
models are highly biased. Not reported in Table A2, but the increase in standard errors 
between the non-imputed and imputed Heckman models ranged upwards of 10.91-
29.25%. Additionally, the Stata14 output from the Heckman ordered probit model in 
Table A2 was not able to calculate the F-statistic or Chi-square, further suggesting that 
the Heckman selection models do not behave as would be desired within the multiple 
imputation suite of commands on Stata14. 
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By way of overview, since the extent of missing data is very minimal, the sample 
size is very high, and there is a high possibility of inherent bias due to sample selection 
and interactions among categorical variables in the estimation models, coupled with the 
finding that descriptive statistics suggest that the list-wise deletion subsample is not 
significantly different from the full dependent-variable-present subsample on the vast 
majority of variables of interest, it becomes much more important to handle the potential 
sample selection issue than to preserve the roughly seven percent of data lost through list-
wise deletion. As described in Chapter 3, the Heckman correction (Heckman, 1987) and 
the more general two-stage estimation procedure (Bushway et al., 2007) will be used to 
account for sample selection bias in the estimation models predicting punishment 
outcome.  
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Table A2. Heckman Ordered Probit Model Completed with Multiple Imputation of Missing Data with Huber White 
Cluster robust standard errors (based on 326 groups); Dependent Variable = Sanction Severity Scale 
 Selection Model Full Model DFd 
 Coef SE z Coef SE z  
Legal Factors        
Most serious instant misconduct 
offensea 
       
   Security/order violation    -.200 6.24 -0.32 <.000 
   Drug/alcohol    .651 6.21 0.10 <.000 
   Property/contraband    .149 5.02 0.30 <.000 
   Assault: inmate    .553 4.70 0.12 <.000 
   Assault: staff    .490 5.29 0.93 <.000 
Prior misconduct History    -.014 1.02 -0.14 <.000 
Quasi-legal Factors        
Offense of convictionb        
   Drug       <.000 
   Property/financial       <.000 
   Public order/misdemeanor       <.000 
   Other       <.000 
Prison job -.086 3.28 -0.26 -.143 3.06 -0.39 <.000 
Program participation .231 2.99 0.71 -.105 3.72 -0.28 <.000 
Time served .478 2.07 0.23 -.020 3.80 -0.53 <.000 
Prior incarceration  .232 2.96 0.78 .048 3.43 0.14 <.000 
Extra-legal Factors        
Male .072 5.74 0.13 .084 1.71 0.11 <.000 
Racec        
   Black       <.000 
   Hispanic       <.000 
   Other       <.000 
Controls        
Facility .000 .000 0.38 .000 .000 0.71 <.000 
Federal -.523 8.50 -0.62 .405 0.57 0.42 <.000 
Age  -.027 1.72 -0.15 .002 .003 0.59 <.000 
Exclusion Restrictions        
Mental health scale        
   1        
   2        
   3        
   4        
Negative affect .353 2.66 0.13     
Suicide        
   Only thought about it        
   Prior attempt        
GED or HS diploma .088 2.56 0.34     
Married -.160 3.24 -0.49     
        
Constant -1.13 .117 -9.68***     
Rho -.234 .115      
Cut 1    -1.59 .168 -9.44*** >240,000 
Cut 2    -.292 .174 -1.68 >162,000 
Cut 3    .042 .180 0.23 >164,000 
Cut 4    .962 .196 4.91*** >159,000 
AthRho    -.238 .122 -1.96* >84,000 
Wald 2 
Psuedo log likelihood 
Wald test – independence of equations 
cannot calculate 
cannot calculate 
2 = cannot calculate 
 
 
